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Introduction 
On a recent trip to Guatemala, I traveled to a small town called Sayaxche, which 
is located in the northeastern sector of the country.  The town is situated in an area that 
centuries before had served as a place where the ancient Mayans lived.  Citizens of 
Sayaxche today mostly live in small homes, which compared to Western standards, are 
humble dwellings.  The people typically make roofs out of corrugated metal and fashion 
siding out of mud-brick.  The homes lack many of the other normal accoutrements of 
houses in the United States such as standard electrical and sanitary systems.  Many of 
these homes do not have signs demarcating the formal recognition of a person’s property 
including such ordinary things as a mailbox with a corresponding address or a number on 
the sidewalk.  Originally, when I thought about what it would be like to lack these stan-
dard signs, I wondered whether I might take pleasure in the fact that no one could reach 
me by mail so that I might cut back on a busy lifestyle.  Upon further reflection, I realized 
the difficulty it would cause me to live in a town where no one could identify where I 
live.  I asked myself, “How could I conduct my personal affairs or business dealings 
without having a permanent address to receive mail?  How could I connect with anyone 
from the outside world when people could not even identify where I live?” 
As I became more familiar with Sayaxche, I traveled to both the outskirts of town, 
where most people worked as farmers, and to the town center, where many entrepreneurs 
operated stores that sold a variety of goods and services including fruits and vegetables 
and knockoff clothing products.  It was in these stores that I learned to bargain for better 
deals with the storeowners.  At home, I usually did not haggle with the manager of a 
GAP or Brooks Brothers over the price of a shirt, but in Sayaxche, I did this regularly.  
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Since prices varied greatly from store to store for similar products, I quickly became an 
expert in this kind of exchange to get the lowest price for an item.  Many of these shop-
keepers were excellent entrepreneurs and I marveled at their ability to utilize almost 
every inch of space to sell their wares.  They filled their stores with a variety of eclectic 
items and the people who owned the shops were always courteous and polite.  When they 
discovered that I was from the United States, the storeowners flocked to me in order to 
attend to my needs.  Growing up in New York, I never experienced such friendly sales-
persons.  As a graduate student, I also never realized that I was “rich” until I arrived in 
Sayaxche.   
After my visit to Sayaxche, it was apparent that I had stepped into a market situa-
tion unfamiliar to me in the United States.  Although Sayaxche contained many of the 
trappings of a modern market economy, it lacked many constitutive elements that make 
this kind of economic system both productive and efficient in the United States and 
Europe.  For example, in almost every store I entered, credit cards were not accepted and 
shopkeepers used old style ledgers instead of computers to track their inventory of goods.  
Many businesses in town also lacked a formal address, which was similar to the houses in 
Sayaxche.  This led me to question whether these shopkeepers legally owned their stores.  
I concluded that a countless number of them were probably operating their businesses 
outside the confines of established markets.  I also noticed that many of the street-
vendors always appeared concerned that the police would suddenly arrive to shut down 
their business.  The people of Sayaxche repeatedly told me that street vendors feared 
eviction from the land upon which they were selling their products because local gov-
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ernment officials did not recognize their right to the land on which they conducted their 
business.   
I took away many things from my experience in Sayaxche, but mainly it made me 
more aware of the large disparities that exist between rich and poor nations and it gave 
me greater insight into the enormous challenges that people face in these countries be-
cause of their poverty.  My time in Sayaxche led me to recall the words declared at the 
Second Vatican Council in Gaudium et spes,  
Never has the human race enjoyed such an abundance of wealth, resources, and 
economic power, and yet a huge proportion of the world's citizens are still tor-
mented by hunger and poverty, while countless numbers suffer from total illiter-
acy.1 
 
Forty years after the Council, these words unfortunately remain true.  Today, many peo-
ple around the world continue to live in the kind of poverty that is all too familiar to the 
people of Sayaxche.  The United Nations estimates that nearly half of the planet’s six bil-
lion people live on less than two dollars per day.2   
In light of my experience, I thought, “Why did the people of this small town live 
in such dire poverty?  Why were these people so poor when they lived in an area that had 
large swaths of arable land, possessed industrious workers, and had motivated and tal-
ented entrepreneurs?  Why was it that people, who possessed many of the trappings of a 
modern economy, including a number of potentially profitable assets, live so poorly?”  
These questions challenged me on a number of fronts.  Primarily they fueled my desire to 
find solutions to these questions as a Catholic Christian.  The Roman Catholic Church 
                                                 
1 Austin Flannery, O.P., ed., Gaudium et spes, Vatican Council II: Volume 1: The Conciliar and Post Con-
ciliar Documents (Northport, N.Y.: Costello Publishing Company, 1996), no. 4. 
 
2 The United Nations, Freedom from Want.  Available online at 
http://www.un.org/millennium/sg/report/ch2.pdf (accessed July 22, 2006). 
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challenges its followers to place the dignity of the human person at the center of all ethi-
cal reflection.  Catholic social teaching speaks to the ideal that every person - regardless 
of such attributes such as race or economic status – is worthy of respect.3  The bishops at 
the Second Vatican Council made the dignity of the human person the fulcrum of its so-
cial teaching with the recognition that there is “a growing awareness of the sublime dig-
nity of human persons, who stand above all things and whose rights and duties are uni-
versal and inviolable.”4  Catholic social teaching claims that human dignity is the result 
of human existence.  As Charles Curran says,  
Human dignity comes from God’s free gift; it does not depend on human effort, 
work, or accomplishments.  All human beings have a fundamental, equal dignity 
because all share the generous gift of creation and redemption from God.5 
  
The tradition puts forth the ideal that a unique and sacred worth is present in each person 
simply because she or he exists.  The aptitudes and abilities each person possesses at birth 
                                                 
3 Throughout the dissertation, I use the term Catholic social teaching to describe the hierarchical documents 
of the Catholic Church that deal with social issues, beginning with the encyclical Rerum novarum of Pope 
Leo XIII in 1891.  When I use adjectives such as “modern,” “contemporary,” and “recent” Catholic social 
teaching, I am referring to magisterial documents that have been written since the publication of Leo XIII’s 
Rerum novarum and concluding with Pope John Paul II’s Centesimus annus issued in 1991.  Although 
there is no official canon of papal documents, generally, however, the following documents are included: 
Rerum novarum, “The Condition of Labor” (1891), Pope Leo XIII; Quadragesimo anno, “After Forty 
Years” (1931), Pope Pius XI; Mater et magistra, “Christianity and Social Progress” (1961), Pope John 
XXIII; Pacem in terris, “Peace on Earth” (1963), Pope John XXIII; Gaudium et spes, “Pastoral Constitu-
tion on the Church in the Modern World” (1965), Second Vatican Council; Dignitatis humanae, “Declara-
tion on Religious Freedom” (1965), Second Vatican Council; Populorum progressio, “On the Development 
of Peoples” (1965), Pope Paul VI; Octogesima adveniens, “A Call to Action on the Eightieth Anniversary 
of Rerum novarum” (1971), Pope Paul VI; Justitia in mundo, “Justice in the World” (1971), Roman Synod; 
Evangelii Nuntiandi, “Evangelization in the Modern World” (1975), Pope Paul VI; Laborem exercens, “On 
Human Work” (1981), Pope John Paul II; Sollicitudo rei socialis, “On Social Concern” (1987), Pope John 
Paul II; Centesimus annus, “On the Hundredth Anniversary of Rerum novarum” (1991), Pope John Paul II.  
In addition, two documents of the U.S. Catholic bishops are usually included in this “canon”: The Chal-
lenge of Peace: God’s Promise and Our Response (1983) and Economic Justice for All (1986).  All refer-
ences to Catholic social teaching come from Catholic Social Thought: The Documentary Heritage, edited 
by David J. O’Brien and Thomas A. Shannon.  See David J. O’Brien and Thomas A. Shannon, eds., Catho-
lic Social Thought: The Documentary Heritage (Maryknoll, N.Y.: Orbis Books, 1992). 
 
4 Gaudium et spes, no. 26. 
 
5 Charles Curran, Catholic Social Teaching 1891-Present: A Historical, Theological, and Ethical Analysis 
(Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2002), 132. 
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constitute a divine vocation, a specific and unique calling to further the development of 
human society as a whole.  Indeed, “The principle of human dignity gives the human per-
son a claim on membership in a community, the human family.”6 
The commitment of the Catholic Church to the principle of human dignity chal-
lenges followers to recognize that to exclude large numbers of people from participation 
in human affairs is a form of marginalization that is an affront to both human dignity and 
basic justice.  As the U.S. Catholic Bishops stated in their 1986 pastoral letter Economic 
Justice for All, 
The ultimate injustice is for a person or group to be treated actively or abandoned 
passively as if they were nonmembers of the human race.  To treat people this 
way is effectively to say they simply do not count as human beings.  This can take 
many forms, all of which can be described as varieties of marginalization, or ex-
clusion from social life.7 
 
In fact, marginalization can take a variety of forms, including those that are economic.  
When people purposely deny others the right to work, for example, those denied this right 
often become unable to meet their basic material needs or those of their families.  More-
over, they lose the capacity to join in carrying forward God's creative activity.  When so-
ciety denies large numbers of people from exercising this right, the inability to find work 
is a sign of inhuman development, which erodes the foundations of solidarity with all 
people, especially those in poverty.  From the perspective of Catholic social teaching, it is 
a mistake to call wealthy nations that do not live and work in effective solidarity with 
people in poverty developed nations.8  The general thrust of the social teaching of the 
                                                 
6 William J. Byron, “Ten Building Blocks of Catholic Social Teaching,” America 179 (10/31/98): 3. 
 
7 Economic Justice for All, no. 77. 
 
8 Edward P. DeBerri and James E. Hug, Catholic Social Teaching: Our Best Kept Secret (Maryknoll, N.Y.: 
Orbis Books, 2003), 20. 
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church contends that all persons have a right to participate in the economic life of soci-
ety.9   
Today, Catholic social teaching affirms that to participate in the economic well 
being of society requires that people have access to legitimate and secure property rights.  
It insists that private property is an essential element of an authentically social and de-
mocratic economic policy, and it is the guarantee of a correct social order.10  Catholic so-
cial teaching requires that ownership of goods be equally accessible to all, so that all may 
become, at least in some measure, owners.11   
A key figure today who argues that poverty is directly linked to denying people 
their property rights is the Peruvian economist Hernando de Soto.  De Soto currently 
serves as a co-chair with former Secretary of State Madeline Albright for the High Level 
Commission for the Legal Empowerment of the Poor (HLCLEP) at the United Nations.  
De Soto also serves as the President of the Institute for Liberty and Democracy (ILD) in 
Lima, Peru, which he founded in 1980.12  De Soto believes a major obstacle for many 
poor people in the developing world is the inability to create a formal way for them to 
document their assets or possessions through such legally acceptable tools such as deeds, 
                                                 
9 For examples of the right to participation in Catholic social teaching, see Pacem in terris, no. 26; 
Gaudium et spes, no. 65; Populorum progressio, no.28; Justitia in mundo, nos. 18 and 71; and Economic 
Justice for All, no. 77.   
 
10 Pontifical Council for Justice and Peace, The Compendium of the Social Doctrine of the Catholic Church, 
available from 
http://www.vatican.va/roman_curia/pontifical_councils/justpeace/documents/rc_pc_justpeace_doc_200605
26_compendio-dott-soc_en.html#Origin%20and%20meaning; Internet; accessed 22 July 2006. 
 
11 Ibid. 
 
12 I first learned about the work of Hernando de Soto at a conference I attended in the fall of 2003 for 
alumni of Georgetown University.  The keynote speaker was former President William J. Clinton.  When 
he spoke about the problem of poverty in the developing world, President Clinton talked at length about the 
work of Hernando de Soto.  He discussed his commitment to helping the poor to capitalize on their assets 
by unifying the property rights systems of diverse nations such as Peru, the Philippines, and Ethiopia. 
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contracts, and permits.  Similar to many of the inhabitants and entrepreneurs I met in 
Sayaxche, de Soto finds that many of these “individuals live and work in a type of “‘in-
formal sector’ that exists outside a set of widely-recognized and enforceable rules.”13  He 
says,  
Pervasive poverty and the absence of the rule of law are inextricably linked.  The 
vast majority of the world’s three billion poor live their daily lives outside the rule 
of law, in what is often referred to as the “informal sector.”  These individuals 
lack the basic legal protection that recognizes their assets and hard work.  As a re-
sult, they are denied the opportunity to participate in and benefit from economic 
activity.  They are locked out of the system - in their own countries and in the 
global marketplace.14 
 
De Soto contends that by creating protections for the assets that the poor control, these 
individuals will gain tangible benefits that go beyond property and ownership.  Once they 
achieve legal ownership over their assets, they “will become participants in a system of 
laws and commerce that can leverage capital and create investment, and with it, gain such 
real rewards as clean water, medical care, schools, and economic growth.”15 
The purpose of this dissertation is to provide a constructive dialogue between the 
work of Hernando de Soto and Catholic social teaching in order to assist people in devel-
oping nations to escape the cycle of poverty.  I argue that de Soto’s insights to protect 
property rights, in conjunction with the Catholic Church’s theological commitment to 
promote human dignity and human rights, through a preferential option for the poor, of-
fers practical resources for sound economic development to help those trapped in poverty 
                                                 
13 Hernando de Soto, “The High Level Commission On Legal Empowerment of the Poor Mission State-
ment,” available from http://legalempowerment.undp.org/html/commission.html#background; Internet; 
accessed 22 July 2006. 
 
14 Ibid. 
 
15 Ibid. 
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to become more active participants in the well ordering of society.16  Thus, I believe a 
dialogue between de Soto’s work and Catholic social teaching can benefit both parties.  
On the one hand, Catholic social teaching can enhance de Soto’s work by connecting his 
ideas about property rights to a theological anthropology that supports the dignity and 
social nature of the human person.17  On the other hand, de Soto’s economic analysis can 
augment Catholic social teaching in three key ways.  First, de Soto’s work provides a 
more lucid investigation into the ways that the poor are denied their property rights in 
developing nations, which effectively curtails long-term economic growth.  Second, de 
Soto’s analysis reveals more clearly than Catholic social teaching why gaining ownership 
over one’s assets, such as a home or small business, is a crucial step in the process toward 
economic development.18  Finally, de Soto’s work provides a better explanation than 
Catholic social teaching about the kinds of strategies needed to develop partnerships 
among disenfranchised property owners and government authorities in order to create a 
more equitable and just legal framework that supports the most efficient and productive 
use of all people’s assets, including those who now live in poverty.  I have divided the 
dissertation into six chapters to examine these issues. 
In chapter 1, I introduce the argument that the work of Hernando de Soto offers 
those who opt for the poor a viable solution to eradicate poverty in the developing world.  
                                                 
16 I will discuss the origin, meaning, and issues raised by the term “preferential option for the poor” for 
Catholic social teaching in chapter 1. 
 
17 For an excellent treatment of the theological anthropology that underwrites Catholic social teaching, es-
pecially since the Second Vatican Council, see Charles Curran’s chapter entitled, “Anthropology.”  Curran, 
Catholic Social Teaching 1891-Present, 127-136. 
 
18 See, for example, Centesimus annus, no. 31-32.  Although Catholic social teaching correctly supports the 
right of persons to own property and engage in economic initiative, de Soto’s investigation into the ways 
legal and political institutions in developing nations purposely exclude large numbers of people from utiliz-
ing their assets to meet their basic material needs provides sound analysis about the best ways to overcome 
this problem. 
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The chapter begins with a brief excursus concerning the problem of poverty in the devel-
oping world to grasp the enormous challenges facing those interested in the question of 
economic development.  This part shows how measuring wide scale poverty primarily in 
terms of a nation’s gross domestic product or per capita income does not give an accurate 
picture regarding the ways poverty reduces a person’s basic capabilities.  Second, I pro-
vide a succinct overview of the common reasons that economists and specialists in the 
field of economic development give regarding why poverty persists in many places 
throughout the world.  Third, I review the failures of the “The Washington Consensus,” 
which was a set of policy proposals and proscriptions endorsed by the World Bank, The 
International Monetary Fund, 19 and the World Trade Organization20 to eradicate poverty 
in the developing world.  Next, I introduce the work of Hernando de Soto and his col-
leagues at the ILD.  I argue that he provides an alternative strategy for economic devel-
opment to the policies endorsed by the Washington Consensus.  I then introduce the con-
cept of the preferential option for the poor and why the Catholic Church has made a 
commitment to this principle as part of its social teaching.  I conclude the chapter by ini-
                                                 
19 The World Bank is made up of two unique development institutions owned by 184 member countries—
the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development and the International Development Association  
(IDA).  The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development focuses on middle income and credit-
worthy poor countries, while IDA focuses on the poorest countries in the world.  Together they provide 
low-interest loans, interest-free credit and grants to developing countries for education, health, infrastruc-
ture, communications and many other purposes.  The International Monetary Fund was established to pro-
mote international monetary cooperation, exchange stability, and orderly exchange arrangements; to foster 
economic growth and high levels of employment; and to provide temporary financial assistance to coun-
tries to help ease balance of payments adjustment.The World Bank, “The World Bank: Working for a 
World Free of Poverty,” available from http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTABOU-
TUS/0,,pagePK:50004410~piPK:36602~theSitePK:29708,00.html; Internet; accessed 22 July 2006. 
 
20 The World Trade Organization is the only global international organization dealing with the rules of 
trade between nations.  At its heart are the World Trade Organization agreements, negotiated and signed by 
149 trading nations and ratified in their parliaments.  The goal is to help producers of goods and services, 
exporters, and importers conduct their business.  The World Trade Organization, “What is the WTO?”  
available from http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/whatis_e.htm; Internet; accessed 22 July 
2006. 
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tiating a dialogue between the work of Hernando de Soto and Catholic social teaching, 
which sets up much of the discussion that will follow in the remaining chapters.   
I examine in chapter 2 why Catholic social teaching defends a person’s right to 
own and use property and the duties and responsibilities that come with this right.  I draw 
mainly from the papal social encyclicals to frame my analysis.21  In the opening section 
of the chapter, I review why each pontiff since Leo XIII in his 1891 encyclical Rerum 
novarum has defended a person’s right to own and use property.  I argue that the Catholic 
Church has mainly defended this right because of its commitment to a theological an-
thropology that affirms human dignity and the social nature of the person.  This historical 
review uncovers why each pontiff, beginning with Leo XIII and concluding with Pope 
John Paul II, made the argument that the right to own property supports human dignity 
and the social nature of the person.  Another theme I investigate in this section is the way 
Catholic social teaching increasing came to limit the right to own property, especially 
when the basic material needs of large numbers of people go unmet.  I argue that the 
church’s growing awareness about the economic deprivation of the poor over the past 
century has increasingly led the tradition since Rerum novarum to emphasize limitations 
to the right to own property.  Catholic social teaching affirms that private property, in 
fact, regardless of the concrete forms of the regulations and juridical norms relative to it, 
is in its essence only an instrument for respecting the principle of the universal destina-
tion of goods.22  As a result, the tradition wrestles with a person’s legitimate right to own 
                                                 
21 See footnote 3 for the encyclicals that makeup the body of Catholic social teaching. 
 
22 Pontifical Council for Justice and Peace, The Compendium of the Social Doctrine of the Catholic Church, 
available from 
http://www.vatican.va/roman_curia/pontifical_councils/justpeace/documents/rc_pc_justpeace_doc_200605
26_compendio-dott-soc_en.html#Origin%20and%20meaning; Internet; accessed 22 July 2006. 
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property with its commitment to meeting the basic material needs of all persons through 
its teaching about the universal destination of material goods.  The commitment to defend 
the dignity and social nature of the person has led the church not only to support the right 
of persons to own property, but also to analyze contemporary economic structures from 
the perspective of the poor.  Catholic social teaching asks whether current economic 
structures help to contribute to both the dignity and social nature of the human person or 
whether they marginalize people through denying them their right to utilize the material 
goods of the earth that are common to all.  Thus, a prominent issue raised in Catholic so-
cial teaching is how to relate an individual’s right to own property with the idea that the 
use of the material goods of the earth are intended for all people in order to benefit the 
common good.  I close the chapter with a review of the strengths and weaknesses of 
Catholic social teaching regarding its understanding of the right to private property.  In 
particular, I examine the benefits and drawbacks of the tradition’s commitment to linking 
its teaching about the universal destination of material goods with its defense of property 
rights.   
In chapters 3 and 4, I examine the work of Michael Novak of the American En-
terprise Institute and Fr. David Hollenbach, S.J. of Boston College.  I draw on their work 
for two main reasons.  First, I want to draw out the benefits associated with their posi-
tions regarding the different anthropological dimensions of the human person advanced 
in Catholic social teaching in order to provide the soundest foundation on which to build 
an economic system that promotes human dignity.  Second, I use these chapters to iden-
tify in chapter 6 the way each theologian’s theological anthropology can augment the 
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work of Hernando de Soto to aid him in his quest to secure and defend the property rights 
of people who now live in poverty.23   
In chapter 3, I contend that Novak’s view of the human person stresses the crea-
tive potential of active subjects to allow people to use their gifts and talents to meet their 
basic material needs.  The main benefit of Novak’s view of the person is that he offers a 
strong theological foundation on which to build arguments for holding private property, 
participating in markets, and engaging in entrepreneurship.  The chapter begins with an 
overview of Michael Novak’s intellectual development to show why he came to support 
democratic capitalism in preference to democratic socialism as a system of political econ-
omy.  Next, I explore the anthropology that underlies his commitment to this kind of sys-
tem.  In this section and throughout the chapter, I draw mainly from his three principal 
works that argue in favor of democratic capitalism.  They are The Spirit of Democratic 
Capitalism, Free Persons and the Common Good, and The Catholic Ethic and the Spirit 
                                                 
23 Both Novak and Hollenbach stand in the tradition of Catholic social teaching as supporters of a person’s 
right to own and use property.  They disagree, however, about its limits, especially when large numbers of 
people purposely are excluded from meeting their basic material needs.  I contend that Novak and Hollen-
bach hold opposing views about the right to private property because they stress different anthropological 
traditions within Catholic social teaching.  Novak stresses the libertarian tradition while Hollenbach identi-
fies more with the communitarian tradition.  Although Novak’s anthropology offers many resources to sup-
port one’s right to private property, participation in the market, and ability to engage in entrepreneurship, it 
will become evident that I think that David Hollenbach’s anthropology provides a richer view of the human 
person than the one Novak employs, which borrows heavily from classic libertarianism.  Novak’s anthro-
pology fails to present enough resources for people to cooperate with each other to stand in solidarity with 
the poor.  In contrast, Hollenbach’s commitment to identify the social and cooperative elements of human 
personhood provides an anthropology that is better suited toward achieving an important goal of Catholic 
social teaching, which is to structure a closer collaboration between civil society, government institutions, 
and markets to help the poor to meet their basic material needs.  Hollenbach’s view of the person offers a 
richer analysis than Novak’s toward identifying the ways economic and government institutions should 
collaborate with each other to stop hindering the poor from participating in markets.  He does this by offer-
ing a better explanation of the human person than Novak about why the lack of participation in the market 
by those in poverty threatens both human dignity and solidarity. 
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of Capitalism.24  Next, I identify Novak’s criticisms of socialism.  Then I explicate No-
vak’s support for a market-based system of political economy through an exploration of 
several questions.  First, what does Novak believe are the main criticisms of capitalism, 
especially as developed within Catholic social teaching?  Second, why does Novak be-
lieve that Pope John Paul II tempered these criticisms?  Third, what new insights does 
Novak say the late Pontiff brought to these discussions?  Fourth, what does Novak think 
are the benefits of a market economy?  Fifth, what does Novak think are the main obsta-
cles toward the creation of these kinds of economic systems within Third World and for-
mer communist nations?  Sixth, why does Novak support the protection and promotion of 
property rights?  Seventh, what are the shortcomings of Novak’s defense of democratic 
capitalism?  I conclude the chapter by speculating about the ways that Novak might re-
spond to these criticisms of democratic capitalism as a system of political economy.   
In chapter 4, I examine David Hollenbach’s anthropology to contrast his more 
communitarian vision of the human person to the libertarian anthropology offered by Mi-
chael Novak.  His anthropology, which is personalist and communitarian, challenges the 
way the globalization of the market tends to marginalize poor people, especially when 
government fails to protect people’s economic rights.  His anthropology is personalist in 
its insistence that the dignity, worth, and freedom of all human beings must be fully re-
spected in the economic as well as the political domains.  It is communitarian in stressing 
that this dignity and freedom can only be realized in solidarity and mutual interdepend-
ence.  In the opening section of the chapter, I provide an overview of how the Catholic 
                                                 
24 Michael Novak, The Spirit of Democratic Capitalism (Lanham, M.D.: Madison Books, 1982); Free Per-
sons and the Common Good (New York: Madison Books, 1989); The Catholic Ethic and the Spirit of Capi-
talism (New York: The Free Press, 1993). 
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Church came to adopt a vision of human rights as the minimum conditions for participa-
tion in community life.  I do this primarily through using one of Hollenbach’s first major 
works Claims in Conflict: Retrieving and Renewing the Catholic Human Rights Tradi-
tion.25  In section two, I look at Hollenbach’s view of the common good, especially as 
discussed in his 2002 book The Common Good and Christian Ethics.26  Hollenbach em-
ploys the concept of the common good as an intellectual tool to think about the necessary 
requirements to protect and promote human dignity to challenge the dominant liberal 
ethos that makes individual autonomy and self-sufficiency primary social goods.  As a 
result, this section addresses the institutional challenges raised by Hollenbach’s compre-
hensive vision of the human person and the common good, especially in regards to the 
benefits and drawbacks brought about by the globalization of the market. 
In chapter 5, I examine the work of Hernando de Soto and his support for promot-
ing and protecting property rights among the poor in the developing world.  I seek to 
identify why de Soto believes the promotion and protection of property rights for the poor 
can provide them with the necessary capital to escape the cycle of poverty.  First, I pro-
vide a brief overview of de Soto’s early life to explain why he got involved in the strug-
gle to eradicate poverty in the developing world.  Second, I define and explicate his ma-
jor ideas and concepts.  The purpose of this section is to elucidate why de Soto thinks the 
crucial step in the process toward economic development is for the poor to gain owner-
                                                 
25 David Hollenbach, S.J., Claims in Conflict: Retrieving and Renewing the Catholic Human Rights Tradi-
tion (New York: Paulist Press, 1979). 
 
26 David Hollenbach, S.J., The Common Good and Christian Ethics (Cambridge, MA: Cambridge Univer-
sity Press, 2002). 
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ship over their assets through the creation of an integrated property rights system.27  I 
draw mainly in this section from his two influential books on economic development The 
Other Path and The Mystery of Capital: Why Capitalism Triumphs in the West and Fails 
Everywhere Else.28  These works encapsulate Hernando de Soto’s ideas about the crea-
tion of capital, the nature of property, the devastating effects of working extralegally, and 
the steps toward creating a unified property rights system.  In the final section, I clarify 
how the ILD helps diverse nations such as Peru, Haiti, Egypt, Mexico, and the Philip-
pines to create integrated property rights systems.  I believe the success of the ILD in 
tracking the assets of the poor and integrating them into a unified property rights system 
offers support for the viability of de Soto’s program to work within diverse cultural set-
tings around the world.  I conclude the chapter with an examination of the ways the ILD 
works with political leaders and members of civil society to incorporate the Institute’s 
methods into the legal systems of poor countries to create unified property rights systems.      
I use chapter 6 to tie together several topics alluded to in earlier chapters.  My 
main goal in this chapter is to draw together the common areas of agreement between the 
Catholic Church’s defense of property rights and Hernando de Soto’s support for these 
same rights.  I argue that both agree that the ability to protect property rights and expand 
the realm of ownership among the poor promotes human dignity, freedom, and creativity 
                                                 
27 I borrow from Duncan Kennedy and Frank Michelman that an integrated property rights system is one in 
which things of value are assigned to owners, who have the following rights with respect to them: (a) they 
can consume them, or use them to produce other things of value, which they will also own; (b) they can get 
the state’s help in preventing any nonowner from consuming them or using them for production without the 
owner’s consent; and (c) owners have exclusive power to transfer ownership to others, with the state recog-
nizing and then enforcing the transfer.   For a full description of their definition of an integrated property 
rights system, see Duncan Kennedy and Frank Michelman, “Are Property and Contract Efficient?,” Hofstra 
Law Review 8 (1980): 711-737. 
 
28 Hernando de Soto, The Other Path (New York: Basic Books, 1986); The Mystery of Capital: Why Capi-
talism Triumphs in the West and Fails Everywhere Else (New York: Basic Books, 2000). 
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and that a key way to safeguard these rights is to create a strong juridical framework be-
tween government officials, legal experts, and ordinary citizens.  I also draw together 
how the differing anthropological approaches of Novak and Hollenbach can benefit de 
Soto’s work.  I contend that a critical engagement with their different anthropological 
perspectives offers Hernando de Soto valuable insights about the best ways to structure 
markets to defend human dignity, enhance human solidarity, and champion the rights of 
the poor.  Finally, I speculate about the ways that de Soto’s work can connect with those 
who want to enact a preferential option for the poor in developing countries.  I want to 
show that those who make the preferential option for the poor can cooperate with de 
Soto’s group to stand in solidarity with the poor.  Although his approach does not solve 
all the problems faced by those in poverty, I conclude that Hernando de Soto’s strategy to 
promote and protect property rights is an important step in the struggle to overcome eco-
nomic injustice. 
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Chapter 1 
Hernando de Soto and Catholic Social Teaching: Initiating the Dialogue 
 
1. The Problem of Poverty in the World’s Least Developed Countries  
Today the economic situation for those living in the world’s least developed coun-
tries (LDCs) remains bleak.1  For those who live in LDCs the problem is not that these 
people are being impoverished by globalization, they are largely excluded from it.2  “In 
2002, LDCs accounted for 11% of the world’s population but only 0.6% of world GDP.  
Their average gross national income per capita was $438, compared with $2,848 in other 
developing countries.”3  Over the period 1979–2001, “LDCs experienced 9.5% more in-
stability in their agricultural production and 49% more instability in their exports of 
                                                 
1 “Since 1971, the United Nations has used the term least developed countries (LDCs) to denote a category 
of countries (originally 24, currently 50) that are poor and considered highly disadvantaged in their devel-
opment process.  Countries on this list are considered to have a particularly high risk of failing to overcome 
poverty, and to need the highest degree of support from the international community in their development 
efforts.  By periodically identifying the LDCs and highlighting their structural problems, the United Na-
tions sends a strong signal to the development partners of these countries and underscores the need for spe-
cial concessions and benefits in their favor.”  United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, “De-
velopment and Globalization: Facts and Figures,” available from 
http://globstat.unctad.org/html/index.html; Internet; accessed 20 February 2005. 
 
2 I chose to focus on Less Developed Countries (LDCs) primarily because the extreme economic hardship 
of these nations challenges those interested in questions of economic justice to identify the causes of pov-
erty among those whom it most negatively affects.  Another reason why I chose this term is to differentiate 
some of these nations from those also described by the United Nations as Landlocked Developing Coun-
tries (LLDCs) and Small Island Developing States (SIDS).  Nations such as Afghanistan and Aruba also 
suffer from poverty, but the U.N. places these nations in these categories because the causes and roots of 
their poverty are in many ways directly related to their geographic location.  For example, Afghanistan is 
described by the United Nations as both a LDC and a LLDC.  However, when I examine the work of Her-
nando de Soto in chapter 5, I will show that he challenges the idea that the lack of economic development 
in LLDCs and SIDS are primarily the result of geography.  I want to use the term LDC because its compre-
hensiveness is more in line with Hernando de Soto’s belief that the lack of economic development in these 
nations is not primarily related to their geographic location, but to a systematic failure of these nations to 
develop unified property rights systems. 
       
3 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, “Development and Globalization: Facts and Fig-
ures,” available from http://globstat.unctad.org/html/index.html; Internet; accessed 20 February 2005. 
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goods and services than other developing countries.”4  In 2002, “their share of world 
merchandise exports was 0.6%, while that of other developing countries was 31%.”5   
Measuring a country’s development primarily in terms of gross domestic product 
or per capita income does not offer a complete picture of the ways poverty affects the 
freedoms, capabilities, and quality of life people enjoy in LDCs.  The Nobel winning 
economist Amartya Sen argues that another way to evaluate the devastating affects of 
poverty in LDCs is to identify the ways that it reduces the basic capabilities or the sub-
stantive freedoms that persons enjoy to lead the kind of life they have reason to value.6  
From this perspective, a number of non-economic indicators, such as life expectancy of 
citizens, infant mortality rates, denial of access to basic goods such as healthcare, shelter, 
and sanitary water, help to uncover the ways that poverty diminishes basic capabilities.7  
For example, “people in LDCs can expect to live an average of 50 years, compared with 
63 years in developing countries as a group.  About 95 out of 1,000 children in LDCs die 
in their first year, compared with 35 out of 1,000 in other developing countries.”8  Sen 
contends that widespread poverty in LDCs not only adversely affects a person’s physical 
existence, but it “robs the poor of the freedom to satisfy hunger, or to achieve sufficient 
                                                 
4 Ibid. 
 
5 Ibid. 
 
6 Amartya Sen, Development as Freedom (New York: Anchor Books, 1999), 3. 
 
7 For an excellent treatment about the basic capabilities approach and its impact on women, see Martha 
Nussbaum, Women and Human Development (Cambridge, M.A.: Cambridge University Press, 2001). 
 
8 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, “Development and Globalization: Facts and Fig-
ures,” available from http://globstat.unctad.org/html/index.html; Internet; accessed 20 February 2005. 
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nutrition, or to obtain remedies for treatable illness, or the opportunity to be adequately 
clothed or sheltered, or to enjoy clean water of sanitary facilities.”9   
The economic deprivation suffered by the poor in LDCs contributes to the grow-
ing divide between haves and have-nots.  The result of this divide is the increase of those 
who live in dire poverty.  Despite repeated promises of poverty reduction made over the 
last decade of the twentieth century, 10 the actual number of people living in poverty has 
actually increased by almost 100 million.11  This occurred at the same time that total 
world income increased by an average of 2.5 percent annually.12  Another Nobel Prize 
winning economist, Joseph Stiglitz, says there can be no dispute about three facts when 
looking at these figures: “There has been little progress in eliminating poverty; most of 
the progress has been in Asia, and especially China, and in much of the rest of the world 
the plight of the poor has worsened.”13  For example,  
In Sub-Saharan Africa, 46 percent of the population lives in absolute poverty (on 
less than a dollar a day), and in Latin America and the former Soviet Union the 
                                                 
9 Sen, Development as Freedom, 4. 
 
10 In 2000, at the United Nations Millennium Summit, 191 member states resolved, through the United Na-
tions Millennium Declaration, to halve, by the year 2015, the proportion of the world’s people whose in-
come is less than one dollar a day and the proportion of people who suffer from hunger and, by the same 
date, to halve the proportion of people who are unable to reach or to afford safe drinking water.  United 
Nations, “United Nations Millennium Declaration,” available from 
http://www.un.org/millennium/declaration/ares552e.htm; Internet; accessed 20 May 2006.  For a summary 
of the eight goals adopted by the United Nations in the Millennium Declaration, see United Nations, “Im-
plementing the Millennium Declaration,” available from http://www.un.org/millenniumgoals/MDGs-
FACTSHEET1.pdf; Internet; accessed 20 May 2006. 
 
11 “In 1990, 2.718 billion people were living on less than $2 a day.  In 1998, the number of poor living on 
less than $2 a day is estimated at 2.801 billion.”  World Bank, Global Economic Prospects and the Devel-
oping Countries 2000 (Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 2000), 29. 
 
12 Joseph E. Stiglitz, Globalization and its Discontents (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2003), 259. 
 
13 Ibid. 
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percentage of the population in poverty is 16 percent and 15 percent, respec-
tively.14 
 
2. Responses About Why Economic Development Fails to Transpire in LDCs 
 
The hardship felt by the poor living in LDCs has led those who work for eco-
nomic justice to consider the reasons for the lack of economic development in these na-
tions.  They want an answer to the question, “What makes some nations rich and other 
nations poor?”  Today, there are several widespread theories about why it is difficult to 
sustain economic development in the world’s poorest nations.  I summarize below three 
of the most common reasons given by specialists in the field of economic development 
for the lack of it in LDCs. 
a. Geography Matters 
First, Jeffrey Sachs of Columbia University argues that one of the most over-
looked reasons for the lack of economic development in many LDCs is simply geogra-
phy.  Many economists neglect the fact that the geographic location of a nation often pre-
cludes it from partaking in the benefits that have come with the expansion of the global 
market.15  Sachs believes that people in the United States, for example, tend to forget that 
they inherited a vast continent rich in material resources, immense navigable rivers, and 
one that possessed thousands of miles of coastline that provided a wonderful foundation 
                                                 
14 Ibid.  An important issue to consider is the great number of people who live in poverty in the United 
States.  According to the U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops, one in eight Americans lives in poverty.  In 
spite of the seemingly limitless prosperity that many Americans enjoy, 13 million, or 1 in 6, children live in 
poverty.  United States Conference of Catholic Bishops, “Catholic Campaign for Human Development: 
Poverty in America,” available from http://www.nccbuscc.org/cchd/povertyusa/index.htm; Internet; ac-
cessed 17 August 2006. 
 
15 One person who is commonly associated with this position is Jared Diamond, who argues that a decisive 
factor in explaining the economic growth of a people is geography and environment.  See Jared Diamond, 
Guns, Germs, and Steel: The Fates of Human Societies (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1999). 
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for sea-based trade.16  These are important factors for the successful economic develop-
ment of the United States.17  In contrast, many nations around the world lack these advan-
tages.  Many of the world’s poorest nations are landlocked, which expands their transpor-
tation costs.  Other kinds of geographical distress are also at play.  He says,  
Many countries are trapped in arid conditions with low agricultural productivity 
or vulnerability to prolonged droughts.  Most of the tropics have ecological condi-
tions that favor killer diseases like malaria, schistosomiasis, dengue fever, and 
dozens of others.  Sub-Saharan Africa, in particular, has an ideal rainfall, tempera-
ture, and mosquito type that make it the global epicenter of malaria, perhaps the 
greatest factor in slowing Africa’s economic development throughout history.18 
   
As a result, these adversities require countries to undertake additional investments that 
other, more fortunate, countries did not have to make.  Although a landlocked country 
can build a road to a port in another country, and advancements in medicine can control 
tropical diseases, geography raises the costs of solving the problems of farming, trans-
port, health, and thereby makes it much more likely that a country will be caught in a 
poverty trap. 
b. Culture Matters 
A second reason given for the lack of economic development in many LDCs is 
that the cultural attitudes, norms, and values of poor people living in these nations impose 
obstacles to development.  As Harvard Professor David Landes says,  
If we learn anything from the history of economic development, it is that culture 
makes almost all the difference.  Witness the enterprise of expatriate minorities – 
                                                 
16 Jeffrey Sachs, The End of Poverty: Economic Possibilities for Our Time (New York: Penguin Press, 
2005), 58. 
 
17 Jeffrey Sachs, “Can Extreme Poverty Be Eliminated?,” Scientific American 292 (September 2005): 58. 
 
18 Sachs, The End of Poverty, 58. 
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the Chinese in East and Southeast Asia, Indians in East Africa, Lebanese in West 
Africa, Jews and Calvinists throughout much of Europe, and on and on.19 
 
Today’s adherents to this position can trace the origins of this argument to the sociologist 
Max Weber.  In his well-known work The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, 
Weber claimed that during the nineteenth century in Germany the entrepreneurial values 
of Protestants favored economic development in contrast to the static values of Catho-
lics.20  Today, public opinion in affluent countries often attributes extreme poverty to 
faults with the poor themselves - or at least with their cultural values.  The idea that 
whole societies are condemned to poverty because of their values has a long history, but 
one that some find objectionable for two main reasons.  First, “cultures change with eco-
nomic times and circumstances.”21  Second, “they are usually made on the basis of preju-
dice rather than measurable evidence.”22  For example, in the wake of September 11, 
many Western observers categorized Islamic societies to be unfit for modern economic 
development.  As Sachs says, 
The charges of cultural failure are legion: irrationality, fundamentalism, extreme 
bias against women, antipathy to science.  Yet some of the fastest growing 
economies in the world in the past decade have been Islamic.  Between 1990 and 
2001, average annual per capita growth in Malaysia was 3.9 percent; in Bangla-
desh, 3.1 percent; Tunisia, 3.1 percent; and Indonesia, 2.3 percent.  These coun-
tries also made great strides in equality of girls’ education and literacy.23 
                                                 
19 David Landes, “Culture Makes Almost All the Difference,” in Culture Matters: How Values Shape Hu-
man Progress, eds. Lawrence E. Harrison and Samuel P. Huntington (New York: Basic Books, 2000), 2. 
 
20 Max Weber, The Protestant Ethic and The Spirit of Capitalism (New York: Routledge, 2001). 
 
20 Landes, “Culture Makes Almost All the Difference,” 2. 
 
20 Sachs, The End of Poverty, 316-317. 
 
21 Ibid., 316. 
 
22 Ibid. 
 
23 Ibid., 316-317. 
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c. Governance Matters 
 
A third reason commonly given for the lack of economic development in LDCs is 
that development requires a government orientated toward growth and economic expan-
sion.  According to this argument, government has many roles to play.  They include 
identifying and financing infrastructure projects, making the needed infrastructure and 
social services available to the whole population, and creating an environment favorable 
to investments by private businesses.  Finally, governments must also maintain internal 
security and stability so the safety of persons and property is not threatened.  This comes 
mainly in the form of establishing a judicial system that can define property rights and 
honestly enforce contracts, and defend the national territory to keep it safe from invasion.  
As Professor Sachs says, 
When governments fail in any of these tasks – leaving huge gaps in infrastructure, 
or raising corruption to levels that impair economic activity, or failing to ensure 
domestic peace – the economy is sure to fail, and often to fail badly.  Indeed, in 
extreme cases, when governments are unable to perform their most basic func-
tions, we talk about “state failures,” which are characterized by wars, revolutions, 
coups, anarchy, and the like.24 
 
3. Responses to the Challenge of the Lack of Economic Development in LDCs 
 
a. The Washington Consensus  
     
The lack of economic development in LDCs led representatives in the World 
Bank, the World Trade Organization (WTO), and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
to develop strategies to reduce poverty.  John Williamson of the Institute for International 
Economics suggests that an implicit consensus formed within these organizations over 
the past fifteen years about the best ways to eradicate poverty in these nations.  He origi-
                                                 
24 Ibid., 60. 
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nally called this, “The Washington Consensus.”25  He invented the term to refer to the 
lowest common denominator of policy advice being addressed by the Washington-based 
institutions to Latin American countries as of 1989.26  The core of this consensus af-
firmed that rapidly privatizing business and liberalizing trade through the removal of 
government interference in financial and capital markets spurs economic growth within 
LDCs.   
Stiglitz argues that rapid privatization and trade liberalization led to millions of 
job losses for people in LDCs.27  Supporters of rapid privatization assumed that state en-
terprises would become more profitable by trimming their payrolls.  However, there were 
major social costs associated with unemployment in LDCs including urban violence, in-
creased crime, and political and social unrest.  Other social costs were more subtle and 
they included  
widespread anxiety even among workers who managed to keep their jobs, a 
broader sense of alienation, additional financial burdens on family members who 
managed to remain employed, and the withdrawal of children from school to help 
support the family.28   
 
Trade liberalization also did not benefit many workers within LDCs.  Numerous Western 
countries continued to protect those economic sectors in which competition from devel-
                                                 
25 For a full explanation of the term “Washington Consensus,” see John Williamson, Toward Renewed 
Growth in Latin America (Washington, D.C.: Institute for International Economics, 1986).  For a summary 
list of the economic policies endorsed by the Washington Consensus, see the article by John Williamson 
“Did the Washington Consensus Fail?” available from 
http://www.iie.com/publications/papers/williamson1102.htm; Internet; accessed 20 February 2005. 
 
26 Ibid. 
 
27 Stiglitz, Globalization and its Discontents, 56-57. 
 
28 Ibid. 
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oping countries might have threatened their economies.29  In the Uruguay Round of trade 
negotiations at the WTO,  
markets were opened mainly for the services exported by the advanced countries 
– financial services and information technology – but not for maritime and con-
struction services, where the developing countries might have been able to gain a 
toehold.30 
 
“One World Bank calculation showed that Sub-Saharan Africa, the poorest region in the 
world, saw its income decline by more than 2 percent as a result of the trade agree-
ment.”31  Stiglitz demonstrates with this evidence that the policies favored by those who 
formed the Washington Consensus have not only failed to reduce poverty, but they have 
actually increased the numbers of those who are poor in LDCs. 
b. An Alternative Strategy to The Washington Consensus: Hernando de Soto 
and the Institute for Liberty and Democracy  
 
The inability to reduce the number of people living in poverty in LDCs by those 
who formed the Washington Consensus challenges anyone interested in addressing the 
question of economic development to develop alternative strategies to reduce poverty in 
these countries.  One person who has attempted to address this problem by offering an 
alternative strategy to spur economic development in LDCs is the Peruvian economist 
Hernando de Soto of the Institute for Liberty and Democracy (ILD).   
After years of investigating the causes of poverty in Peru and other LDCs, de Soto 
concluded that the lack of formal property rights for homeowners and small business 
owners remains the fundamental roadblock toward economic development in poor coun-
                                                 
29 Ibid., 59-61. 
 
30 Ibid., 61. 
 
31 Ibid. 
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tries.  The inability of governments in many LDCs to create integrated property rights 
systems has prevented the poor from entering the market, which disables them from 
transforming their limited assets into usable forms of capital necessary to elevate them 
out of poverty.  The ILD estimates, “the total value of the real estate held but not legally 
owned by the poor of the Third World and former communist nations is at least $9.3 tril-
lion.”32  The principal reason why people in the world’s poorest countries cannot repre-
sent their assets is the inability of governments to secure property rights.  Usually, the 
problem is not the form, but the substance of the law.  As Article 17 of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights declares, “everyone has the right to own property alone as 
well as in association with others.”33  ILD researchers argue that largely the legislation 
and legal systems of most developing and previously communist nations formally comply 
with Article 17.  In substantive terms, however, some 80% of these countries’ popula-
tions either do not have real access to these rights and obligations – or, when they do, are 
not empowered by them to increase their productivity as effectively as in developed mar-
ket economies.34  De Soto concludes as long as governments cannot protect the property 
rights of the poor to enable them to use their assets to enter the marketplace, widespread 
poverty will persist in LDCs.35 
c. The Catholic Church and The Preferential Option for the Poor 
                                                 
32 The Mystery of Capital: Why Capitalism Triumphs in the West and Fails Everywhere Else (New York: 
Basic Books, 2000), 35. 
 
33 The United Nations, “United Nations Declaration on Human Rights,” available from 
http://www.un.org/Overview/rights.html; Internet; accessed 8 May 2006. 
 
34 Ashraf Ghani, “Economic Development, Poverty Reduction, and the Rule of Law: Successes and Fail-
ures,” available from 
http://www.undp.org/legalempowerment/documentWord/Economic_development.pdf; Internet; accessed 8 
May 2006. 
 
35 de Soto, The Mystery of Capital, 35. 
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The desire to respond to the needs of the poor is a concern shared beyond secular 
institutions such as the ILD.  The need to take action on behalf of the poor remains a cen-
tral commitment for many religious traditions, including Roman Catholicism.  According 
to Pope John Paul II,  
The Church’s love for the poor, which is essential for her and a part of her con-
stant tradition, impels her to give attention to a world in which poverty is threat-
ening to assume massive proportions in spite of technological and economic pro-
gress.36 
 
In order to serve the poor, John Paul reaffirmed the Catholic Church’s commitment to a 
preferential option for the poor in his 1991 encyclical Centesimus annus.37  The concept 
of a preferential option for the poor first arose at the Second Conference of Latin Ameri-
can Bishops at Medellin in 1968 and was defined formally by the bishops in their Third 
Conference at Puebla in 1979.  Since Puebla, “Pope John Paul II, the Congregation for 
the Doctrine of the Faith, and the bishops of Canada and the United States have all af-
firmed the preferential option in their respective teachings.”38  According to Donal Dorr, 
to “make an option for the poor is to choose to disengage from serving the interests of the 
powerful and instead to take the side of those who are relatively powerless,”39 effectively 
                                                 
36 Centesimus annus, no. 57. 
 
37 Centesimus annus, no. 57. 
 
38 Thomas L. Schubeck, “Ethics and Liberation Theology,” Theological Studies 56 (1995): 108.  See John 
Paul II, Sollicitudo rei socialis, in David J. O’Brien and Thomas A. Shannon, eds. Catholic Social Thought: 
The Documentary Heritage (Maryknoll, N.Y.: Orbis, 1992) nos. 42-45; Congregation for the Doctrine of 
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39 Donal Dorr, “Poor, Preferential Option For,” in The New Dictionary of Catholic Social Thought, ed. Ju-
dith A. Dwyer (Collegeville, M.N.: Liturgical Press, 1994), 755, emphasis added. 
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“transforming society into a place where human rights and the dignity of all are re-
spected.”40  As the U.S. Catholic Bishops said in their pastoral letter Economic Justice for 
All, to make an option for the poor is “to speak for the voiceless, to defend the defense-
less, to assess life styles, policies, and social institutions in terms of their impact on the 
poor.”41   
Dorr calls this option, which remains a key concept in liberation theology, the 
most controversial religious term since the Reformers cried for salvation through faith 
alone.42  Not surprisingly, not everyone agrees with the option for the poor and chal-
lenges to it come on several fronts.43  First, from a theological perspective, it is argued 
that the preferential option fosters an unjust partiality or favoritism that is counter to the 
universal love that God shows all people.44  Second, regarding its social analysis, “critics 
see the preferential option conditioning the way liberation theologians select their instru-
ment of analysis, especially their use of Marxist analysis and dependency theory.”45  The 
Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, for example, criticized certain theologies of 
liberation for adopting a preferential option that appeared to pit the poor against the 
                                                 
40 Ibid. 
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42 Donal Dorr, Option for the Poor: A Hundred Years of Catholic Social Teaching (Maryknoll, N.Y.: Orbis 
Books, 1991), 1. 
 
43 For adversarial perspectives about the concept of the preferential option for the poor, see Dennis P. 
McCann, Christian Realism and Liberation Theology: Practical Theologies in Creative Conflict 
(Maryknoll, N.Y.: Orbis, 1981); and Michael Novak, Will It Liberate?  Questions for Liberation Theology 
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44 Schubeck, “Ethics and Liberation Theology,” 109.  See Gordon Graham, The Idea of Christian Charity: 
A Critique of Some Contemporary Conceptions (Notre Dame, I.N.: University of Notre Dame, 1990), 116-
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45 Ibid., 110.  See Novak, Will It Liberate?, 108-109; and Gary Dorrien, Reconstructing the Common Good 
(Maryknoll, N.Y.: Orbis, 1990), 139. 
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wealthy.  The Congregation charged that this was similar to Marxian class struggle.46  
Third, certain adversaries have “questioned a corollary of the preferential option, namely, 
the affirmation that the poor, because of their social location, possess an epistemological 
privilege.”47  In other words, critics challenge the idea that the poor have the ability to 
know better than the non-poor a certain dimension of reality, namely how God shows 
loves toward his people.   
The criticisms raised by those within and outside the church against the concept 
of the preferential option for the poor are important, but liberation theologians and others 
provide an adequate defense of it for several reasons.  First, theologians who favor this 
concept argue that “preferential” love does not mean “exclusive” love.  They equate the 
love God shows to human beings to a physician who loves her patients by eradicating the 
cause of their maladies.  Second, this option for the poor does not mean placing in con-
flict one group against another, but rather, strengthening the whole community by assist-
ing those who are the most vulnerable.  For Christians, the preferential option for the 
poor calls the faithful to respond to the needs of all their brothers and sisters, but those 
with the greatest needs require the greatest response.  Finally, Stephen J. Pope provides a 
persuasive answer to the charge that the poor have epistemological superiority over the 
non-poor.  He says, 
In my judgment, this transition can be further promoted by more carefully differ-
entiating valid claims of insights and sensibilities availed by material poverty 
from illusory or exaggerated claims of broad class-based epistemological superi-
ority.  Certainly some among the poor understand the ways in which Jesus 
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preached "good news to the poor" in a manner not attained by the non-poor.  Pov-
erty provides a special context for discovering and giving witness to aspects of 
God's love and providence; yet other arenas can also be found, e.g. the obstetri-
cian who experiences each new birth as a precious gift from God, or an astro-
physicist's (or microbiologist's) appreciation of the majesty of creation.  These are 
also “privileged locations” from which aspects of God's goodness, mercy, justice, 
etc., can be appreciated in special ways.  Far from being biased, this understand-
ing of the hermeneutical privilege works against bias by insisting that we submit 
to the truth as disclosed in the experience of people who have been hitherto ig-
nored.48 
 
d. The Preferential Option for the Poor and the Work of Hernando de Soto: Initiating 
the Dialogue 
 
The Catholic Church’s commitment to transform society into a place where peo-
ple respect human dignity and human rights challenges those who support this option to 
analyze how contemporary economic structures and systems marginalize those who live 
in poverty.49  Advocates for the preferential option for the poor recognize that much of 
today’s economic development marginalizes millions of people in the world’s poorest 
countries.  The current system often denies the poor the right to use their talents to sup-
port themselves, families, and local communities.  A large number of people today have 
no way of entering the global market that would enable them to see their qualities appre-
ciated and utilized.  Thus, one of the main problems for the poor of the developing world 
today is that of gaining fair access to local and international markets.  De Soto, for exam-
ple, seriously challenges the idea that poverty in the Third World results from people 
lacking entrepreneurial skill and talent, nor is it because the people who have been 
shaped by these cultures are unable to adopt the techniques and practices necessary to 
benefit from a market economic system.  They remain outside of the global market be-
                                                 
48 Stephen J. Pope, “Proper and Improper Partiality and The Preferential Option for the Poor,” Theological 
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49 Gaudium et spes, no. 29. 
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cause they do not possess the ability to utilize their assets since they are denied their 
property rights.50  As a result, I contend throughout the dissertation that Hernando de 
Soto’s strategy to help the poor is applicable to those who support the Catholic Church’s 
commitment to a preferential option for the poor.  De Soto’s work is applicable to those 
who opt for the poor because it provides valuable insight into the myriad ways in which 
bureaucratic and legal obstacles deny the poor their right to own and represent their as-
sets.  His approach shows how people can opt for the poor to join in solidarity with them 
by identifying and eliminating the legal and institutional barriers that currently marginal-
ize these people.  Although no one approach can solve all the problems faced by those 
living in LDCs, Hernando de Soto’s strategy to promote and protect property rights is an 
important step in the struggle to overcome economic injustice.   
To demonstrate how each party can benefit from one another’s ideas and perspec-
tives, it is important to recognize some of the obstacles to link de Soto’s work with 
Catholic social teaching.  Catholic social teaching raises significant questions for de 
Soto’s work because he places a heavy emphasis on an individual’s absolute right to own 
and use property.  Although Catholic social teaching supports the right of a person to own 
and use property, its more communitarian framework for understanding property owner-
ship and its use challenges de Soto to reconsider the responsibilities that come with prop-
erty ownership.  Indeed, Catholic social teaching contends that private property, regard-
less of the concrete forms of the regulations and juridical norms relative to it, is in its es-
sence only an instrument for respecting the principle of the universal destination of 
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goods; in the final analysis, therefore, it is not an end but a means.51  Thus, a dominant 
question throughout this work is, “How can Catholic social teaching augment de Soto’s 
work by linking his ideas about property rights to a theological anthropology that makes 
the dignity and social nature of the human person central to its social teaching?”  Al-
though de Soto attempts to address the needs of the poor by helping them to gain owner-
ship over their assets through solidifying their property rights, he employs a libertarian 
anthropology that makes it difficult to provide an adequate rationale for why it is impor-
tant to stand in solidarity with the poor.  In contrast, Catholic social teaching, with its 
commitment to a preferential option for the poor, has led the church to examine which 
economic structures best serve human dignity and meet the material needs of the poor.  
Catholic social teaching emphasizes a more organic view of ownership.  It views the 
goods of the earth as intended for all people and it sees the human person as a social crea-
ture created in the image and likeness of God who engages in economic activities to sat-
isfy basic human needs, which also allows people to serve the whole of society.  The kind 
of anthropology Catholic social teaching provides can help de Soto to go ever further to-
ward helping the poor to meet their material needs because its more communitarian view 
of the person in society provides better resources for why it is vitally important to stand 
in solidarity with the poor.  The more communitarian framework of Catholic social teach-
ing for understanding the duties and responsibilities that come with property ownership 
therefore augments the kind of anthropology de Soto’s employs to underwrite his com-
mitment to property rights.   
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Although there are many ways that the theological anthropology that underwrites 
Catholic social teaching can benefit de Soto’s work, his investigation provides this tradi-
tion with a more robust investigation into the ways people can use their assets to sustain 
and generate wealth.  Although Catholic social teaching positively supports the right to 
both own and use property to meet one’s basic material needs, it is important to ask 
whether a simple affirmation of this right leads to any greater clarity about the ways that 
people can utilize this right effectively to help the poor to fulfill their basic needs.  De 
Soto’s many years of working in developing nations, which has allowed him to see the 
negative impact the disenfranchisement of people’s property rights have had on poor 
people, can provide the tradition with a guide who can both explain why poverty persists 
in the developing world and offer solutions to eliminate it.  Thus, de Soto’s work not only 
uncovers why people are disenfranchised from their property rights, but his analysis lu-
cidly defends the idea that it is necessary to expand the realm of ownership among the 
poor to create a living environment that produces a greater sense of solidarity among all 
people, which advances an essential ideal of Catholic social teaching. 
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Chapter 2 
 
Catholic Social Teaching and the Right to Private Property: History, Strengths, Weak-
nesses, and Future Directions 
 
In chapter 1, I briefly discussed why poverty in the developing world is a source 
of hardship for people who live in LDCs.  Today, the situation for those living in these 
nations remains bleak as evidenced by the alarming statistical evidence mentioned earlier.  
I argued that on the most basic level poverty negatively affects a person’s physical exis-
tence.1  I also discussed in chapter 1 that the impact of poverty goes well beyond under-
mining a person’s physical existence.  Poverty also diminishes a person’s capacity to par-
ticipate in society as an active and equal agent since people in poverty often cannot ac-
cess such things as basic education and healthcare.  The plight of the poor in the develop-
ing world therefore challenges both national governments and non-governmental organi-
zations (NGOs), such as the Catholic Church, to find strategies to eradicate poverty in the 
developing world.  As Pope John Paul II said in his 1993 World Day for Prayer for Peace 
message,  
No country by itself can succeed in such an undertaking.  For this very reason, it 
is necessary to work together, with that solidarity demanded by a world, which 
has become ever more interdependent.  To allow situations of extreme poverty to 
persist is to create social conditions ever more exposed to the threat of violence 
and conflict.2 
 
                                                 
1 For example, more than 800 million people have too little to eat to meet their daily energy needs.  For 
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In order to stand in solidarity with the poor, the Catholic Church over the past 
century has developed a body of social teachings whose purpose primarily has been to 
enlighten, inspire, and guide moral reform on social matters.  Although there is no offi-
cial canon of Catholic social teaching, general agreement exists on the major documents 
belonging to this tradition.  One of the key issues that the church has repeatedly ad-
dressed in these documents is the right of persons to own and use property.  The church’s 
worldwide, transnational extent has given it vital experience of nearly all of the economic 
systems that have been developed, and its historical memory is a long one.  It is not sur-
prising, therefore, that the right to own and use property has received extensive treatment 
in the tradition of Catholic social teaching because issues surrounding who determines 
and arranges systems regarding the possession and use of the material goods of the earth 
greatly influences the lives of so many people.  A corpus of social teaching without a 
long-term engagement pertaining to this important right would have left the tradition in 
the perilous position of being potentially unable to deal with the great and challenging 
social questions that emerged over the past one hundred years.  In order to identify the 
strengths and weaknesses of the tradition regarding its teachings about this right, the sec-
tion below provides a historical review of the papal social encyclicals that dealt with the 
right to private property.  To elucidate both the strengths and weaknesses of this tradition 
about this right, a historical review of this important subject is required.  It is to these is-
sues that I now turn.      
a. A History of the Right to Private Property in Catholic Social Teaching 
a. Pope Leo XIII and Rerum Novarum on Private Property 
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Pope Leo XIII wrote Rerum novarum in 1891 in the aftermath of a genuine revo-
lution, the Industrial Revolution that began in England with the invention of the steam 
engine and its application as an energy source for factories.  Over the course of time, this 
revolution spread throughout Western Europe.  The advancement of this revolution 
brought with it a number of changes to the economic and social landscape of Europe.  
Some of the most important economic changes that took place were advantageous to 
capital.  These included “a steady supply of surplus labor, wages set at the lowest level 
possible, and the need for long hours of labor by all members of a family merely to sur-
vive.”3  Socially, Western Europe experienced a large migration from rural to urban set-
tings.  This led to changes in family life including a shift in the family as a unit of pro-
duction to a unit of consumption.   
The immediate problem Pope Leo wished to address in Rerum novarum was how 
to bridge the wide gulf that separated the wealthy few from the impoverished masses.  
Rerum novarum responded to these challenges from the perspective of natural law articu-
lated from within the context of Christendom.  Leo at this point in history still assumed 
the normative status of the Catholic Church in Western Europe as the institution, as 
Thomas Shannon says, that “legitimated other social institutions as well as having the 
moral authority to prescribe solutions to various problems.”4  Leo saw the natural law as 
the framework for civil law and, similar to many contemporaries in the Church, viewed it 
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in the traditional framework of a predominately static understanding of both nature and 
society.   
His view of society and understanding of natural law led him to point out the ill 
effects of liberalism and socialism, which were the two dominant ideological systems at 
the time.  On the one hand, Leo criticized liberalism for its excessive individualism and 
definition of freedom as exemption from external constraint.  On the other hand, he ex-
pressly condemned socialism for its denial of individual liberty through the suppression 
of private property.  While Leo lauded socialism’s eagerness to find a cure for the cupid-
ity stimulated by the free-enterprise system, he saw the proposed solution, namely, the 
total suppression of private property, as worse than the disease itself.5   
The core of Rerum novarum is its insistence on the concept of private property.  
In the encyclical, Leo provides four main reasons why people have a right to private 
property.  First, he says the possession of property distinguishes humans from other ani-
mals, for property allows human beings to go beyond the animal instincts of self-
preservation and the propagation of the species to preparing for the future.6  Second, fol-
lowing up the necessity of planning, for human needs recur and demand future provision, 
Leo asserts we can possess not only the fruits of the earth but also the earth itself; for of 
the products of the earth human beings can make provision for the future.7  Third, accord-
ing to the natural law, when human beings use their industry to procure the fruits of na-
ture by that act they should possess that portion as their own, and should have a right to 
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6 Rerum novarum, no. 4. 
 
7 Rerum novarum, no. 6. 
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keep it without molestation.8  Finally, Leo argues that since the family is the first natural 
society,9 within the family the father, in his capacity as its head, has the duty to provide 
for his family.10 
Leo makes private property a central concept in Rerum novarum because he pro-
posed it as a solution to combat the ill effects of the two dominant ideologies, especially 
socialism.  Leo perceived that the socialists were undercutting rights to property and were 
demanding a redistribution of property – and that implied the right to seize state property.  
Leo proposed, in contrast, that the ability to own property was a way out of poverty for 
workers because it provided some level of security.  He also believed the denial of the 
right to own property would remove the necessary incentives to ingenuity and cause the 
fountains of wealth to dry up.11  As a result, the working principle that Leo established in 
Rerum novarum is that private ownership is rooted in the law of nature (natural law), is in 
conformity with human nature, is enforced by legitimate civil law, and the authority of 
Divine Law.12 
The odd thing about Leo’s teaching on private property is that he appears to give 
this right a higher status than did St. Thomas Aquinas.  This is unusual since in the en-
cyclical Aeterni patris (1879) Leo sought to restore Thomism as the perennial philosophy 
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of Catholicism.13  Leo knew that Thomas was a defender of property rights.  Although St. 
Thomas did not provide a formal treatment of the ways in which people acquire property 
rights,14 he believed that possession of external things is natural to human beings.15  In 
the Summa Theologica, Aquinas argued that human beings have competency over the 
procurement and dispensing of possessions for three reasons.16  First, when people hold 
possessions in common, they tend to neglect them.  Second, people often avoid work 
when holding possessions in common, which leads to an inefficient use of resources.  Fi-
nally, holding possessions in common often leads to discord and quarrelling.17  St. Tho-
mas, however, believed that the right to possessions had a limitation.  Human beings 
ought to use their possessions for the benefit of the common good.18  He justifies the ap-
propriation of particular resources on general justice.  In other words, “on the advantages 
which such appropriation is likely to bring to all members of the community.”19  This 
connection between individual ownership of property and, what we call today, the uni-
versal destination of material goods remains an important part of Catholic social teach-
ing.   
In contrast, Leo describes the right to own property as a natural right whereas St. 
Thomas saw that the possession of property to be the result of human positive law.  Aqui-
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nas’s position is that “a private property system of control is a social convention that does 
not violate the natural law but can be justified on grounds of practical expediency.”20  As 
Aquinas says, 
Now, according to the natural order instituted by divine providence, material 
goods are provided for the satisfaction of human needs.  Therefore the division of 
and appropriation of property, that proceeds from human law, must not hinder the 
satisfaction of man’s necessity for such goods.  Equally whatever a man has in 
superabundance is owed, of natural right to the poor for their sustenance.21 
 
The benefit of Aquinas’s teaching is that possession of property may not be a natural 
right in the way that Leo expresses it.  Aquinas recognizes a claim to property that must 
be respected, but sees the social organization of property or its distribution as a social is-
sue rather than as a right.  As Jean Porter says,  
Aquinas does not quite say that in a situation of extreme need a poor person has a 
right to the goods of the rich person.  But in effect, he does say that the poor per-
son in this situation is immune from punishment if she takes the goods of the 
rich.22 
 
It is possible to argue that in the late thirteenth century many scholars went even further 
along this path than Aquinas did.  As Porter says, some scholastics argued “the claims of 
the poor for material necessities constituted a right which should be safeguarded by law, 
and generated new legal institutions for adjudicating and safeguarding these claims.”23  
Thus, there is a commitment in the work of St. Thomas that the right that one has over 
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property can be qualified by the needs of others.24  The shift away from Thomas’s think-
ing on private property becomes explicit in Rerum novarum 7 when Leo identifies the 
procurement of ownership of property as the result of one’s labor.25 
Leo’s shift in emphasis in the encyclical borrows more from the tradition of the 
philosopher John Locke than from those of the Medieval Scholastics.  Locke’s theory of 
the social contract rests less on the precepts of natural law than the preservation of the 
natural right to property.  He asserted that private property exists within the state of na-
ture before the presence of governments “because people needed to claim as their own 
the fruits from the trees in ‘the commons’ which they had to eat to survive.”26  Indeed, in 
Locke’s Two Treatises of Government, he secures the rights of the individual against 
government, including the right to property.27  Locke believed the preservation of prop-
erty “is the chief reason why individuals place themselves under government, but gov-
ernment does not grant the right to property.”28  Instead, according to Locke, 
Though the earth and all inferior creatures be common to all men, yet every man 
has a ‘property’ in his own ‘person.’  This nobody has any right to but himself.  
The ‘labor’ of his body and the ‘work’ of his hands, we may say, are properly his.  
Whatsoever, then he removes out of the state that Nature hath provided and left it 
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in, he hath mixed his labor with it, and joined it something that is his own, and 
thereby makes it his property.29 
 
It is easy to perceive the influence that Locke had on Leo’s ideas in Rerum novarum.  
This influence, however, obscured Thomas’s earlier emphasis on the use of possessions 
to benefit the common good, especially the poor.  This undercut the earlier ecclesial tradi-
tion of the priority of the communality of all property.30   
Although Leo’s principal concern was with the modern laborer and his earnings, 
some have argued that his “proclamation of the sacredness of private property benefited 
the rich as much if not more than it did the poor.”31  On the one hand, it is possible to ar-
gue that the elevation of the right to own property as a natural right gives this important 
document within the corpus of Catholic social teaching an overtly negative face to those 
who are poor and marginalized.  For if God ordained property rights, He must have or-
dained the inequalities they necessarily entail.  As Dan Usher says about some theologi-
cally based justifications for the protection of private property,  
God must approve of the plutocrat in his mansion and the bum begging on the 
street.  That divine authority stands behind the great disparities of wealth we ob-
serve around us is a proposition which may be congenial to the wealthy but is 
somewhat difficult for the rest of us to swallow.32 
   
On the other hand, and more positively, it is possible to reconcile the right to ownership 
of property with Leo’s emphasis on the social obligations that come with ownership.  In 
Rerum novarum, Leo discusses that just ownership requires meeting one’s obligations to 
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both the poor and workers.  In the case of the poor, this requires the duty of charity or 
benevolence.  Although Leo did not emphasize, like later pontiffs, the role large-scale 
social institutions play in addressing the needs of the poor, he did provide the grounds to 
link the natural right to own property with the concept of stewardship.  As Patricia Wer-
hane contends, 
Thus, Rerum novarum challenges both Marxism and economic egoism.  It links 
alienation to poor working conditions and the inability to own property rather than 
to the nature of work itself.  The economic leveler of greed is not socialism nor 
the market but the obligation to expand and extend property ownership.  Steward-
ship thus conceived as linking property with concomitant obligations implies a 
sense of social justice parallel to the demands of the nineteenth century populists 
that safeguard individualism without sacrificing the goal of economic redistribu-
tion.33 
 
b. Pius XI and Quadragesimo anno on Private Property 
 
Pope Pius XI (Ambrogio Damiano Achille Ratti) wrote Quadragesimo anno at 
the midpoint of his papacy in 1931.  His pontificate spanned seventeen tumultuous years 
(1922-39).  From the aftermath of World War I, to the rise of Soviet Communism in Rus-
sia, to the spread of fascism in Italy and Nazism in Germany, to the collapse of the inter-
national economy that incited a worldwide depression, Pius led the church in a climate 
thick with political and economic tension.  One of the most important achievements of 
Quadragesimo anno was that it commemorated Pope Leo XIII’s Rerum novarum.  Nei-
ther of Pius’s two predecessors, nor his successor Pius XII, did so.  By confirming Leo’s 
work, Quadragesimo anno “helped assure that during the century to come, the Catholic 
Church would treat the task of relating faith to socioeconomic concerns as an integral di-
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mension of its mission.”34  Indeed, Pius, forty years later, built upon the foundation of 
Rerum novarum and introduced new concepts that would significantly add to the body of 
Catholic social teaching.   
The release of the encyclical came after the Vatican had signed the Lateran Treaty 
and Concordat with the fascist government of Benito Mussolini in 1929.  “This treaty had 
relinquished Vatican claims to sovereignty over the former Papal States, including Rome, 
officially ratifying circumstances that had obtained since 1870.”35  Even though the 
church maintained legal jurisdiction over the 108.7-acre state, the Lateran pacts also 
promised protection for various church ministries including the educating of youth, up-
holding marriage and the family, and supporting the myriad associations that constituted 
the lifeblood of the Church’s everyday activities that were important to Pius.36  Mussolini 
ignored these provisions when he ordered numerous Catholic organizations closed down 
by the state police on the charge that they were functioning as political rather than reli-
gious entities.  As a result,  
 Quadragesimo anno played its part in the pope’s ongoing tightrope walk aimed at 
maintaining the Church’s mission as distinct from political engagement or civil 
control, while using ecclesial authority and clout in ways that challenged, if cir-
cumspectly, Mussolini’s totalitarian designs.37 
 
  In regards to the right to private property, Pius emphasizes a new dimension in 
Quadragesimo anno: the social dimension.  Quadragesimo anno 44-52 reaffirms Leo’s 
                                                 
34 Christine Firer Hinze, “Commentary on Quadragesimo anno (After Forty Years),” in Modern Catholic 
Social Teaching: Commentaries and Interpretations, ed.  Kenneth R. Himes, O.F.M. (Washington, D.C.: 
Georgetown University Press, 2005), 153. 
 
35 Ibid., 152. 
 
36 Ibid. 
 
37 Ibid. 
 
  45
commitment in Rerum novarum to own private property, but it places more emphasis on 
the use of possessions for the benefit of the common good.38  As discussed earlier, critics 
of Rerum novarum point out that Leo did not sufficiently develop the social dimension of 
private property to balance the personal dimension.  As Matthew Habiger, O.S.B. says, 
When distinguishing between ownership and use, Rerum novarum places empha-
sis upon ownership.  When the use of private property is mentioned, more empha-
sis is given to the private dimension, rather than the social dimension of prop-
erty.39 
   
Pius XI expands the discussion about the use of property in Quadragesimo anno 44.  He 
defends Leo’s position in Rerum novarum against the charge that the Catholic Church 
upheld the wealthier classes against the working class.  Although Pius defends Leo’s po-
sition, he begins his defense of this right by first highlighting the dual aspect of owner-
ship: it is individual and social.  He acknowledges that God gives the right to own private 
property so that individuals can provide for their own needs and for the needs of their 
families.  He then criticizes in Quadragesimo anno 45-46 the dangers associated with 
both liberalism and socialism.  Pius argues those who deny the social character of prop-
erty succumb to individualism while those who deny or reject the individual character of 
private property fall into collectivism.   
Pius sought to find a more adequate solution to correct the ill effects of both these 
ideologies.  He primarily does this by distinguishing, in many ways more forcefully than 
did Leo, the social dimension of the use of private property.  For example, in Quad-
ragesimo anno 47, Pius says,  
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That justice called commutative commands sacred respect for the division of pos-
sessions and forbids invasion of others’ rights through the exceeding of the limits 
of one's own property; but the duty of owners to use their property only in a right 
way does not come under this type of justice, but under other virtues, obligations 
of which “cannot be enforced by legal action.”  Therefore, they are in error who 
assert that ownership and its right use are limited by the same boundaries; and it is 
much farther still from the truth to hold that a right to property is destroyed or lost 
by reason of abuse or non-use.40 
 
Pius argued, on the one hand, that commutative justice requires that people faithfully re-
spect the possessions of others.  On the other hand, how one uses one’s possessions, 
though, while not always legally enforceable, is subject to the dictates of other virtues.  
As a result, “Pius praises civil efforts to specify duties attaching to use in light of the re-
quirements of the common good, but he warns that in so doing one must take care not to 
destroy or even weaken property’s individual character (47-48).”41 
 Quadragesimo anno made an important contribution to Catholic social teaching 
when it affirmed that the social character of private property requires that owners “take 
into account not only their own advantage but the common good.”42  Pius argued, “To 
define the duties relevant to the common good is the function of government.”43  He says 
that government, when necessary and for the sake of the common good, has the responsi-
bility to define the licit and illicit uses of property.  The “natural” right to own property 
remains intact, but Pius affirmed that when, within proper limits, civil authority “adjusts 
ownership to meet the needs of the public good, the greater justice of the commonwealth 
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that results strengthens the legitimate right to private property (48-49).”44  By highlight-
ing the communal dimensions of the use of private property, Pius accentuates the idea 
that  
no matter who owns a piece of property, there is a social function inherent in that 
property.  This social function compels its owner to bear in mind that society is to 
be served by the material goods which the Creator has intended for everyone.  
This rules out an excessive individualism.45 
 
Not only does this teaching curb an excessive individualism, it emphasizes the impor-
tance of entrepreneurial investment of extra income to create employment opportunities 
for others, which Pius regarded as an act of liberality especially appropriate for his day.46  
c. John XXIII and Mater et magistra on Private Property 
 
Before John XXIII (Angelo Roncalli) became Pope in 1958, Pope Pius XII 
(Eugenio Pacelli) led the Catholic Church from 1939-1958 through the tumultuous years 
of World War II and its aftermath.  Today, most historians agree that the central issue in 
the assessment of Pius XII as a man, as a Christian leader, and in the interpretation of his 
pontificate is the adequacy or inadequacy of his response to Hitler’s attempt at a “final 
solution of the Jewish problem.”47  During his pontificate, Pius never issued a social en-
cyclical to commemorate Leo’s Rerum novarum, but through a series of Christmas mes-
sages, he attempted to proclaim the basic truths of Catholic social teaching, including the 
right to procure and use property.  In the writings of Pius XII, there is no significant 
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change in the Church’s social teaching about private property.  “By far the most highly 
emphasized dimension of Pius XII’s teaching on property is its role in the establishment 
of a just world order.”48  Thus, Pius accepted Rerum novarum and Quadragesimo anno 
and referred to them repeatedly.  Although his pronouncements do not modify or surren-
der the basic principles of Catholic social teaching, the lack of specificity with which he 
applied these principles has led some historians to judge him complaisant or timorous in 
the face of overwhelming evils.  Thus, John Langan, S.J. concludes, 
What Pius XII was able to articulate in his Christmas messages during this time of 
grave crisis was a constrained and restricted repetition of some central values of 
the Catholic social tradition of social thought, values such as the importance of 
maintaining the moral character of the state.  But these values could easily be seen 
as tautologies or platitudes, since they were not joined with a perceptive and 
forthright statement of the actual political and moral situation of Europe in this 
gravely disturbed time or with a prophetic willingness to denounce evil.  General-
ity and neutrality prevailed over courageous commitment and principled resis-
tance to evil.49 
 
The lack of a strong voice to give new direction to Catholic social teaching, however, 
changed during the pontificate of John XXIII.   
Many church historians agree that the brief pontificate of John XXIII (1958-1963) 
marked a period of renewal within the Catholic Church.  As evidence, they point to his 
calling of the Second Vatican Council and his writing of two major social encyclicals 
Mater et magistra in May 1961 and Pacem in terris in April 1963.  Both the Second 
Vatican Council and John’s social encyclicals brought a new tone and openness to the 
Church’s reflection on economic and political issues.  As historian Garry Wills says, 
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“The encyclicals and the council amounted to a one-two punch by the prime mover be-
hind them both, Pope John XXIII.”50  Even though the most lasting legacy of John’s pon-
tificate was his calling of the Second Vatican Council, his two social encyclicals helped 
to define a vision of the Church that reached out to secular society.  While Pacem in ter-
ris became important because it served as a platform for Catholic social action on behalf 
of human rights movements in nations such as Chile, South Africa, South Korea, Poland, 
Guatemala, El Salvador, the Philippines, Mexico, and East Timor, it was Mater et magis-
tra where people discovered most explicitly John XXIII’s teaching about the economic 
order.  As a result, its release accomplished many important things in the history of 
Catholic social teaching.   
First, it was the original encyclical to address the problems of the developing 
world.  Second, Mater et magistra analyzed “the growing complexity of social relation-
ships in the controversial section on “socialization,” offered concrete strategies in the ag-
ricultural sector, and discussed the social dimensions of private property and a just 
wage.”51  Third, the encyclical introduced a methodology that was inductive, which 
opened the door to regional and national articulations of Catholic social teaching that 
were appropriate for that region, for example, the Conference of Latin American Bishops 
(CELAM) and the National Conference of Catholic Bishops of the United States.  Fi-
nally, Donal Dorr believes Mater et magistra provided the foreground for later discus-
sions about the need to develop a preferential option for the poor because it challenged 
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those interested in Catholic social teaching to ask the question, “With whom do we 
stand?”52   
Regarding the right to private property, sections 104-121 of Mater et magistra 
discuss the importance of this right.  Overall, John sees the right to private property as but 
one of a set of interdependent, universal human rights deriving from the inherent dignity 
of the human person.53  First, John affirms, in agreement with Leo XIII and Pius XI, that 
this right is permanent and natural to human beings.   
The right of private ownership of goods, including productive goods, has perma-
nent validity.  It is part of the natural order, which teaches that the individual is 
prior to society and society must be ordered to the good of the individual.54  
 
John follows these statements with the claim that the right to property is required by natu-
ral law and part of the plan of divine wisdom.55  Third, he joined Leo by emphasizing that 
individual ownership comes through one’s labor.56  Finally, he continued to go beyond 
Leo’s teaching by joining with Pius XI, who recovered the Thomistic tradition that em-
phasized that private property is a right to the extent that it serves a social function, in 
that it helps to promote right order in society and the stewardship of resources.  Mater et 
magistra thus defends the right of private property as “a safeguard” and “stimulus” for 
the “exercise of liberty” and the “rights of the human person”.57   
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One of John’s most important contributions to Catholic social teaching is that the 
right to private property is never merely personal.  Instead, John believed the personal 
right to private property presumes the correlative social duty of ensuring not only a 
broader but more equitable extension of property rights.  This becomes evident in section 
115 of Mater et magistra.  John states, “Now, if ever, is the time to insist on a more 
widespread distribution of property, in view of the rapid economic development of an 
increasing number of States.”58  The benefit that John assumed would come with the ex-
tension of property rights was a foundation to secure human liberty personally and stabil-
ity in the political order socially.  That is why he states in Mater et magistra 111, “Hence 
private ownership must be considered as a guarantee of the essential freedom of the indi-
vidual, and at the same time an indispensable element in a true social order.”59  John was 
optimistic that nations could rather easily expand ownership among those who lack prop-
erty rights.  He says, 
It will not be difficult for the body politic, by the adoption of various techniques 
of proved efficiency, to pursue an economic and social policy which facilitates the 
widest possible distribution of private property in terms of durable consumer 
goods, houses, land, tools and equipment (in the case of craftsmen and owners of 
family farms), and shares in medium and large business concerns.  This policy is 
in fact being pursued with considerable success by several of the socially and 
economically advanced nations.60 
 
John’s teaching implied that “economic growth that a number of nations had experienced 
led naturally to increased ownership.”61  Donal Dorr sees this as an “uncritical assump-
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tion’ and a “blind spot” in papal analysis and thinking.62  When comparing John’s analy-
sis to the obstacles associated with expanding property rights among the poor today, his 
encyclical appears overly optimistic.63  Nonetheless, and to his great credit, John recog-
nized that the expansion of property rights among the poor is an important step in the 
process of economic development.  Today, John’s insight remains a key contribution to 
Catholic social teaching.   
d. Paul VI on Private Property 
 
Giovanni Battista Montana became Pope on June 21, 1963 and served the church 
for fifteen years until his death on August 6, 1978.  He is most widely known for his 
overseeing the final sessions of the Second Vatican Council and for his encyclical Hu-
mane Vitae (July 29, 1968).  Paul VI also started the trend, continued and expanded by 
Pope John Paul II, of addressing social questions by traveling to different places around 
the world.  For example, in 1964 he became the first Pope since St. Peter to visit the Holy 
Land.  In October 1965, he addressed the United Nations in New York on the subject of 
world peace.  In 1969, Paul VI traveled to Geneva, Switzerland, in June for an appear-
ance at the Protestant World Council of Churches and two months later to Kampala, 
Uganda for a two-day visit, making the first time a pontiff ever visited Africa.   
The social writings bearing the signature of Pope Paul VI include two Vatican II 
documents, Gaudium et spes (December 7, 1965) and Dignitatis humanae (December 7, 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
62 Donal Dorr, “Pope John XXIII – New Directions?” in Readings in Moral Theology No. 5: Official 
Catholic Social Teaching, eds. Charles Curran and Richard McCormick (New York: Paulist Press, 1986), 
85.  Dorr’s essay can also be found in his book Option for the Poor: A Hundred Years of Catholic Social 
Teaching, rev. ed. (Maryknoll, N.Y.: Orbis Books, 1992), 113-46. 
 
63 As I will discuss in chapter 5, de Soto’s work shows why John’s analysis was overly optimistic regarding 
the ease with which people could legitimately secure their property rights in developing nations. 
  53
1965), and two letters.64  The first of these letters is formally an encyclical, Populorum 
progressio (March 26, 1967), and is addressed to the bishops, priests, religious, the faith-
ful, and to all men of good will.  The second letter is an “apostolic letter” addressed to 
Cardinal Maurice Roy, president of the Laity and Pontifical Commission “Justitia et 
pax.”  Written on the eightieth anniversary of Rerum novarum, it is entitled Octogesima 
adveniens.   
A key issue that the social encyclicals of Paul VI address, especially Populorum 
progressio, is the precariousness of economic development.  Populorum progressio is 
widely considered the most critical document within the corpus of modern papal Catholic 
social teaching regarding the dangers of economic development and the strategies em-
ployed to alleviate poverty in developing countries.  While previous social documents of 
the Church tended to balance critiques of liberalism or free market capitalism with equal 
or stronger critiques of collectivism, this encyclical tilts more in the direction of a critique 
of the type of capitalism currently practiced.65   
Pope Paul VI responded to the problem of economic development in Populorum 
progressio by advocating an “integral” development where ownership must cultivate the 
good of all persons.  He placed the human person at the center of all his reflections re-
garding how to measure the benefits of economic development.  Paul believed that devel-
opment must contribute to the blossoming of what is most authentic and deepest in hu-
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man beings, that which goes beyond the purely economic or material, that is, the spiritual 
side of the human person and community.  He underwrote his idea of an integral devel-
opment with the concept of solidarity, which means that the rich nations must be con-
cerned about the poor ones.66  They must show that concern in practical ways, “such as 
giving direct aid, establishing fairer trade relations, and seeing to it that no one is left be-
hind as development advances.”67  Paul, therefore, challenged the present system of in-
ternational trading relations, pointing out that they are such that “poor nations become 
poorer while the rich ones become still richer.”68  In this way, Paul did not assume that 
poverty stemmed from “purely natural causes or the laziness of the people living in the 
poorest parts of the world.”69  Instead, he severely criticized more than his predecessors 
did a defective capitalist system that negated the great potential of industrialization for 
human advancement.  He provided criteria in Populorum progressio to judge the authen-
ticity of development including the way it affects the family, culture, environment, and 
human persons.  Thus, the great benefit of Populorum progressio is that it insists on the 
ethical and philosophical underpinnings of development and, as a result, it makes sub-
stantial contributions to the legacy of Catholic social teaching, including expounding the 
purpose of economic life, “which is for people and for enhancing being, not having.”70   
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Regarding the right to private property, Paul VI denies in Populorum progressio 
and Octogesima adveniens that it constitutes an absolute and unconditional right.71  Paul 
calls attention to “‘the moral primacy of the common good’ to denounce the ‘oppressive 
social structures’ originating in the ‘abuses of ownership’ and ‘power.’”72  He strongly 
affirms the insistence on the universal destination of created things consistent with Catho-
lic social teaching.  It is in Populorum progressio 22-24 where Paul discusses the human 
right to private possessions most thoroughly.  He subordinates this right to the principle 
that God created everything on earth for the use of every human being.  The Bible, Paul 
VI argued, 
teaches us that the whole of creation is for man, that it is his responsibility to de-
velop it by intelligent effort and by means of his labor to perfect it, so to speak, 
for his use.  If the world is made to furnish each individual with the means of live-
lihood and the instruments for his growth and progress, each man has therefore 
the right to find in the world what is necessary for himself.73 
 
After commenting that the Second Vatican Council reaffirmed the idea that the goods of 
the earth and all that it contains are for the use of every human person, Paul claims that 
all other rights, including those of property and of free commerce, “are to be subordinated 
to this principle.  They should not hinder but on the contrary favor its application.  It is a 
grave and urgent social duty to redirect them to their primary finality.”74  As a result, 
Allan Figueroa Deck, S.J. claims, “This affirmation of the social purpose of private prop-
erty is still the strongest in Catholic social teaching.”75 
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Paul’s emphasis regarding the social dimension of property is particularly relevant 
when comparing his work to earlier statements made by his predecessors within the his-
tory of Catholic social teaching.  In Rerum novarum, Leo XIII initiated the tradition of 
modern Catholic social teaching with an affirmation that all persons have a right to own 
personal possessions.  In his desire to combat the ill effects of socialism and Marxist ide-
ology, he stressed the right of ownership to the detriment to the social responsibilities that 
come with it.  In Quadragesimo anno, Pius XI began to reverse this trend by highlighting 
the social purpose and duty inherent in the possession of private property.  In Populorum 
progressio, Pope Paul VI went further than his predecessors did by placing “the social 
function before the individual right to private property.”76  This was an important step 
within the history of Catholic social teaching.77  In asking the question about the actions 
that flow from an awareness of global poverty and economic injustice, “the pope chose to 
make the topic of the proper role of private property absolutely central.”78  Although he 
takes for granted that the right of private property is a well-established fact and many 
people accept it, his concern was that owners of private property were not giving suffi-
cient attention to the primary finality of all property.  Thus, for Paul, all resources for de-
velopment are to be pooled and utilized where they can best affect the common good.  In 
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particular, he believed that wealthy nations have a special obligation to help poor nations 
attain their fair share of the goods of the earth to meet the demands of social justice.  As a 
result, he does not advocate the elimination of the free market.  Rather, he wanted to 
regulate it in such a way to help level the playing field to establish conditions of equality. 
e. Pope John Paul II and Private Property 
 
Karol Wojtyla became pontiff of the Roman Catholic Church on October 16, 
1978.  During his long and remarkable tenure as Pope, John Paul II made significant con-
tributions to the history of Catholic social teaching.  The three social encyclicals he wrote 
between the years 1981 through 1991 evidence this contribution.  His first social encycli-
cal, Laborem exercens, issued on September 14, 1981, provides the most comprehensive 
treatment about the dignity of human work in the corpus of Catholic social teaching.  Sol-
licitudo rei socialis, issued in December of 1987 to commemorate the twentieth anniver-
sary of Populorum progressio, focused on the issue of human development.  Finally, in 
1991, John Paul commemorated Leo XIII’s Rerum novarum with Centesimus annus.  
This important letter addressed both the dramatic changes undermining communism in 
Eastern Europe and the arguments for and against Western capitalism.   
Although Pope John Paul II made many considerable contributions to the history 
of Catholic social teaching, one of the most important was his commitment to explaining 
the meaning and dignity of human work.  Beginning in Laborem exercens, he expounded 
more than any of his predecessors did “a spirituality of work” that related the moral value 
of labor to the human desire to come closer to God.  John Paul believed that work is a 
vocation to which God calls all human beings.  He said,  
Work is a good thing for man - a good thing for his humanity - because through 
work man not only transforms nature, adapting it to his own needs, but he also 
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achieves fulfillment as a human being and indeed in a sense becomes “more a 
human being.”79 
 
John Paul believed work augmented human dignity in two key ways.  First, human labor 
allows people to achieve self-realization and contribute to the common good.  Work al-
lows human beings to exercise virtue and acquire morally virtuous habits that not only 
benefit the individual person, but also contribute to the well-being of society.  Second, 
John Paul saw the toil of work as a symbol of the human participation in the cross of 
Christ.  He argued, 
By enduring the toil of work in union with Christ crucified for us, man in a way 
collaborates with the Son of God for the redemption of humanity.  He shows him-
self a true disciple of Christ by carrying the cross in his turn every day in the ac-
tivity that he is called upon to perform.80 
 
The belief that Christ reveals what it means to be most authentically human was a theme 
that John Paul first raised in his encyclical Redemptor hominis.  In Laborem exercens and 
throughout his other social encyclicals, John Paul returned to this theme repeatedly.  He 
suggests, “Jesus is one with humanity through the suffering and toil that accompany hu-
man labor.”81  As a result, the toil often accompanied by work allows followers to share 
in the salvific and redemptive cross of Christ.  John Paul believed this was a sign that viv-
idly reveals the dignity of the human person. 
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John Paul’s belief in the value and dignity of human work as a vocation from God 
is a central reason why he argued for the priority of labor over capital.82  Laborem exer-
cens clearly summarizes his ideas.  John Paul contended that the ownership of goods and 
resources must serve human labor.  Since human labor is an expression of our subjectiv-
ity, capital must serve persons because it is the result of human work.  He said,  
In view of this situation we must first recall a principle that has always been 
taught by the church: the principle of the priority of labor over capital.  This prin-
ciple directly concerns the process of production: In this process labor is always a 
primary efficient cause, while capital, the whole collection of means of produc-
tion, remains a mere instrument or instrumental cause.  This principle is an evi-
dent truth that emerges from the whole of man’s historical experience.83 
 
John Paul believed capital serves labor because of the fundamental claim of human dig-
nity based upon the doctrine of creation.  He wanted “to ensure that each person, regard-
less of the type or nature of work, is the fundamental value around which work processes 
are organized.”84  His anthropology, which made the human person and the value of her 
work central elements of his social teaching, denies the idea that the principle of maxi-
mum profit should serve as the only economic consideration.  By placing labor over capi-
tal, he recognized in Laborem exercens the legitimacy of labor unions, of workers’ par-
ticipation in policy formation, management, and ownership, and of socializing certain 
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means of production.85  Thus, from the earliest stages of his pontificate, John Paul made 
explicit what many economists often deny – that there are values behind economics.   
Pope John Paul II’s commitment to the dignity of the human person and her labor 
had an enormous bearing on his writings regarding the right to private property.  
Throughout his social encyclicals, John Paul continued the tradition of his predecessors 
by reaffirming the right to private property while limiting it to meet the demands of the 
common good.  The only thing that surpasses his reliance on the Catholic interpretation 
of private property in his social teaching is his commitment to the dignity of the human 
person.  His appeal to this interpretation is central to understanding John Paul’s analysis 
of economic life in the modern world.  His most notable statements about the right to pri-
vate property come in Laborem exercens and Centesimus annus.   
In Laborem exercens, John Paul continues to emphasize the value and dignity of 
human labor by stating that people acquire property through work in order that it serves 
workers.86  He continues the tradition of Paul VI by subordinating the right to private 
property “to a right common to all to use the goods of creation for the fulfillment of per-
sons.”87  Therefore, no claims upon material resources are absolute because the goods of 
the earth are common to all.  John Paul grounds this principle in the mystery of creation, 
where Yahweh is Lord and the only true owner.88  He harkens back to the Thomistic tra-
dition, which views private property as a secondary right.  Thus, John Paul argued that 
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private property “is a right to the extent that it serves a social function, in that it helps to 
promote right order in society and the stewardship of resources.”89 
John Paul’s most important contributions on the subject of property come in Cen-
tesimus annus, especially in the fourth section entitled, “Private Property and the Univer-
sal Destination of Material Goods.”  Here again, the Pope argues that the truth about the 
human person recognizes both the dignity and the solidarity of human persons.  This sec-
tion deals with private property in this light.  John Paul begins this section with an en-
dorsement of Leo’s affirmation of the natural character of the right to private property.90  
He notes that Leo intended his arguments in favor of private property to oppose socialism 
in the late nineteenth century.  Yet, John Paul follows his more recent predecessors by 
insisting on stronger obligations for property owners, and stronger restrictions on their 
prerogatives, than did Leo.  “This means that the economic efficacy and the moral ade-
quacy of markets must be evaluated in light of the conviction that the goods of the earth 
are destined for all humans and not simply for the prosperous.”91  This is an important 
conviction.  John Paul’s  
reliance on the notion of the universal destination of material goods stresses the 
idea underlying the right of individuals to the goods they need, but puts the stress 
where Aquinas put it: on God’s creative intention for the goods needed, with 
somewhat reduced emphasis on the claims of individuals.92 
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An equally important feature of John Paul’s understanding about property is shift-
ing the argument from the right of private property toward the right to private property.93  
John Paul changed the nature of the debate regarding property rights in order to promote 
the idea that the poor needed to participate more fully in the economic well-being of their 
communities.94  The inability of the poor to participate in many aspects of the global 
economy is the standpoint from which Pope John Paul II identified and criticized many 
problems with modern economic development.  He believed the current economic system 
often denies the poor the right to use their talents to support themselves, families, and lo-
cal communities.  He claimed a large number of people today have “no way of entering 
the network of knowledge and intercommunication which would enable them to see their 
qualities appreciated and utilized.”95  Economic development often takes place above the 
heads of the poor.96  He concluded that a principal problem for the poor of the developing 
world “is that of gaining fair access to the international market, based not on the unilat-
eral principle of the exploitation of the natural resources of these countries but on the 
proper use of human resources.”97   
Thus, Pope John Paul II to his great credit, “is the first pope to emphasize the 
need for the creation of wealth.  This emphasis corresponds not only to the reality of the 
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situation but also to John Paul II’s understanding of the human person.”98  The Pope says 
that in the modern context, “human work, including creativity, invention, and entrepre-
neurial effort, explains much of contemporary economic activity.”99  In paragraph 32 of 
Centesimus annus, the Pope broadens the scope of discussion beyond the “natural fertility 
of the earth” as the main source of production.100  He recognizes the increasing role of 
human capital, which is human scientific knowledge and ingenuity.  He says, 
In our time, in particular, there exists another form of ownership which is becom-
ing no less important than land: the possession of know-how, technology and 
skill.  The wealth of the industrialized nations is based much more on this kind of 
ownership than on natural resources.101 
 
Again, he makes personal work the linchpin for his advocacy of ownership because hu-
man creativity and ingenuity are gifts from God.  These gifts allow people to participate 
in social life and provide opportunities for individuals to benefit the common good, 
mainly in the form of producing jobs for ordinary workers.102  John Paul calls attention to 
the many benefits that result when people use their creativity and ingenuity to elevate the 
good of society.  He says that persons can use their intelligence to discover the earth’s 
productive potential and they can use their capacity to work in common to transform 
natural and human environments.103  Yet, this purpose of capital ownership, in creating 
jobs that pay a wage sufficient to ensure that the goods of the earth are accessible to all, 
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means that ownership becomes illegitimate if it contravenes this goal.  Thus, John Paul 
stated in Centesimus annus 43, 
Ownership of the means of production, whether in industry or agriculture, is just 
and legitimate if it serves useful work.  It becomes illegitimate, however, when it 
is not utilized or when it serves to impede the work of others, in an effort to gain a 
profit which is not the result of the overall expansion of work and the wealth of 
society, but rather is the result of curbing them or of illicit exploitation, specula-
tion or the breaking of solidarity among working people.  Ownership of this kind 
has no justification, and represents an abuse in the sight of God and humanity.104 
 
In paragraph 42 of Centesimus annus, John Paul provides Catholic social teaching 
with guideposts about which kind of economy best supports human dignity and the social 
nature of the person.  He said a “free economy” is one that recognizes the fundamental 
and positive role of business, the market, private property, and the resulting responsibility 
for the means of production, as well as free human creativity in the economic sector.105  
John Paul’s approval of a free economy supports his notions of work and solidarity be-
cause “the ordinary way for humans to partake of the earth is to work with others in pro-
duction so that, in the process, a portion of that world can meet their needs.”106  Sustain-
ing a free economy requires a strong juridical framework, where the rule of law governs 
the market to guarantee the basic needs of the whole of society.  He argued that the social 
teaching of the church supports these kinds of economies when they respect human dig-
nity through allowing broad areas of participation for workers in the life of industrial en-
terprises and when laborers can work for themselves.107   
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The right to own property in the social teaching of Pope John Paul II therefore 
remains “under a ‘social mortgage,’ which means that it has an intrinsically social func-
tion based upon and justified precisely by the principle of the universal destination of 
goods.”108  The universal destination of material goods means that the primary canon of 
just distribution of material goods is human need.  In light of John Paul’s analysis, Daniel 
Finn suggests, “Not only do those who own property have a right to it but all persons 
have a claim on property, a right to have sufficient amounts of it to maintain themselves 
and those for whom they have responsibility.”109  The consequence of this teaching is that 
when large numbers of people remain in poverty, those who have an excess of the earth’s 
goods and resources have a moral obligation to share them with the community.  Indeed, 
the forces of society and the state should see that the basic needs of the whole society and 
of individuals are satisfied.110  The combination of these insights provides the theological 
foundation for John Paul II’s commitment to a preferential option for the poor.111  Even 
though he distances himself from liberation theology by emphasizing love and charity 
and by referring to the entire tradition of the church, John Paul pays particular attention to 
the damages caused by the mass of material poverty in the developing world.112  Al-
though John Paul argued that the preferential option is never exclusive or discriminatory 
toward other groups, there is little doubt, especially in light of his commitment to the 
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principle of solidarity that standing with the poor was an important element of his social 
teaching.113 
b. Strengths and Weaknesses of Catholic Social Teaching Regarding the Right to 
Private Property 
 
From Pope Leo XIII to Pope John Paul II, Catholic social teaching has supported 
a person’s legitimate right to own property.  Although the tradition made a shift from the 
past by returning to its Thomistic roots by emphasizing more directly the concept that 
those who own an excess of property must use their surplus to benefit the common good, 
Catholic social teaching remains steadfast in its support of a person’s right to own prop-
erty.  Catholic social teaching affirms this right today not only from the standpoint of 
natural law, but from an anthropological conviction about the human person that this 
right augments human dignity through providing people with the means to participate in 
the economic well-being of society.  Catholic social teaching contends that without this 
right people lack the resources to provide for their own material needs and for the needs 
of their families.  Thus, each pontiff over the past one hundred years has employed the 
church’s teaching about private property to identify flaws in the economic order.   
In the beginning of the tradition, Pope Leo XIII used the church’s teaching about 
private property to condemn socialism.  More recently, Pope John Paul II addressed flaws 
in the economic order by employing the tradition’s teaching about private property.  On 
the one hand, he pointed out that a root cause of poverty in the modern world is the in-
ability of millions of people to participate in the global market because so many people 
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are denied their legitimate right to own property.  On the other hand, he challenged those 
who own an excess of property to use their entrepreneurial skills and the God-given re-
sources of the earth to enhance the well-being of society.  Today, the tradition of Catholic 
social teaching continues to use its teaching about private property to help followers and 
all people of good will to work for both personal and institutional renewal regarding con-
temporary economic life.  As a result, in light of its teaching about the ownership and use 
of property, the tradition continues to try to guide and inspire reflection about the best 
economic structures to sustain the material needs of all people, especially the poor.  Thus, 
the tradition’s “solidaristic” understanding of the human person and support for a per-
son’s legitimate right to own property serves, on the one hand, to highlight the benefits of 
markets and the ways they help people to use their gifts and talents and the goods of the 
earth to meet productively and efficiently their material needs.  On the other hand, social 
Catholicism uses its anthropology to correct the imbalance of modern market economies, 
including the fact that they are often driven by a reductionist notion of the person as an 
isolated individual consumed with maximizing self-interest.114  It is from this anthropo-
logical conviction that the tradition has returned to Aquinas’s earlier notion that the use 
of private property must benefit the common good.  Indeed, Catholic social teaching 
claims,  
the universal destination of goods entails obligations on how goods are to be used 
by their legitimate owners.  Individual persons may not use their resources with-
out considering the effects that this use will have, rather they must act in a way 
that benefits not only themselves and their family but also the common good.  
From this there arises the duty on the part of owners not to let the goods in their 
possession go idle and to channel them to productive activity, even entrusting 
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them to others who are desirous and capable of putting them to use in produc-
tion.115 
 
Today, this remains one of the most important contributions that Catholic social teaching 
has made to the contemporary discussion about the ownership and use of property.  The 
advancement of the idea that the material goods of the earth are intended for all people 
and that the social function regarding the use of property limits an individual’s claim of 
ownership, especially when the material needs of large numbers of people go unmet, adds 
significantly to a modern understanding of property rights.   
In spite of the many positive contributions that Catholic social teaching has made 
to discussions regarding a person’s legitimate right to own property, several problems 
persist concerning its defense of this right.  One of the most pressing issues that the tradi-
tion of Catholic social teaching faces is its lack of specificity regarding how to balance, 
on the one hand, a person’s legitimate right to own property with, on the other, how per-
sons should use their possessions to benefit the common good.  Although the tradition 
acknowledges more forthrightly than in the past the challenges associated with the use of 
property, the tradition fails to address these questions, “When is it proper to distribute 
one’s individual property for the benefit of the common good?  What social institution 
should facilitate these processes?  What criteria should people use to evaluate whether 
these institutions are meeting basic human needs?”  These remain important questions.  
For in an age when multinational firms challenge both civil society and the nation-state 
because of their ability to move their operations to other nations with less restrictive labor 
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and property laws, the tradition’s reliance on these mediating sources of authority to help 
the poor appears tenuous in light of this new global situation.  The ability of the tradition 
to answer these questions will determine whether it remains an important participant in 
debates regarding economic development throughout the world.  The tradition of Catholic 
social teaching will remain important only if it addresses the new questions brought forth 
with the changes emerging from the signs of the times.  The challenge before Catholic 
social teaching is to translate its teachings about property rights into policy to guide pol-
icy studies, advocacy, and social choices.  It was important in the past that the largest 
NGO in the world provided general guidelines and philosophical pronouncements about 
the duties and responsibilities that come with property ownership.  It is also important 
that it continue to speak out on behalf of the poor by calling for the expansion of this 
right to those currently excluded from the global market.  Indeed, its anthropological pre-
sumptions can, if put into policy, make for a more humane society.  Yet, without concrete 
proposals or policy applications to establish these principles within the global market, the 
relevance of Catholic social teaching to the global discussion about the ownership and 
use of property will diminish.   
Another important issue that Catholic social teaching needs to clarify, especially 
in light of its commitment to a “preferential option for the poor,” is which wing of its an-
thropological heritage best helps those mired in poverty throughout the developing world.  
The tradition affirms many of the most important tenets of the liberal tradition, including 
the right to own and use property, which allows people to engage in business activity.  
Catholic social teaching also affirms many ideals closely associated with communitarian 
philosophical traditions.  This is evident in the way Catholic social teaching challenges 
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many aspects of the contemporary global market including the way it denies those who 
lack purchasing power to enter the market and buy the things they need.  Catholic social 
teaching criticizes this aspect of the global market because it denies people the ability to 
participate in the economic well-being of society.  It also criticizes other elements of the 
global market in the way it often disenfranchises people from participating in their na-
tion’s political and social development.   
One area where this tension appears most clearly among supporters of Catholic 
social teaching is in the way adherents to the tradition understand the kind of role that 
states should play in the structuring of the global market, especially when the material 
needs of large numbers of people go unmet.  For example, Michael Novak stresses the 
libertarian tradition of Catholic social teaching because he thinks the institutionalization 
of “democratic capitalism” helps to promote individual freedom and human creativity.  
He argues that when people receive the opportunity to pursue their own limited self-
interest, they will use their gifts and talents to meet their material needs.  Novak con-
cludes that those who favor command economies lack the insight that free and intelligent 
persons can generate a spontaneous economic order that is more productive, efficient, and 
better suited to meeting the economic needs of the poor than planned economic sys-
tems.116  David Hollenbach, on the other hand, identifies more with the communitarian 
tradition of Catholic social teaching.  Hollenbach contends that social justice deals with 
and addresses the major institutions that enhance or impede people’s participation in cre-
ating and benefiting from the common good.  His vision of social justice calls attention to 
the social structures that handicap the poor from entering the global market.  He advo-
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cates that governments need to reform the market when they do not help the poor to meet 
their basic material needs.  When the institutional arrangements prevailing in developing 
countries prevent numerous people from sharing in social goods to the level required by 
their dignity as members of the human community, this violates the requirements of dis-
tributive justice.  When important economic and social institutions create barriers that 
disable the poor from meeting their basic material needs, these institutions require altera-
tion.  Thus, I examine in the next two chapters their contrasting visions of the human per-
son.  The purpose of this examination is to look at which tradition best represents Catho-
lic social teaching and provides the soundest foundation on which to build a market sys-
tem that promotes human dignity and human rights.  It is to these issues that I now turn.  
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Chapter 3 
1. Michael Novak and His Defense of Democratic Capitalism 
a. Novak’s Early Intellectual Roots and Support for Democratic Socialism 
Michael Novak was born in 1933 to a working class family in Johnston, Pennsyl-
vania.  He spent much of his early years training for the priesthood before leaving the 
seminary to pursue a life as an intellectual.  In the early 1960s, his work reflected a strug-
gle to integrate his life as a citizen of the United States with his Catholic religious back-
ground.  Novak’s first published series of essays were entitled A New Generation: Ameri-
can and Catholic.1  In 1964, he published a report on the second session of the Second 
Vatican Council called The Open Church.2  Novak positively assessed many of the 
changes that took place during the Council (1962-1965), especially the church’s eventual 
pronouncement on religious liberty Dignitatis humanae.  These early works reveal sev-
eral prominent themes that would later emerge in Novak’s writings.  They elucidate the 
benefits associated with American liberal institutions and the ways Catholic religious 
practices can transform and enrich these institutions by strengthening their moral founda-
tions.   
Novak’s working class background and interest in Catholic social teaching led 
him to investigate the political and economic foundations of modern life during the late 
1960s and early 1970s.  Novak primarily thought of himself as a democratic socialist and 
he allied himself with democratic socialist writers.3  He acknowledges that during this 
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period that “capitalism remained something of a dirty word.”4  It did so because “unlike 
democracy and pluralism, it seemed less than spiritual, less than communal, and – more 
strongly – disruptive of community and tradition.”5   
Catholic scholars such as Lamennais, de Maistre, Chesterton, Belloc, Scheler, and 
Marcel were his greatest intellectual influences during this period.  He adopted what he 
took to be their negative images of capitalism.  He says their “literature contrasted the 
machines, slums, alienation, competition, and loneliness of modern secular man with the 
orderly, communal, holistic life of the Catholic past and (romantic) future.”6  These 
scholars taught him to see capitalism as the form of political economy that spurred indi-
vidualism, utilitarianism, and pragmatism.  He contrasted his negative image of capital-
ism with an ideal medieval Catholic culture.  He remained nostalgic for the medieval 
Catholic village since he saw humanity “as a ‘Mystical Body,’ somehow organically 
united as the human body is united.”7  Novak found writers who stressed corporatism, 
solidarism, or even non-atheistic forms of socialism intellectually compelling and persua-
sive.8   
Novak’s early aversion to capitalism led him to adopt negative images of English 
philosophers such as John Locke and Adam Smith and American thinkers such as Wil-
liam James and John Dewey.9  He experienced “their talk of atomic individuals forming 
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‘contracts’ and ‘compacts,’ and their way of thinking in a narrowly empirical, pragmatic 
way”10 as not only foreign but spiritually wrong.  His working class background did not 
allow him to experience himself as “a lonely individual looking for a social contract.”11  
He saw himself as a member of an organic community whose rich series of social net-
works provided a plethora of friendships and numerous opportunities for civic involve-
ment.  He found “the European critique of British individualism and contract theory quite 
attractive.”12  The writings of Continental phenomenologists and existentialists, such as 
Mounier, Sartre, Camus, and Merleau-Ponty, appeared more in tune with the inner reality 
of freedom and spiritual risk than their British or American counterparts.   
Novak’s movement away from these ideas took place in the 1970s.  Formerly on 
the political left, Novak’s “experience in liberal environments led him to ever-deeper dis-
sent – first on foreign policy issues, then on cultural issues such as abortion, the family, 
and crime.”13  Novak acknowledges that his conversion to favor democratic capitalism 
over democratic socialism was odd at a time when most of his friends were moving in 
exactly the opposite direction.  “Radicalized by the Vietnam War, they were drawn to 
Marxian analysis and to socialist ideals.”14  Deeply troubled by conditions in the world, 
especially by the enormous gap between rich and poor nations, Novak contends many 
secular and Catholic intellectuals thought democratic socialism provided a more coherent 
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and compelling vision to solve the problem of poverty in the modern world.  Novak ad-
mits that his early admiration for democratic socialism was the result of their call to 
eradicate poverty.  They also influenced him because they used eighteenth century im-
ages of town meetings and a view of community based on early village life.15  The de-
mocratic socialist vision, which emphasized the communal dimensions of human exis-
tence and the need for ‘social justice,’ appeared more in tune with Catholic social teach-
ing and Novak’s own life’s journey. 
Novak’s support for democratic socialism waned when he turned his attention to 
the causes of wealth and the institutional mechanisms required for its creation.  He came 
to hear the high-minded rhetoric of democratic socialists and their advocacy for distribu-
tive justice as unrealistic and utopian as he witnessed its actual shortcomings throughout 
the 1970s.  This period gave him practical insight into the dangers associated with real 
socialism as practiced in the former Soviet Union and its ex-satellite states throughout 
Eastern Europe.  The long bread lines, the poor health-care, the shorter life expectancy of 
citizens, and the lack of freedom led Novak to abandon his support for democratic social-
ism.  His desire to investigate the causes of wealth as well as the interrelationships be-
tween religion, economics, and politics led him to take a position as a resident scholar at 
the American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy in 1978.  In 1983, he became the 
George Frederick Jewett Chair in Religion and Public Policy and he now serves as the 
Institute’s director of social and political studies.  Today, he is widely regarded as a key 
intellectual voice in the “neoconservative” movement. 
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b. Defining Democratic Capitalism 
Today, Michael Novak advocates democratic capitalism as the best form of politi-
cal economy.  He defines democratic capitalism as three systems in one:  
a predominately market economy; a polity respectful of the rights of the individ-
ual to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness; and a system of cultural institu-
tions moved by ideals of liberty and justice for all.  In short, three dynamic and 
converging systems functioning as one: a democratic polity, an economy based on 
markets and incentives, and a moral-cultural system which is pluralistic and, in 
the largest sense, liberal.16 
 
He believes a democratic form of government is only sustainable in practice with a mar-
ket economy.17  Novak believes these “pillars of liberty” arose together from the moral 
aspirations of people “(1) to limit the power of the state, in defense against tyranny and 
stagnation; and (2) to liberate the energies of individuals and independently organized 
communities.”18  Novak credits English and American thinkers such as Montesquieu, 
Adam Smith, James Madison, and Alexander Hamilton with laying the intellectual foun-
dations for this new order of liberty.  He claims that much of the intellectual basis of de-
mocratic capitalism is traceable to these members of the Whig tradition.19   
Novak recognizes in these thinkers an unparalleled sense of political realism 
about the need to constrain the power of government authority.  He says,  
While some scholars interpret their work as though they were sunny rationalists, 
the opposite is nearer the truth….  They were not optimistic about the human ca-
pacity for reasonableness or virtue.20 
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They were wary of state tyranny and they worried about the repression of individual lib-
erty more than the potential disorder brought about by living in a pluralistic society.  
These thinkers recognized the potential dangers associated with unleashing individual 
freedom, but they also clearly saw the drawbacks of living under a unitary social order.   
In past social orders before the Enlightenment, Novak notes that more crimes 
were more likely committed in the call for greater virtue than through commitments to 
eradicate vice.21  Rulers frequently used their authority to determine the practices neces-
sary to live a good life in the name of cultivating virtue.  Unfortunately, this typically led 
to the repression of individual liberty because monarchs often used their absolute power 
to undermine the dignity of persons.  Claiming divine authority, the monarchs of Europe 
often commanded their subjects to obey their edicts without gaining the consent of the 
governed.  Although this seemed to produce a harmonious social order among the 
masses, this often came at the expense of individual liberty.  Liberal thinkers argued that 
the harmoniousness of society claimed by older forms of government relied more on the 
coercive power of monarchs than the practical wisdom and intelligence of the people.   
Novak argues liberal thinkers, in contrast, desired to form a new social order 
where individuals received the opportunity to express their unique gifts and talents.  They 
wanted to create a social order where people received the opportunity to define for them-
selves the meaning of the good life.  They also wanted to give people the necessary civil 
space in order to put forth diverse visions of it.  They understood that this new pluralistic 
order violated older conceptions of social life.22   
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Why did many Enlightenment thinkers favor this more pluralistic order?  First, 
they believed that this new order of liberty would be less inclined to repress individual 
freedom by eliminating monarchical rule.  Second, it would resist the utopian temptation 
to create a completely harmonious social order by repressing minority voices of dissent.  
Third, it would curtail the human drive for power by differentiating it into various 
spheres of influence.  Finally, it would no longer advance a view of the good life from the 
top down, but would fashion it from the ground up by using the common experiences of 
ordinary people.  The system would make it easier for people to work together to gain 
consensus about this end.  These thinkers recognized that they were breaking with the 
past in order to form a new social order that would allow more individual freedom and 
pluralism.   
To accomplish these tasks required a new set of institutions.  Novak argues liberal 
thinkers sought to limit government by creating a social order that differentiated power 
into three separate spheres: political, economic, and moral/cultural.  James Madison, for 
example, in The Federalist Papers, no longer embedded political authority solely in the 
hands of a monarch, but placed it in the hands of the people through the creation of de-
mocratic political institutions.23  Adam Smith, in The Wealth of Nations, placed economic 
power into markets that were as “free as possible from governmental and religious com-
mand ….”24  Later, Alexis de Tocqueville saw that democratic moral values could be 
fashioned in the newly created space of civil society, which liberal institutions made pos-
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sible.25  Through the creation of democratic polities, free markets, and vibrant civil socie-
ties, liberal thinkers made pluralism and individual liberty the centerpieces of their new 
social order.   
Today, Novak thinks the clearest examples of those who embody the ideals ex-
pressed by these liberal thinkers are those who practice democratic capitalism.  He says 
those who favor democratic capitalism are unique because they have chosen, like their 
liberal predecessors, a form of political economy that makes pluralism and limited gov-
ernment central to its identity.26  They favor this form of political economy because it al-
lows individuals to define for themselves the nature of the good life.  That is why Novak 
believes, “A democratic capitalist society is, in principle, uncommitted to any one vision 
of a social order.  For such a commitment is a violation of transcendence.”27  People who 
favor democratic capitalism also share the liberal desire to promote individual liberty and 
pluralism through institutions that differentiate power.  He thinks those who practice de-
mocratic capitalism agree, “No one group may be trusted to see the common good whole 
and entire, as if by immediate inspection.”28   
Novak asks why Christians should support a system that makes pluralism and a 
commitment to individual liberty central tenets.  He says: 
If the system genuinely permits pluralism, does it not, in effect, lack unitary vi-
sion?  Does it not set humans at cross-purposes?  Does it not permit some to en-
gage in what to others seems to be evil behavior?  Is not it moral laissez-faire, 
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howsoever dignified by the name of tolerance, an impermissible concession to er-
rant consciences?29 
 
These are important questions.  He notes the Vatican did not look with approval upon lib-
eral, pluralistic societies of the American and British type until the middle of the twenti-
eth century.30  They feared the creation of societies that were so individualistic that they 
would end in tyranny.   
Novak responds to these questions by offering some intriguing thoughts.  First, 
the new kind of liberty offered by democratic capitalism is more challenging and com-
plex when compared to older and more unitary conceptions of liberty.  He does not find it 
surprising that people often feel estranged, isolated, and lonely in these kinds of societies.  
They feel this way because the experience of the individual self, apart from the commu-
nity, is part of the newfound sense of freedom provided by living in a pluralistic society.  
This may be regarded as the necessary other side to any genuine experience of liberty.  
He says, 
For if in relationship to the values and symbols of my family, my church, and my 
culture I am free to ask such radical questions as “alienate” me from them, it does 
not follow that I am ill, misused, or deranged.  The human capacity to raise ques-
tions is testimony to our capacities for the more than finite.31   
 
The opportunity to discover the individual self apart from the communities in which we 
live is part of the experience of liberty.  Free persons will experience feelings of isolation 
as unique individuals.  The opposite would be to feel so connected as not to be free.32  To 
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appropriate one’s own liberty is to learn to experience oneself as a transcendent being 
who is more than just another cog in the social wheel. 
The second issue that Novak responds to is the challenge that pluralistic societies 
do not provide a unitary religious vision, or sacred canopy, to structure social life.  Critics 
argue that a pluralistic society is more likely to fall into a state of moral relativism.  This 
is because its emptiness creates a moral vacuum.  Novak acknowledges that pluralistic 
societies intentionally do not provide one sacred canopy under which to live.  He re-
sponds positively to this challenge.  He says, 
Its emptiness … represents the transcendence which is approached by free con-
sciences from a virtually infinite number of directions.  Believer and unbeliever, 
selfless and selfish, frightened and bold, naïve and jaded, all participate in an or-
der whose center is not socially imposed.33   
 
This does not mean that its core is completely empty despite the fact that there is not a 
socially imposed center.  In the United States, for example, he says many of its most sa-
cred symbols have a pluralistic content and they function as symbols that point people 
toward the transcendent.  Novak thinks, “Their function is to protect the liberty of con-
science of all, by using a symbol which transcends the power of the state and any other 
earthly power.”34  These symbols help people to guard against tyranny and repression of 
individual conscience.  Therefore, 
The moral progress to which democratic capitalism calls is not utopian; but it is 
never at an end in history.  The fact that the center is kept empty does not mean 
that it lacks vitality, but rather that its vitality exceeds the limits of any one in-
strument by which its nature might be adequately defined.35  
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The inability to control the system inhibits Christians from monopolizing the 
reigns of political authority.  Novak thinks this is a positive development for several rea-
sons.  First, the liberal tradition begins from its concern for the individual in commu-
nity.36  The realism of democratic capitalism, which intends to frustrate the “totalistic im-
pulse,” protects the rights and liberties of individual persons.37  The kind of freedom it 
provides not only protects individuals from tyrannical states, but it protects people from 
coercive religious bodies who seek to impose doctrine without regard to individual con-
science.  Second, the space a pluralistic society provides creates opportunities for a vari-
ety of civic groups, including religious groups, to shape the moral and cultural practices 
of society.38  Democratic capitalism places great emphasis on members of civil society, 
including religious believers, to inculcate the virtues necessary to live in a democratic 
republic.39  Novak thinks that people of faith must play an important role to shape the un-
derlying cultural matrix of civil society.  They possess the ability to infuse the center with 
their own unique values so that it does not collapse into self-absorption. 
Novak’s commitment to pluralism and individual freedom leads him to champion 
the benefits associated with a market based economic system.  He thinks, “Political econ-
omy must deal with humans as they are.”40  Democratic capitalism resists the idea that 
the state should control the economic destiny of a people.  He contends political democ-
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racy can only work when combined with a market economy because they both share 
similar moral principles and institutional values.   
They share the moral principle that individual freedom limits tyranny.  The capac-
ity to engage in commerce and own property provides a check on the political authority 
of the state.  Novak believes that having political liberty without having certain economic 
liberties is inherently unstable.  Having economic liberty provides people with the oppor-
tunity to use their gifts and talents to better their lives.   
The institutional values political democracy and capitalism share is the desire to 
create institutions that increase individual liberty.  The accomplishment of this objective 
again comes through diversifying power.  In the political realm, the primary institutional 
mechanism is the constitutional republic, which protects individual liberties by diversify-
ing power into three separate branches of government: legislative, executive, and judicial.  
In the economic realm, it is the creation of the market, which protects property rights, 
promotes entrepreneurship, and allows people to trade and sell their goods independent of 
state authorities.  Democratic polities require the promotion and protection of markets 
because free societies depend upon the realities of economic growth and social mobility.  
He thinks democracy wins common consent when individuals receive these economic 
opportunities because, “It yields freedom to dream and realistic fulfillment of dreams.”41  
Without these kinds of economic opportunities, democratic polities often break down and 
become factious.  To stifle economic growth and restrict social mobility is to teach peo-
ple to see economic realities as a zero sum game where one person’s gain is another’s 
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loss.42  The provision to give people the economic opportunity to engage in commercial 
activities provides the incentive to make political democracy work.  Economic liberty 
allows individuals to see the benefits that come with political cooperation and the stabil-
ity provided by the rule of law. 
2. Michael Novak on the Failure of “Real Socialism” 
 
a. Socialism’s Principal Goals as a Theory of Political Economy 
 
Michael Novak supports democratic capitalism as a system of political economy 
because of its ability to limit government, promote individual liberty, and allow plural-
ism, which makes it a suitable political and economic system for persons who are free.  
Novak’s enthusiastic support for democratic capitalism has led him to criticize many of 
the central tenets of socialism as an alternative theory of political economy.  As men-
tioned earlier, Novak’s early intellectual formation led him to favor the goals and aspira-
tions expressed by socialist writers.  He admired their desire to eliminate poverty by 
promoting economic equality.  He found their call for workers to join in solidarity with 
one another to advance an anthropology that was more social in nature.  Socialist ideol-
ogy persuaded him because he thought it was more in line with the organic view of social 
life found within Catholic social teaching.  He says, 
In thinking of socialism as a kind of political religion, or perhaps more exactly as 
a political-economic expression of Jewish-Christian ideals, I tended to give so-
cialists credit for pure idealism.  Capitalism might be justified because it works 
better, but – I tended to agree – it represents an inferior ideal.43   
 
Novak contends that an early weakness in his support for democratic capitalism was that 
he ceded the moral high ground to socialist thinkers.  He found democratic capitalism 
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lacking high ideals and revolutionary aspirations.  The lack of intellectual clarity given to 
the way democratic capitalism expands human freedom, spurs creativity, and raises the 
living standards of the poor, mitigated his support for democratic capitalism.  Socialist 
ideals motivated him because they supported the goals of economic equality, unity 
among workers, and the eradication of poverty.  Yet, he never found it persuasive that the 
accomplishment of all these objectives should come through revolutionary struggle.  No-
vak says democratic capitalism primarily sought practical goals that were less idealistic 
and revolutionary.  Democratic capitalism was more realistic because it dealt more prac-
tically with humans as they are.44   
Novak argues the original goals of socialists were to eliminate poverty, private 
property, and economic inequality.  Early socialists promoted these ideals in order to 
eliminate what they perceived to be the root cause of discord amongst human beings: the 
never-ending quest for profit.  Novak says, 
Positively, socialism once meant the abolition of private property; state ownership 
of the means of production through the nationalization of industries; state control 
over all aspects of the economy; the abolition of ‘bourgeois democracy’ through 
the creation of a classless society; and an international order based upon a class 
analysis transcending national, cultural, and linguistic frontiers.  Socialism meant 
the banishing of profit motive, which was judged to be the root cause of the ex-
ploitation of labor.  It also meant the abolition of imperialism, since capital and 
the profit motive were judged to be the root of empire.  Socialism promised a so-
cial structure which would end competition between person and person to give to 
each according to need while taking from each according to ability, a social struc-
ture which would thus effect a change in what earlier generations had erroneously 
regarded as ‘human nature.’  Socialism, it was confidently predicted, would bring 
about a new type of human being, ‘socialist man.’  Such a human being would act 
from motives of human solidarity, community, cooperation, and comradeliness.45 
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Novak came to disparage “real socialism” with his contact with it throughout the 1970’s 
and 80’s.  He found the widespread religious, political, and economic repression within 
the Soviet Union and its Eastern European satellite states disdainful.  This made him look 
more closely at the limitations of socialism and expound the benefits associated with de-
mocratic capitalism.  Novak believes socialism remained mired in its high ideals because 
its intellectual advocates had lost touch with reality.  Some of their ideals included the 
elimination of poverty by government authorities, the elimination of great inequalities in 
wealth in order to increase freedom of action, and meeting basic material needs through 
large-scale government programs, even if this involved some loss in the aggregate of 
goods and services which would otherwise be available.46 
Novak claims he foresaw the failure of socialism years before the fall of the Ber-
lin Wall and the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1989 and 1991.  He realized its high ide-
als were not producing tangible results.  In the political sphere, the centralization and bu-
reaucracy of the state proved to be a thorough instrument of repression.47  In the eco-
nomic sphere, socialist doctrine did not produce the tangible benefits it promised as evi-
denced by the long bread lines, inefficient use of natural resources, and lack of adequate 
health-care.48  In the moral-cultural sphere, no fully socialist state showed that it could 
                                                 
46 Ibid., 202. 
 
47 Ibid., 191. 
 
48 Although Novak points out the hardships created by the former Soviet Union because of its commitment 
to socialist ideology, the rapid transition to a free market system since 1991 has created its own negative 
economic outcomes for the Russian people.  For a more thorough review of these matters, see Joseph E. 
Stiglitz, Globalization and Its Discontents (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2003). 
 
  87
tolerate the broad range of dissent, human liberties, and human rights achieved by de-
mocratic … states.49   
b. The Failure of “Real Socialism” 
Why did socialism fail so miserably?  Novak gives four principal reasons.50  First, 
socialism deprived people of private property.51  He thinks that the greatest benefit that 
comes with a regime of private property is that it “limits the power of the state.”52  Deny-
ing people the right to own property leaves citizens without an important check on the 
power of the state.53  Second, socialism restricts people from engaging in entrepreneur-
ship and eliminates possibilities for personal initiative.54  The inability to engage in these 
kinds of activities made citizens more likely to obey the unquestioned authority of the 
state.  As Novak says, “A market economy inculcates a type of mentality quite different 
from that of a command economy.  In the place of passivity and obedience, it awakens 
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the life of active vitality.”55  Third, it disregards that natural inequalities exist in the world 
regarding personal gifts and talents.56  The desire to level these natural inequalities stifles 
social mobility and increases factiousness in society.  The irony of socialism is that its 
original intent was to eliminate these trends, but in reality, it exacerbated them.  Finally, 
Novak says that the fatal conceit of socialism is its mistaken view of reason.”57  In the 
name of rationality, socialism misconstrues, “the nature of practical intelligence as it ac-
tually works in society.”58  The socialist vision of society flows from the top down, like a 
pyramid.  It employs a geometric view of reason, which fails to consider contingency in 
historical processes and for the liberty of individual persons.59  As St. Thomas Aquinas 
pointed out centuries earlier, there are different kinds of rationality.  In such a field as po-
litical economy, Novak argues prudence or phronesis is better than geometry to meet 
human political and economic needs.60 
3. Novak on the Free Market 
a. Novak’s Summary of the Criticisms of Capitalism in Catholic Social Teaching 
Novak argues the primary criticism of capitalism in Catholic social teaching is 
that it derives from an individualistic, mainly Protestant, ethic.  Beginning in the nine-
teenth century, the Vatican thought of democratic capitalism as far away and heretical.61  
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During this period, “the social structure of Catholic Italy, Spain, and Austro-Hungary was 
still feudal, monarchical, and mercantilist.”62  In 1891, when Leo XIII issued Rerum no-
varum, “he was soundly critical not only of certain practices of capitalism but of some of 
its philosophical bases, especially its individualism and its radical dependence on the free 
market.”63  Forty years after Rerum novarum, in 1931, Pius XI’s Quadragesimo anno de-
scribed individualism and collectivism as “twin evils.”64  In this encyclical, Pius did not 
symmetrically condemn capitalism with socialism, but he did “blast the “tottering tenants 
of liberalism” and the “evil of individualism.”65   
Four years later, the Italian Amintore Fanfani, a leading Christian Social Democ-
rat, convincingly summarized many of the same criticisms of capitalism leveled by the 
papacy in his influential book Catholicism, Protestantism, and Capitalism.66  In it, he 
identified why capitalism is incompatible with Catholicism.67  Fanfani argued that capi-
talism produces an unlimited satiety for consumer goods.  This unquenchable desire for 
material possessions derives from a predominately-Protestant ethic.  He saw the Protes-
tant ethic as being too individualistic, selfish, and favorable toward utilitarian satisfac-
tion.68  Fanfani agreed with Max Weber’s assessment that the spirit of capitalism inevita-
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bly leads to an “iron cage,”69 where the hedonistic acquisition of goods and resources be-
comes the only ends of economic activity.  He concluded that if capitalism became the 
dominant economic ideology, people would place the procurement of material posses-
sions above family life, prayer, and charity towards the poor. 
Novak argues the reluctance to accept the basic tenants of democratic capitalism 
continued during the Papacy of Paul VI.  Novak quotes Paul VI, in Octogesima adven-
iens, as saying, 
The liberal ideology … asserts itself in the name of economic efficiency, for the 
defense of the individual against the increasingly overwhelming hold of organiza-
tions, and as a reaction against the totalitarian tendencies of political powers.  
Certainly personal initiative must be maintained and developed.  But do not 
Christians who take this path tend to idealize liberalism … while easily forgetting 
that at the very root of philosophical liberalism is an erroneous affirmation of the 
autonomy of the individual in his activity, his motivation and the exercise of lib-
erty.70 
 
As of 1982, all the popes from Leo XIII to Paul VI had respected some of the fundamen-
tal principles of democratic capitalism, including the limited state and the indispensable 
role of private property.71  Novak recognized that their resistance to democratic capital-
ism was not due to illusions about socialism.72  In fact, from the very beginning, Catholic 
social teaching was alert to socialism’s materialism, atheism, utopianism, and potential 
for state tyranny.73  However, Novak says he remained critical of the church’s social 
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teaching because it occupied a sort of utopian ground – literally, no place.74  He found 
calls among Catholic intellectuals to find a “middle way” between socialism and liberal-
ism untenable.  As a result, Catholic social teaching appeared to him to have become un-
characteristically abstract and otherworldly.  He thought it would from time to time make 
astute and valuable comments about the world, but the platform on which it stood seemed 
disconnected from real life experience.75 
b. Novak on the Impact of Pope John Paul II on Catholic Social Teaching  
 Novak argues a major shift in attitude regarding the tradition’s recognition of the 
benefits of democratic capitalism emerged during the Pontificate of Pope John Paul II.  In 
Laborem exercens, he says John Paul recognized four things about democratic capitalism 
that went beyond that of his predecessors.  First, he distinguished nineteenth century 
capitalism from recent capitalism.76  Second, he recognized that socialist collectivization 
of property takes power from one class and gives it to another.77  Third, he identified as 
labor many sources of creativity – the work of inventors, intellectuals, and management 
experts.  This broadened the horizon of work within Catholic social teaching beyond the 
labor performed by “blue collar” workers.78  Finally, he emphasized the creativity of 
modern work by drawing analogously from theological symbols of the Creator and his 
creation.79  Despite these insights, Novak says the history that John Paul provided in La-
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borem exercens of the legacy of the benefits of democratic capitalism had been as defi-
cient as the views of his predecessors.80 
c. Novak on Pope John Paul II’s Anthropology 
Novak argues the release in 1991 of Centesimus annus by John Paul II was a turn-
ing point for the tradition of Catholic social teaching regarding its assessment of capital-
ism.  He says like a “sonic boom,” 81 the encyclical burst onto the scene as a classic re-
statement of Christian anthropology.82  The encyclical, which first reflects on some of the 
tragic events of the twentieth century, rejected socialism because of its faulty anthropol-
ogy, which failed to respect the sanctity of the individual.83  John Paul argued it reduced 
human beings to a series of social relationships, and the concept of the person as the 
autonomous subject of moral decision disappeared.84  In contrast, Novak says the Pope 
proposed a tripartite social structure composed of a free political system, a free economy, 
and a culture of liberty.85  Novak notes that the underlying principle of the Pope’s anthro-
pology is the creative subjectivity of the human person, together with the resulting sub-
jectivity of society.86  The unique characteristic of the human person is the capacity to 
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conceive new things and then do them.87  As a result, Novak thinks it is proper to call 
John Paul both a “philosopher of liberty” and a “philosopher of creativity.”88   
Novak contends the Pope recognized in order to promote human creativity; peo-
ple must have the ability to engage in enterprise as a vocation, a virtue, and a right.89  In 
order to allow entrepreneurial ingenuity to flourish, John Paul discussed the corollary in-
stitutions that allow for this kind of economic activity.  Novak says there was never any 
question in this Pope’s mind that democratic institutions, whatever their faults, are the 
best available protection for human rights in the political realm.90  The unique contribu-
tion of Centesimus annus is that John Paul now added capitalist virtues and institutions to 
the economic realm.91  Novak says John Paul roots the capitalist ethos in the positive 
thrust of Judaism and Christianity, in their capacity for inspiring new visions and creative 
actions, “rather than in the negative ‘this-worldly asceticism’ that Max Weber found in 
the Protestant ethic.”92  Novak claims that underlying Weber’s thesis were three main 
ideas about why a Protestant ethos supported capitalism, namely, 
a sense of duty toward the acquisition of wealth for its own sake; religious asceti-
cism in avoiding luxury, pleasure and consumption; and a sense of calling, such 
that work was undertaken soberly, consciously and industriously.93 
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Even though Novak credits Weber as the first person to make people familiar with the 
idea that religion – in particular Calvinism – was one of the great shaping forces of the 
modern economy, he argues John Paul II offers a richer Catholic anthropology for the 
right practice of capitalism than his Protestant counterpart.94 
What are the kinds of capitalist virtues and institutions that John Paul proposes?  
Novak says the Pope elucidates what these are in what has now become a much-debated 
paragraph in Centesimus annus.  In paragraph 42 of Centesimus annus, John Paul states, 
If by ‘capitalism’ is meant an economic system which recognizes the fundamental 
and positive role of business, the market, private property and the resulting re-
sponsibility for the means of production, as well as free human creativity in the 
economic sector, then the answer is certainly in the affirmative, even though it 
would perhaps be more appropriate to speak of a ‘business economy’, ‘market 
economy’ or simply ‘free economy’.95 
 
Novak argues that “point by point” this description of capitalism reflects the experience 
of nations that since the end of World War II have experienced both political and eco-
nomic prosperity.96  In these nations, “a structure of law has evolved over the centuries, 
from which slowly emerged the political, economic, and cultural institutions that, to-
gether, frame the ‘free society.’”97  In fact, Novak claims such neo-liberal thinkers in-
cluding F.A. Hayek in The Constitution of Liberty and Bruno Leoni in Freedom and Law 
particularly stress these non-economic factors.98  Novak concludes that John Paul’s de-
scription of the institutions necessary to allow human liberty and creativity to prosper are 
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similar to his own “tripartite system” described years earlier in The Spirit of Democratic 
Capitalism.99 
 Novak believes the crucial insight that John Paul II uncovered in Centesimus an-
nus is that “capitalism rightly understood”100 flows from a sound understanding of human 
anthropology.  The anthropology the Pope employs recognizes that labor and the desire to 
create express human subjectivity.  The human capacity for work expresses the unique-
ness of each created being and it is the wellspring of creativity.  As the Creator reflects 
his uniqueness in the created order, so to does the human person.  The cultivation of these 
uniquely human characteristics finds expression socially through collaborations of labor.  
As John Paul says,  
By means of his work man commits himself, not only for his own sake but also 
for others and with others.  Each person collaborates in the work of others and for 
their good.  Man works in order to provide for the needs of his family, his com-
munity, his nation, and ultimately all humanity.101 
 
Work, therefore, is never a solitary activity.  It serves as the distinctive contribution that 
each person offers to the good of society.  A truly “free economy” recognizes the gifts 
and talents of each individual and allows each person to use them for the benefit of soci-
ety.  In fact, Novak thinks the Pope “urges us not to stress an opposition between ‘self-
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interest’ and ‘the common good.’  He urges us, rather, to seek a ‘harmony’ between ‘self-
interest’ and the interests of society as a whole,’ wherever this may be possible.”102  He 
finds John Paul’s view of legitimate self-interest103 similar to the realism expressed by 
Madison and Hamilton104 in The Federalist.105 
Novak says an important contribution of John Paul’s anthropology is that human 
subjectivity serves as a new form of “capital.”106  Traditionally, capital was mainly asso-
ciated with the ownership of land.107  Economists often cited the accumulation of land as 
the most important economic factor toward increasing prosperity.  Today, he argues the 
greatest source of capital, besides the earth, is the human person, who is the source of 
creativity, invention, and economic initiative.108  An effective use of this resource takes 
place when people use their gifts and talents to help transform their natural and human 
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environments into places that augment opportunities for collaboration.109  Certain virtues 
are required to allow for this kind of collaboration.  They include  
diligence, industriousness, prudence in undertaking reasonable risks, reliability, 
and fidelity in interpersonal relationships, as well as courage in carrying out deci-
sions which are difficult and painful but necessary, both for the overall working of 
a business and in meeting possible set-backs.110 
 
He concludes that enterprise benefits our nature as social beings because, more than ever, 
work is a communal activity that contributes to the well being of society.111  
d. Novak on the Benefits of Human Capital and the Practice of Capitalism 
John Paul’s belief in human capital leads Novak to claim that it is the primary 
cause of the wealth of nations and more important even than natural resources.112  Novak 
points to the poverty that exists in Brazil, which has an abundance of natural resources, 
and compares it to the wealth found in Japan, which lacks an abundance of natural re-
sources, to demonstrate his point.113  The fact that many wealthy nations exist without 
possessing an abundance of natural resources proves to Novak that the effective utiliza-
tion of ‘human capital’ is the key element toward sustaining economic growth.  This 
leads him to praise the moral and practical superiority of capitalism for two reasons.  
First, as a system capitalism is constituted by a set of institutions, nourishing in-
vention, innovation, and enterprise.  These are the primary cause of economic de-
velopment.  Second, market systems better recognize the dignity of individuals 
and respect their choices, better reward cooperation and mutual adjustment, and 
better precipitate reform, experiment, and steady progress.114 
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Novak concludes, “Both in creativity and in cooperative voluntary activities the capitalist 
order attains a progressively higher standard of the common good.115  Not only does it 
attain these objectives better than any alternative system, “Capitalism, for all its faults, is 
a better system for the poor than any other existing system.”116 
e. Novak and the Benefits of Capitalism for LDCs 
 Novak does not blame wealthy nations for poverty in the developing world.117  
Nor does he blame poverty in LDCs on factors such as laziness of workers or a lack of 
entrepreneurial spirit among business owners.  Instead, poverty is the result of a failure to 
develop truly capitalist systems.  In Latin America, for example, he says, “what is called 
‘capitalism’ is actually a form of precapitalist, state-sponsored, patrimonial mercantilism 
that Adam Smith was writing against.”118  “Nearly all the economies of Latin America 
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are in the grip of the state, and the state in turn is typically bent to the service of a rela-
tively few elite families.”119   
His claim that capitalism remains the best economic system for the poor leads him 
to draw two conclusions about poverty in the developing world.  First, the poor are poor 
because the law locks them outside the dynamism of invention, markets, and enter-
prise.120  Second, state power, exercised by small elites, restricts the creativity and inven-
tiveness of entrepreneurs by creating insurmountable roadblocks to institutions that se-
cure property rights and lend credit.  The combination of these factors does not allow 
small business owners to utilize their gifts and talents to benefit the common good.121 
Novak believes the practical solution toward the development of legitimate capi-
talist institutions is to reform the political and legal institutions that inhibit small business 
owners and homeowners from using their assets to spur economic growth.  Reform does 
not depend primarily on the creation of large government programs to redistribute money 
to the poor.  The ability to secure foreign loans for internal economic development is also 
not the primary way to end poverty.  Novak believes these kinds of reforms lead to in-
creased state authority, dependency on foreign countries, and limits the power of civil 
society.  He distrusts them because they view the poor as vulnerable, passive, and await-
ing the ministrations of the state.  Thus, Novak understands the Catholic principle of sub-
sidiarity, which Pius XI first articulated in Quadragesimo anno, that economic decisions 
should be taken at the lowest level possible that is compatible with good government.122  
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He presumes that higher levels of government, especially government programs that fa-
vor the wide-scale redistribution of wealth through tax programs, have more potential for 
harm, and therefore require greater justification.  Novak believes the theological point 
subsidiarity makes is not necessarily that lower level economic structures are less likely 
to be sinful than higher level ones, but that higher level economic structures operated by 
the government have greater potential for abuse and misuse, and therefore ought to be 
created when it is necessary to do so.  To put it another way, all economic power struc-
tures may be equally tainted by sinfulness, but stronger power structures operated by the 
government contain greater potential for harm if that sinful potential is realized.  That is 
why he thinks there ought to be a presumption against the creation of such economic 
structures.  As a result, it is not surprising that Novak favors economic policies that see 
the poor as capable, creative, and active.123  Novak contends that the majority of poor 
people around the world already have the necessary assets to elevate themselves out of 
poverty.  What they lack is secure political and legal institutions that promote ownership, 
entrepreneurship, commerce, industry, and property rights.  He advocates increasing the 
ability of homeowners and small businesses to enter into the market so that they can use 
their own resources to promote economic growth.  Indeed, many of Novak’s ideas re-
garding the causes of poverty in LDCs are in many ways similar to those of Hernando de 
Soto, which I will discuss in chapter 6. 
f. Novak on the Right to Private Property 
The right to own property is a key reason why Novak supports capitalism and its 
corresponding institutions; primarily, the market.  First, Novak supports capitalism be-
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cause its promotion of private property provides a check on state power.  The right to 
own property is an extension of his “realism.”  The suppression of property rights in the 
former Soviet Union and its satellite states restricted individual liberty.  The repression of 
property rights augmented the power of the state.  The power of the government to con-
trol all aspects of social life, including the economy, led to the usurpation of power by 
government officials.  The restriction to own property stifled invention, decreased pro-
ductivity, and led to the mismanagement of valuable natural resources.  Harvard Univer-
sity historian Richard Pipes agrees with much of Novak’s assessment about the reasons 
for the collapse of the Soviet Union.  He says, 
There obviously were many reasons for the collapse of the Soviet Union in late 
1991, an event unparalleled in world history – an empire under peacetime condi-
tions, disintegrating in a matter of weeks.  But if, as there are good grounds to be-
lieve, the prime reason for this collapse was the faltering economy, then it is not 
unreasonable to conclude that the absence of private property was a major and 
possibly decisive factor.  It affected economic performance in two ways.   The 
citizenry lacked incentives to produce beyond the minimum, since its basic needs 
were guaranteed whereas doing more brought no significant rewards and could 
even bring penalties in the form of higher production quotas.  But even if, in dis-
regard to such discouragement, a Soviet citizen displayed enterprise, he ran afoul 
of the beaureucratic apparatus whose self-interest required the stifling of every 
independent initiative.  Thus, the concentration of all economic resources in the 
hands of the state undermined the nation’s work ethic and inhibited innovation.124 
 
Novak believes a regime that promotes and protects property rights is less likely to re-
strict individual liberty and suppress the independence of civil society.  A sound political 
economy should encourage virtue and cope “with the fact that citizens sometimes sin.”125  
This is why he favors capitalism and its emphasis regarding individual ownership.  As a 
system of political economy, it differentiates economic power through private ownership 
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and it gives entrepreneurs the ability to compete with one another in the marketplace.  
The ability to buy, sell, and trade goods independent from state owned enterprises miti-
gates the power of the state to control the activities of its citizens.   
A second reason why he favors the right to own property is that it promotes plu-
ralism by offering customers a wide range of goods and services.  By increasing the 
number of private sellers of a particular product, customers receive the opportunity to 
purchase items that fit their own needs and preferences.  A positive contribution of mar-
ket systems is their ability to offer a variety of goods and services to consumers at afford-
able prices.  Products discarded are those that do not find a niche in the market.  This ex-
pands the horizon of goods and services available to consumers and it increases their 
economic independence.  Novak believes it is only in places where the right to own pri-
vate property is protected do people receive the chance to become consumers with a 
wide-range of choices.  This is because nation’s that protect property rights give entre-
preneurs incentives to invent better goods and services through the protection of patents. 
g. Criticisms of Novak support for Democratic Capitalism 
The review of Michael Novak’s work on political economy shows that he thinks 
that contemporary Catholic social teaching supports democratic capitalism.  Novak con-
tends that Catholic social teaching is not opposed to democratic capitalism and that its 
proper implementation affirms human dignity, creativity, and elevates the living stan-
dards of the poor better than any rival system of political economy.  He is interested in 
showing the practices and attitudes of capitalism, “especially small businesses based on 
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knowledge of local needs, will benefit large numbers of poor people both here in the 
United States and in the developing countries of the Third World.126   
 Many theologians criticize Novak’s enthusiastic support for democratic capital-
ism.  They challenge his claim that democratic capitalism supports human dignity and 
benefits the poor.  They argue that he does not adequately address several issues.  First is 
the way that capitalism tends to commodify all sectors of human life.  Second is the way 
the global market, through the actions of multinational corporations, destabilizes political 
authority in many developing countries.  Third, democratic capitalism exacerbates wealth 
inequalities between rich and poor, making solidarity with the poor impossible.  It is to 
these issues that I now turn. 
i. The Danger of Consumerism 
The principal criticism of Michael Novak’s work is that he fails to account for the 
way the global market makes the buying and selling of goods the primary mechanism for 
community interaction and formation.  David Schindler argues, “Consistent with the neo-
conservative unawareness of their own monism – the invisible monism of liberalism itself 
– they are unable to grasp the pope’s critique of consumerism as a “structure of sin.”127  
Schindler criticizes Novak’s work because it fails to wrestle with the way capitalism 
makes the constant buying and selling of goods the principal social tool for cultural inter-
action.  Schindler thinks Novak’s logic has a priori “no conceptual means for identifying 
(America’s) consumerism and materialism as “structures of sin,” in the way that is re-
                                                 
126 John Langan, S.J., “Ethics, Business, and the Economy,” Theological Studies 54 (1993): 110. 
 
127 David Schindler, Heart of the World, Center of the Church: Communio Ecclesiology, Liberalism, and 
Liberation (Grand Rapids, M.I.: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1996), 130. 
 
  104
quired by the present teaching of the present pope.”128  Indeed, Novak helps to ensure 
“America’s consumerism and materialism will not be deeply challenged in their institu-
tional dimensions: because neo-conservatism helps render consumerism and materialism 
invisible precisely in their institutional dimensions.”129  
 David Schindler’s criticism that Novak’s brand of neo-conservatism renders con-
sumerism invisible, especially on an institutional level, finds support among other theo-
logians.  For example, Rodney Clapp contends,  
A problematic feature of consumer capitalism is the inescapable barrage of adver-
tising – its coaching and coaxing of multitudinous desires.  The New York Times 
has estimated that the average American is exposed to 3,500 ads per day.  So in-
undated, we are hardly aware of how pervasive and invasive these images and 
messages are.130 
 
The size and strength of the global market suppresses communal solidarity and replaces it 
with a drive to consume constantly.  Therefore,   
What worries some people is that the affluent, technologically advanced West 
seems more and more focused not on consuming to live, but on living to consume.  
The problem with consumption, and the consumer capitalism that has pushed it to 
feverish historical extremes, is the fact that it has become so all-consuming.131 
   
Another danger associated with a consumer culture is that it places great emphasis 
on bourgeois desires such as being “comfortable” and “safe” to the detriment of other, 
more heroic virtues that are necessary for developing a reflective and virtuous people ca-
pable of sustaining democracy.  Indeed, some critics suggest our culture glorifies the 
“mediocre” and “banal” because we fail to cultivate practices worthy of a free people.  
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For example, in the aftermath of September 11, Stanley Hauerwas sorrowfully notes one 
way that President Bush challenged the American people to respond to the attacks on the 
World Trade Center and the Pentagon was to continue to go shopping to support the 
American way of life.132  He raises the question, “For what can freedom mean if the pri-
mary exercise of that freedom is to shop?”133  For a people confronted by groups who are 
willing to die for their beliefs, Hauerwas believes it is frightening to think that the best 
response to this tragic act of unspeakable violence is to go to the mall to buy the latest 
CD that exhorts illicit sex, gang violence, and drug use.   
Others suggest that the totalizing effects of the world market may not only 
threaten the integrity of local political structures, but they may challenge religious institu-
tions as mediators of grace and salvation.  Critics of the globalization of the market note 
the promises already offered to consumers by companies such as Nike and Pepsi.  In their 
carefully crafted marketing campaigns that blanket all aspects of the media, they promise 
people that if they “Just Do It” or take part in the “Choice of a New Generation,” their 
lives will magically improve.  These large-scale multinational corporations promise a 
utopian vision that if people just buy the latest pair of $200 shoes or the largest $20,000 
plasma screen television, life would be greatly improved and much more comfortable.  
Critics also believe that the global market will even seek to transform the world of physi-
cal experience.  They point to vacation destinations such as Las Vegas and Disney World.  
The proprietors operating in these locations promise that taking a gondola ride at the Ve-
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netian Hotel is just as good as taking one in Venice.  Why go to famous historical places 
like France, Japan, Germany, and China when Disney World’s EPCOT center offers rep-
lications of these countries cultural icons within a few blocks walk?  One can have all 
these adventures without jet lag or the need to overcome language barriers.    
 Schindler contends that the most damaging outcome resulting from the drive to 
consume constantly is that it spawns “spiritual poverty.”  He argues Novak’s vision of 
capitalism, indeed, all versions of capitalism; inherently rely on a view of the person that 
is fundamentally determined by self-interest.  He says, 
Once we recognize…that the market system will itself always-already be proposed 
in terms of a definite cultural-moral order, any actual market system will always-
already embody, however implicitly, some definite notion of self-interest, of the 
self’s relation to the other, of the self in terms of a primacy of “being” or “having” – 
and thus some definite disposition toward what the pope calls “consumerism.134   
 
The disposition toward the primacy of consuming over giving orders human “doing” on-
tologically prior to human “being.”  Schindler believes this vision of the human person is 
contrary to a Christian anthropology that sees persons as created in the image of a self-
giving God.  He contends that “doing” is not the reason for human existence.135  
Schindler concludes that Novak does not provide a rigorous Christological critique of lib-
eralism that affirms “a primacy of receptivity in the beginning and all along the way as 
the inner form of human action (“doing”).”136  He concludes that the current spiritual cri-
sis caused by our consumer culture can only be solved through “a spiritual transformation 
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of our being, which is (logically) prior to, even as it comprehends, a moral-social re-
sponse.”137 
ii. Invasion of Multinational Corporations and the Danger to In-
digenous Cultures 
 
A second criticism of Michael Novak’s support for democratic capitalism is that 
he fails to address how many cultures are ill prepared to deal with the negative impact 
that the globalization of the market has on the maturity of a nation’s political develop-
ment.  In D. Stephen Long’s, “A Global Market – A Catholic Church: The New Political 
(Ir)Realism,” he recalls through his experience with the Guarifuna, a displaced African 
tribe presently living in Central America, how the new world economy decimated their 
culture.138  He argues the Guarifuna were unable to deal with the effects of a worldwide 
global market.  Long says that life for the Guarifuna once revolved around the shrimp and 
lobster plant that existed within the village square.  Plant members would take the shrimp 
and lobster, package it, and eventually export it, usually to the United States.  In ex-
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change for their labor, many of these people, especially the young people of the village, 
resisted buying local goods because they wanted to use their limited resources to buy 
American consumer products.  They resisted buying indigenous cultural goods or invest-
ing their small wages for future spending in order to feel connected to the global market.   
Novak could argue that this is not a problem with capitalist ideology.  He could 
defend his thesis that people such as the Guarifuna need more time to develop the neces-
sary virtues to understand capitalism’s capacity for augmenting wealth.  In contrast to 
buying foreign goods, they could learn to invest money back into their local economy by 
buying local products.  Their lack of discipline to save and invest is simply a failure to 
understand the intricacies of the global economy, not a failure of capitalism as an eco-
nomic system.  He could argue that cultures that fail to develop required capitalist habits 
cannot expect to eat broadly of capitalism’s fruits.139 
Professor Long contends that the Guarifuna do not lack a diligent work ethic, an 
unwillingness to use their natural resources for the betterment of their local community, 
or a misunderstanding of the advantages of capitalism.  These people lack a fair chance to 
enter the global marketplace because multinational corporations undermine the principle 
of fair competition.  The small businesses that Novak champions as reflections of the en-
trepreneurial spirit often fail in developing nations because people lack the capital re-
sources necessary to compete with large multinational corporations.  They do not possess 
vast amounts of capital reserves to compete with these kinds of companies.  Eventually, 
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“The corporation, with its flexibility, rises to power both in cooperation with and in op-
position to the power of the nation-state.”140   
Many multi-national corporations use their extensive capital reserves to challenge 
the supremacy of the nation-state.141  Corporations use their economic power to gain a 
competitive advantage within developing markets.  They bypass state power because 
many LDCs do not possess the wherewithal to defend themselves against these kinds of 
economic intrusions.  This shields multinational corporations from competition and it 
relegates small businesses in these nations to an indentured status.  The wages the Guari-
funa were paid were insufficient, for example, “to purchase the product they prepared, yet 
other cultural products were made available to them – Coca-Cola, cigarettes, audiocas-
settes, World Wrestling Federation mementos, and, on rare occasions, vaccination.142   
The contemporary global market challenges the independence of political systems 
within many LDCs.  The global market does not contain an impartial center from which 
to arbitrate power.  This differentiates it from a nation-state.  It is not in the interest of a 
multinational corporation to create these kinds of centers because they do not want citi-
zens to participate in their decision-making processes.  Their desire to increase productiv-
ity and make exchanges easier makes them less likely to try to develop political coher-
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141 The other way that multinational corporations challenge state authority is by establishing their company 
headquarters in countries that possess weak tax collecting agencies similar to the IRS.  Thus, by establish-
ing bases of operation in developing nations, these kinds of corporations often have no incentives to put 
money back into the local economies to raise the general welfare of the people who produce the products of 
these large firms.    
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ency among the people.143  The amorphous nature of the multinational corporation and its 
unaccountability to local citizens helps to undermine the legitimate political rights of citi-
zens in LDCs.  Corporations possess the ability to dismiss claims made on them to estab-
lish just working conditions, living wages, and reasonable working hours without a strong 
government to protect worker’s rights.  The multinational corporation gains hegemonic 
influence over the political system.  They use this power to undermine developing de-
mocracies by curtailing them from establishing viable political cultures.  The system of 
checks and balances championed by Novak disappears and becomes a fragment of its 
former self.144  The sweeping power of the global market displaces it.  The inability of the 
global market to protect the rights of citizens leads some to discredit the idea that the 
globalization of the world economy is one of the great unifying achievements of moder-
nity.  This new brand of global capitalism has produced a new Leviathan that usurps 
power away from local political communities and subverts the mediating influences of 
civil society. 
iii. The Globalization of the Market: How it Marginalizes the Weak-
est Members of Society 
 
A final criticism of Novak’s support for democratic capitalism is that this system 
of political economy weakens the bonds of social unity necessary to protect the poorest 
and weakest members of society.  For some theologians this makes democratic capitalism 
incompatible with the Gospel’s vision of solidarity with the poor.145  These theologians 
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144 Novak’s commitment to political realism, republican democracy, and civil society draws implicitly from 
Reinhold Niebuhr’s work. 
  
145 The list of thinkers who challenge this tendency of capitalism is long and distinguished.  See Donal 
Dorr, Option for the Poor: A Hundred Years of Catholic Social Teaching (Maryknoll, N.Y.: Orbis Books, 
1991); Gustavo Guitiérrez, Evangelización y Opción por los Pobres (Buenos Aires: Ediciones Paulinas, 
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contend the globalization of the market has led to an increase in civil strife, shifted re-
sources away from the marginalized, protected those who are more efficient, and eroded 
the foundations of community life that have historically sustained civic friendship.  As 
Jürgen Multmann says,  
Today countries which neither possess appreciable resources or raw materials nor 
can offer the prospect of worthwhile markets are ignored.  They drop out of the 
global market.  Millions become surplus people.  No one can use them.  They easily 
become the victims of violence, as in Rwanda, or of the plagues which are coming 
back again in the guise of epidemics, as in Latin America – not to speak of AIDS in 
Africa.146 
 
These theologians generally believe that Christians who do not question the basic operat-
ing principles of the global market fail to see that the present system cannot promote an 
ethic of solidarity with the poor.  Several of these theologians argue that to combat the 
hegemonic influence of the global market requires the church to play a more active role 
in society to increase the participation in society of those marginalized by the global mar-
ket.  This gives people the necessary resources to challenge the structures of poverty and 
inequality caused by capitalism.  These critics remain convinced that the free market em-
phasizes egotistical values of productivity, efficiency, and self-interest at the expense of 
others that support solidarity with the poor and weakest members of society.   
These criticisms provide clear evidence that a divide exists between those who 
support liberal institutions, such as the free market, and those who see the proliferation of 
these institutions as a challenge to the church’s authority to foster an authentic Christian 
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witness in the world.  A number of critics of democratic capitalism have put forth an 
ethical vision that emphasizes that Christians living in Western democratic societies must 
place themselves in opposition to these dominant political and economic institutions.  
These writers advocate that the church must resist the globalization of the market because 
it is the true villain n the modern world.  They call for the church to play a more active 
role by challenging the faithful to rectify problems such as the disparity in wealth that 
exists between rich and poor within LDCs.  The ominous warnings these critics raise 
against democratic capitalism begs the question: “Is Michael Novak’s advocacy for de-
mocratic capitalism problematic?” 
h. Novak’s Possible Response to These Criticisms of the Globalization of the Mar-
ket 
 
The previous section’s review of several frequent criticisms of the achievements 
of democratic capitalism and Michael Novak’s support for this system of political econ-
omy raises many important issues.  Today, many see that the expansion of the global 
market as a dangerous threat that continues to produce a number of harmful effects in 
modern world.  As Jeffrey Sachs says, 
At the start of the twenty-first century, Enlightenment hopes for progress embod-
ied in the Millennium Declaration and the Millennium Development Goals have 
clashed head on with war, AIDS, and the still unmet challenge of extreme poverty 
in large parts of Africa, Latin America, and Asia.  The clash of high rhetoric and 
poor results has led to the antiglobalization movement, which burst forth dramati-
cally into public view on the streets of Seattle in November 1999.147 
 
Today, the antiglobalization movement continues to make its mark.  Meetings of leaders 
from the World Bank and the IMF would have most likely continued to be exercises in 
unqualified praise of globalization without their protests.  There was little said about the 
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world’s poor, the AIDS pandemic, women’s rights, and environmental degradation 
caused by human beings before scores of people took to the streets.  The rise of the an-
tiglobalization movement has led the international community to address many of these 
important issues and they have drawn increased media attention in the ensuing years. 
Although Novak would most likely applaud the legitimate moral outrage that fuels 
members of the antiglobalization movement, I think he would argue that they sometimes 
fail to recognize the benefits that have resulted from the globalization of the market.  
These include such things as increased communication, better healthcare, improved food 
production, as well as substantial reductions in the numbers of people now living in ex-
treme poverty in places such as India and China.  As Sachs argues,  
By now, the antiglobalization movement should see that globalization, more than 
anything else, has reduced the numbers of extreme poor in India by two hundred 
million and in China by three hundred million since 1990.148 
 
Novak would ask whether theologians who have joined the antiglobalization movement 
ever provide alternative social structures to make their criticisms more pertinent.  Novak 
might ask these theologians, “What great proficiency does the church possess to speak on 
the great structural problems caused by global poverty, hunger, and the spread of infec-
tious diseases such as AIDS other than noting how they undermine solidarity with the 
poor and marginalized?  Does the church have the capacity to speak authoritatively on the 
shape and structure of the global economy with the same kind of authority that it pro-
nounces to have on issues of faith and morals?”  Even if the church possessed this kind of 
proficiency, it is difficult to envision what kind of alternative economic structures the 
church would provide to the global market to combat the problems already cited.  I agree 
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with Novak that massive efforts to redistribute wealth through large-scale government 
redistribution programs fundamentally undermine human dignity, causes violence, and 
diminishes the initiative of persons to seek solutions to difficult social problems.149  Thus, 
what benefit do the theologians who repudiate the globalization of the market really offer 
to the Christian faithful?  In fact, Novak appears to ask, “What system is better at affirm-
ing human dignity, individual initiative, and creating wealth and prosperity for millions 
of people than democratic capitalism?” 
The persistence of these questions becomes greater for Christians who want to ar-
gue for a more disciplined church capable of sustaining communities of solidarity with 
the poor.  The fact that many theologians have attempted to document the shortcomings 
of the globalization of the market and recover a more distinct Christian language to ar-
ticulate faithful witness to the world are significant steps toward answering these chal-
lenges.  The emphasis these theologians place on community life, prayer, non-violence, 
and the authority of Christ as the norm for Christian discipleship are needed and remark-
able theological achievements.  However, to respond faithfully to the Second Vatican 
Council’s challenge to dialogue with the modern world, a great part of that dialogue con-
tinues to take place for many Christians within the structures of liberal institutions.  No-
vak would probably contend that these theologians are too pessimistic about the possibili-
ties of capitalism with a human face, in which the remarkable power of trade and invest-
ment can be harnessed while acknowledging and addressing limitations through compen-
satory collective actions.  He would most likely remind people that the anti-corporate, 
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anti-trade attitudes have also resulted from an unthinking antipathy to capitalism that re-
flects a more profound misunderstanding.  Novak would say to abandon efforts to reform 
the globalization of the market, a scenario that could benefit millions of people, appears, 
as Reinhold Niebuhr might suggest, “irresponsible.” 
The negative reading that many theologians give regarding the globalization of the 
market raises problems for those who want to work to reform this institution.  This is not 
to say that people should not wrestle with the criticisms of the globalization of the market 
raised by these theologians.  Their insights about the dangers of the global market are 
poignant, demanding, full of vitality, but inevitably frustrating because they appear to do 
their best work on the other side of the eschaton.  Christians must continue to ask 
whether the reading of democratic capitalism that these theologians provide is correct.  In 
other words, do they tell a true story?  The fact that presently there exists a vast gap be-
tween rich and poor is not a new historical reality that has resulted from the globalization 
of the market.  A superficial reading of history shows that this has always been a persis-
tent problem.  Technology and the ability to communicate with people to identify people 
who live in extreme poverty might have increased, but the enduring problems of evil and 
the persistence of human beings remaining cruel to one another remain timeless obstacles 
inherent to the human condition.   
Novak allies himself with these theologians when the globalization of the market 
becomes reckless and fails to promote human dignity150  Novak, nonetheless, makes the 
wise prudential judgment that Christians should not abandon the humane expansion of 
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the market.  He advocates that Christians and others should work to reform the institu-
tions that contribute to the globalization of the market.  He says,  
These institutions tell citizens which of their behaviors will receive social ap-
proval or disapproval….  Such institutions are crucial because the primary form 
of capital is the human spirit, which is subject to decline as well as progress.151 
  
Novak argues that leaving these institutions to people unchallenged by the Gospel pro-
vides support for those who criticize Christianity as an otherworldly religion incapable of 
dealing with humanity’s greatest challenges.  He believes that God calls the faithful to 
work to transform the world into a place that supports human dignity and he finds that 
Catholicism and its moral resources capable of reforming these institutions.  The tradi-
tion’s commitment to human rights, limited constitutional governments, and responsible 
free markets, bound by juridical systems that support the growth of civil society, provides 
resources to challenge those who work within these liberal institutions to make them live 
up to their highest ideals.152  Novak champions and calls for the reform of liberal institu-
tions because these structures provide the necessary freedom to act to allow people to 
make different choices about how they should cultivate democratic values.  In particular, 
Novak thinks the desire for capitalist economic institutions around the world is not sur-
prising since people can scarcely help desiring to express in their institutions and daily 
practices their God-given capacities for personal economic initiative and creativity.153   
Novak concludes that democratic capitalism is the best system of political econ-
omy for protecting individual liberty, promoting human creativity, and increasing the liv-
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ing standards of the poor in the developing world.  He remains firmly committed to the 
promotion and reform of liberal institutions and his support for democratic capitalism to-
day remains steadfast.  He advocates for Christians not to abandon or abdicate responsi-
bility for this kind of system of political economy, but to live out their vocations in them.  
As a result, Novak believes that Christians must use the freedom protected by liberal in-
stitutions not simply to resist coercion, but to use them to build a more compassionate 
society that promotes values worthy of disciples of Jesus Christ.  
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Chapter 4 
 
David Hollenbach, The Catholic Human Rights Tradition, and The Common Good 
 
In chapter 3, my goal was to investigate whether democratic capitalism as a sys-
tem of political economy is capable of supporting the commitments of Catholic social 
teaching to affirm human dignity and defend human rights.  I used the work of Michael 
Novak to accomplish this goal because his years of support for democratic capitalism 
rests on a vision of the human person that draws heavily from thinkers typically associ-
ated with the liberal tradition such as Adam Smith and Alexis de Tocqueville.  He affirms 
that this kind of system of political economy promotes an anthropology that upholds in-
dividual liberty, augments human creativity, values entrepreneurship, and enhances the 
economic well-being of more people better than any alternative system.  At its best, de-
mocratic capitalism provides opportunities to cultivate certain “bourgeois virtues” such as 
prudence, creativity, and liberality.1  Novak believes the capacity of democratic capital-
ism to teach people these kinds of virtues is normally a good thing for persons.  To prac-
tice capitalism rightly understood, people require virtues such as prudence and frugality 
to develop attitudes and dispositions that tame the human proclivity for unabashed self-
interest.  Indeed, those who practice democratic capitalism display a certain kind of 
“spirit,” which Novak thinks people can learn about and acquire in their places of wor-
ship.  In particular, he contends Roman Catholicism’s sacramental vision of the world, 
which places human dignity and human rights at the center of its social teaching, makes it 
                                                 
1 I borrow the term “bourgeois virtues” from the title of Deidre N. McCloskey’s new book.  McCloskey’s 
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tions about democratic capitalism.  See Deidre N. McCloskey, The Bourgeois Virtues: Ethics for an Age of 
Commerce (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2006). 
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a suitable institutional actor within civil society to inculcate the practices necessary to 
sustain the spirit of democratic capitalism as a system of political and economic organiza-
tion.    
Although Michael Novak positively assesses many aspects of democratic capital-
ism, his heavy reliance on libertarian thinkers to demonstrate support for his position 
raises a number of challenges from within the tradition of Catholic social teaching.  Other 
theologians who draw more heavily from the communitarian wing of Catholic social 
teaching question whether this kind of system of political economy and the type of vision 
of the human person it puts forth actually promotes human dignity and human rights in 
the ways that Novak claims.  One Catholic social ethicist today who provides a more 
critical assessment of democratic capitalism and its vision of the human person is David 
Hollenbach.  Fr. Hollenbach is a Jesuit priest who currently serves as the director for The 
Center for Human Rights and International Justice and is the Margaret O'Brien Flatley 
Chair in Theology at Boston College, where he teaches theological and Christian social 
ethics.  Hollenbach joined the Society of Jesus in 1964 and received his Ph.D. in theo-
logical ethics from Yale in 1975.  One of his most significant achievements was when he 
worked as a consultant for the National Conference of Catholic Bishops to draft their 
1986 pastoral letter Economic Justice for All: Catholic Social Teaching and the U.S. 
Economy.  More recently, he served as President of the Society of Christian Ethics in 
1995, received a Fulbright Fellowship in 1996, and received the John Courtney Murray 
Award in 1998 for outstanding contributions to theology from the Catholic Theological 
Society of America.  
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The majority of Hollenbach’s academic work focuses on the foundation of Chris-
tian social ethics, particularly in the area of human rights.  His commitment to human 
rights has led him to address issues as diverse as inner-city poverty in the United States to 
the ethical and moral challenges raised by globalization.  Hollenbach argues that humans 
are primarily social beings who flourish through participating in the cultural, political, 
and economic development of their people.  He challenges whether our contemporary 
ethos, whose primary values are independence and autonomy, is capable of addressing 
the new kinds of interdependence brought about by globalization.  As he says,  
When the possibility of attaining good lives and freedom itself are becoming more 
dependent on new interconnections, however, much more attention must be given 
to the way the well-being of individuals is shaped by institutional connections 
with others.  Globalization is thus challenging the received tradition of public val-
ues that has prevailed in the West for the past several centuries.2 
 
To meet these challenges, Hollenbach presents an anthropology that stresses the 
communal dimensions of human personhood, which has led him to promote a vision of 
the common good that calls upon the idea of solidarity, which he defines as a firm and 
persevering determination to commit oneself to the common good.3  Hollenbach’s com-
mitment to an ethic of the common good refutes the charge that pursuing it is quixotic 
and socially dangerous.4  Indeed, Hollenbach presents grounds both in secular and theo-
logical terms regarding the ways that religion has been and can be a positive contributor 
to public conversation about the common good.  Hollenbach qualifies his approach by 
indicating that what it seeks practically speaking is, first of all, the fulfillment of certain 
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minimal norms.5  These minimal norms are an organic conception of human rights, which 
he sees as the minimum requirements for participation in social life.  He rests his inclu-
sive vision of human rights on an anthropology that is both personalist and communi-
tarian.  Hollenbach promotes this kind of anthropology over and against more libertarian 
conceptions of the human person because the adoption of a comprehensive view of hu-
man rights will help to protect the poorest members of society from marginalization and 
enhance the possibilities for the active participation of all people in the well ordering of 
society.  Hollenbach believes the preservation of human dignity requires positive action 
in the form of social justice to support those who are vulnerable to de facto conditions of 
unequal and non-reciprocal interdependence.6  As a result, Hollenbach sees social justice 
as the call for the development of institutions that make interdependence in a community 
of solidarity a realistic possibility.   
My goal in this chapter is to use the work of David Hollenbach to show that a 
more communitarian vision of the human person is better equipped to support the growth 
of markets that advance the fundamental dignity of human persons and their inalienable 
rights than the liberal anthropology espoused by Michael Novak.  Indeed, I want to show 
that placing individual freedom and solidarity in society as competing ideals is a false 
dichotomy.  Although I agree with Novak that the expansion of markets continues to 
raise the material well-being of millions of people around the world, it is apparent that it 
does so unevenly.  This calls for a communal ethic in which both personal economic ini-
tiative and social solidarity are valued and embodied.  Hollenbach’s work is important 
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because it attempts to outline why universal human rights and the global common good 
are mutually implicating.  His call for solidarity and commitment to an inclusive vision of 
human rights does more than warn people about the dangers associated with the growth 
of a hegemonic global market in which the economic power of the few controls and 
dominates the many.  It calls for people in both government and civil society to develop 
practical forms of global interdependence that enhance both the personal and social well-
being of people in solidarity with one another.  To support these claims, first, I explain 
why Hollenbach thinks the Catholic human rights tradition and its commitment to a com-
prehensive vision of human rights aims to achieve this goal.  Second, I explicate why 
Hollenbach thinks the protection of these rights requires a commitment to solidarity in a 
community of freedom shaped by an ethic of the common good.  Finally, I explore 
whether Hollenbach’s ethic is capable of achieving these goals.  In particular, I assess the 
charge that Hollenbach’s commitment to social justice leads to the expansion of govern-
ment and the loss of individual economic initiative.  It is to these issues that I now turn. 
1. An Examination of Hollenbach’s Exploration of the Catholic Human Rights Tra-
dition from Pope Leo XIII to Pope John Paul II 
 
David Hollenbach’s Claims in Conflict focuses on the development of the Catho-
lic human rights tradition over a span of more than one hundred years.  In this work, he 
argues, 
Human dignity is the concrete normative value which the entire tradition has at-
tempted to defend.  Respect for the dignity and worth of the person is the founda-
tion of all the specific human rights and more general social ethical frameworks 
adopted by the encyclicals and other Church teachings.7   
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Hollenbach makes clear that the foundation of the Catholic human rights tradition is the 
dignity of the human person.  He says, “The thread that ties all these documents together 
is their common concern for the protection of the dignity of the human person.”8  Ken-
neth R. Himes agrees with this statement.  He believes that modern Catholic social teach-
ing draws an intimate connection between human dignity and human rights.  Thus, “hu-
man rights give specificity to the language of human dignity; they articulate the free-
doms, the goods, and the relationships that are expressive of a person’s dignity.”9  Hol-
lenbach focuses on the Catholic human rights tradition, beginning with the work of Pope 
Leo XIII and ending with Pope John Paul II, to analyze the meaning of human dignity 
and the purpose of human rights both ethically and morally. 
a. Pope Leo XIII: Laying the Foundation for the Catholic Human Rights Tradition 
 
David Hollenbach believes Leo XIII’s Rerum novarum marked a turning point in 
Catholic social teaching because it critically addressed the benefits and shortcomings of 
liberal democracy and Marxist thought.  Hollenbach says, “It was with Leo XIII that the 
Church began to move from a stance of adamant resistance to modern Western develop-
ments in political and social life to a stance of critical participation in them.”10  Leo rec-
ognized the impact of both liberal and Marxist thought, which stressed political and eco-
nomic equality, respectively.   
From a political standpoint, the movement toward democracy in many Western 
states emphasized individual liberty and autonomy.  Liberal thinkers affirmed that per-
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sons possess political and civil rights, such as speech, press, and assembly.  These kinds 
of rights serve as negative immunities against state coercion to protect individual free-
dom.  A benefit of this conception of liberty was that it provided individuals with the 
necessary civil space to pursue a conception of the good life apart from outside interfer-
ence from the state. 
Pope Leo XIII, however, criticized many elements of the liberal tradition.  He as-
sociated the institution of democracy in the political sphere as a potential threat to the de-
velopment of human persons in the moral sphere.  Hollenbach claims the moral threat 
that Leo perceived was that the movement toward democracy would usher in the belief 
that human dignity was subjective and that moral values were subject to change by ma-
jority rule.  Leo countered this threat by arguing that ‘man’ precedes the state because of 
his worth as a transcendent being.  All political and legal institutions must be responsive 
to the moral claim of human dignity as a non-instrumental value in order to meet the de-
mands of human dignity.  Otherwise, they will become both totalitarian and oppressive.11  
This led Leo to defend a hierarchical understanding of the social order, which never al-
lowed him fully to endorse liberal democracy.  He remained imbued with a paternalistic 
attitude toward the masses because he thought them incapable of making wise prudential 
judgments about the proper moral ordering of their lives.  Yet, his affirmation that human 
persons ‘precede’ the state, by virtue of the primacy of the moral claim of every person to 
respect his or her transcendental worth,12 allowed Leo to criticize all forms of democratic 
theory that maintained that basic values and human rights are created by human choice.  
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In this way, Leo offered a powerful objection “to all forms of strict moral and political 
voluntarism.”13   
Although Leo did not fully endorse all aspects of the liberal tradition, Hollenbach 
considers his commitment to economic rights an important achievement in the develop-
ment of the Catholic human rights tradition.  Leo’s commitment to economic rights, 
which included the right to adequate remuneration for one’s labor and the right to private 
property,14 allowed him to affirm that human dignity requires protection against treatment 
as a mere instrument of production.  His defense of private property, for example, derives  
not simply from the freedom of individual persons to act in a way unimpeded by 
others, but also from the fact that persons necessarily depend for the preservation 
of their dignity upon material conditions.  All have a right to have these needs ful-
filled at least minimally.15 
 
Leo’s support for a just wage emerges out of his commitment to family life, where wages 
must be commensurate to allow support for the care of families.16  Simple commutative 
justice is inadequate to support and raise a family when the material needs of workers go 
unmet.17  To insure that owners would deal fairly with their employees by providing them 
with a just wage, Leo defended the right of workers to form unions.18  He defended this 
right to insure just working conditions, adequate time for family life, and religious devo-
tion.19  He argued that employers are under a moral and legal obligation to recognize and 
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protect these rights.20  When employers fail to fulfill their obligations to their employees, 
Leo believed the state has the duty to use its power to intervene to protect the rights of 
workers.21  The result of Leo’s defense of these economic rights was that human dignity 
places a claim on the state to protect workers against those who would reduce them to 
instruments for their own purposes.22 
b. Pius XI and the Introduction of the Concept of Social Justice for the Catholic 
Human Rights Tradition 
 
Hollenbach argues the release of Pius XI’s Quadragesimo anno marked another 
turning point in the development of the Catholic human rights tradition.  As discussed in 
chapter 2, Pius dealt with Fascism, the Great Depression, and the development of a 
Communist regime in Russia during his pontificate.  In the midst of these major devel-
opments, Hollenbach suggests, “Pius XI continued to give major emphasis to the central-
ity of human dignity as the basis of all human rights.”23  Pius’s commitment to human 
rights led him to criticize as morally objectionable the way modern economic structures 
functionalize human persons.  They often do this by treating people as commodities.24  
His criticisms of modern economic structures borrowed heavily from Leo’s commitment 
to see persons as transcendent beings whose dignity made them more than mere physical 
objects.25  Pius employed this vision of the human person to reject Marxism’s support for 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
20 Hollenbach, Claims in Conflict, 48. 
 
21 See Rerum novarum, nos. 32-34. 
 
22 Hollenbach, Claims in Conflict, 46.  
 
23 Ibid., 50. 
 
24 Ibid., 52.  See Quadragesimo Anno, no. 83. 
 
25 Ibid. 
 
  127
class struggle.  Although Hollenbach suggests that Pius presented a ‘blanket’ view of so-
cialism because he did not understand its nuances, there is no doubt that he analyzed all 
political and economic structures by the criteria of whether they benefited human dig-
nity.26 
Hollenbach suggests that the most important contribution that Quadragesimo 
anno made to the Catholic human rights tradition was the introduction of the concept of 
social justice.27  Hollenbach says, “The concept of social justice is a conceptual tool by 
which moral reasoning takes into account the fact that relationships between persons have 
an institutional or structural dimension.”28  Before Quadragesimo anno, Catholic social 
teaching tended to analyze political and economic issues from the standpoint of their im-
pact on individual persons.  It tended to neglect interpersonal relationships and the way 
that political, economic, and cultural institutions shape human events, impact human dig-
nity, and contour the context of human rights.  The concept of social justice introduced 
into Catholic social teaching the “consciousness of institutional change”29 and it placed 
efforts to specify the framework of human rights within the context of these institutional 
dynamics.30   
Hollenbach says, for example, “The right to private ownership of property will 
necessarily have different implications in a pre-monetized economy, in a feudal system, 
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and in industrial society.”31  This is because different social contexts affect economic in-
stitutions, which makes a difference about the ways people understand and enforce prop-
erty ownership.  The movement toward a social justice approach gave adherents of 
Catholic social teaching the capacity to analyze the impact of political, cultural, and eco-
nomic institutions on human well-being and development.  The tradition moved beyond 
the idea that human dignity is simply a personal affair.  A social justice approach required 
the Church to look at the way social structures and institutions promote or marginalize 
persons from participating in society.  Hollenbach concludes that Pius’s use of the con-
cept of social justice “marks a major advance in the tradition’s understanding of the way 
social institutions mediate the claims of human dignity and shape the content of human 
rights.”32 
c. Pius XII and the Developmental Character of Human Rights 
The development of the Catholic human rights tradition continued during the pon-
tificate of Pope Pius XII.  Hollenbach argues that he spoke more frequently and more sys-
tematically about “the moral roots of social, political, and economic order than had any of 
his predecessors.”33  Pius XII’s emphasis on the moral foundations of these orders led 
him to stress the rule of law and to favor the kind of political institutions associated with 
constitutional democracies.  He believed that social morality is primarily public, which 
led him to affirm that the dignity of the human person is an “intrinsic element in the very 
nature of social organization itself.”34   
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Similar to his predecessors, Pius’s belief in the ontological reality of human dig-
nity led him to reject both legal positivism and moral subjectivism.  He found the growth 
of totalitarian states abhorrent because they treated human beings as mere devices in the 
social wheel.  Pius offered a more positive vision of social life based on a community of 
morally responsible citizens by making the human person the central moral criterion of 
society.35  As Hollenbach says, “This positive aspect of his thought brought out an essen-
tial characteristic of the moral theory of the modern papacy.”36  Human dignity is  
an intrinsic element in the very nature of organization itself.  All forms of social 
life are conceived of as essentially moral relationships.  They are in service of the 
dignity of the human person whenever they conform to their own proper inner 
structure.37 
   
Pius made the task of respecting human dignity a moral task “present within the condi-
tions and limits of human life.”38  Human dignity, which is both transcendent and finite, 
remains unconditional, but structured and conditioned “by the limitations and possibili-
ties of persons in society.  It is structured by that finite form of mutuality which is tran-
scendental dignity’s human form.”39  Hollenbach calls these finite conditions, which 
promote human dignity, human rights.40  Although Pius did not call them as such, he 
clarified the forms of human relationships, which allow society to function.  Persons 
function morally in social institutions such as the family, governments, and business as-
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sociations.  He thought it was important to analyze the ways that these institutions influ-
enced the core value of human dignity, which led him to specify a number of human 
rights and corresponding duties.   
An important contribution that Pius made toward the safeguarding of these rights 
was the claim that persons had a right to a juridical order that would constitutionally pro-
tect these rights.  Hollenbach says that Pius believed that the role of government is to 
promote the common good – “that form of society in which responsible citizens act in a 
way which leads to mutual respect for rights and dignity.  The common good, founded on 
mutual dignity, is not in opposition to human rights, but rather their guarantee.”41  The 
limited role of government and the nature of the common good conceived by Pius af-
firmed, “human rights cannot be understood apart from social interdependence, nor can 
social well-being be understood apart from personal rights.”42  Although the major diffi-
culty remained how to resolve conflicts between personal and social goods in the con-
crete, Pius introduced “a strong emphasis on the developmental character of rights….”43 
d. John XXIII and the Interdependence of Human Rights 
Hollenbach contends the brief pontificate of John XXIII marked “watershed 
years” for the Catholic human rights tradition.44  John’s optimism and candor endeared 
him to the modern world and his work marked a period of innovation for Catholic social 
teaching.  One of the defining characteristics of John’s view of the modern social order 
was its increasing interdependence.  In Mater et magistra, he identified that major social, 
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political, and economic changes around the world had increased the need for international 
cooperation and organization to solve many of the world’s problems.  To meet these chal-
lenges, John reaffirmed that human dignity remains the central moral criterion to analyze 
the strengths and weaknesses of the contemporary social order.  The difference between 
John’s vision of human dignity and that of his predecessors was “his continual emphasis 
on the fact that human dignity can only exist within a consciously developed context of 
interdependence.”45  The affirmation of human dignity as a moral claim must now ad-
dress human beings, as Hollenbach says, “in association” with one another in a more sig-
nificant way than was pointed out by his predecessors. 
What were the consequences of this new vision of human dignity for the Roman 
Catholic human rights tradition?  In Pacem in terris, John elaborated “a theory of human 
rights as a framework for international and national peace.”46  The organizing principle of 
these rights was the dignity of the human person.47  Hollenbach believes the importance 
of Pacem in terris  
lies primarily in its systematic treatment of the consequences of this basic moral 
norm in highly organized societies and in the world as a whole.  The unifying fea-
ture of this teaching about human rights and the way that they protect human dig-
nity is to see them as means for people to partake in community.  Human rights 
neither provide exclusive negative immunity against the community, nor are they 
the rights of the community against the individual.48   
 
They are mechanisms to empower people to partake in their society’s political and eco-
nomic development.  These rights, which arise from human dignity, come with certain 
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duties.  John believed that a well-ordered society requires that human beings recognize 
and observe their mutual rights and duties because persons are social beings.  Each per-
son should contribute to the well-being of the social order to allow for the greatest level 
of participation possible.49  “These duties and responsibilities are the responses called for 
by the dignity of the person in society.”50  And, because these rights and duties are inti-
mately personal, people need to exercise them in a community of freedom.  
Hollenbach believes that the single foundational norm of human dignity allowed 
John to present an integrated theoretical framework for human rights.  This framework 
allowed the Roman Catholic Church to present a view of human rights that integrated the 
liberal concern to secure civil-political rights with the socialist concern to secure social-
economic rights.  John’s organic view of social life led him to place social-economic 
rights at least on par with civil-political rights in order to protect and promote human 
dignity.51  This is evident in the list of human rights enumerated by John XXIII in Pacem 
in terris.  The political rights that John included were “the rights to participate in public 
affairs and to juridical protection of all one’s human rights.”52  Economic rights included  
the right to work, the rights to humane working conditions, to appropriate partici-
pation in the management of an economic enterprise, to a just wage, to own prop-
erty within the limits established by social duties.53  
 
John’s social encyclicals maintained that the protection and coordination of these rights 
were increasingly the task of organized social bodies within society as a whole.  Al-
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though the institution of government is limited and therefore cannot be responsible as the 
sole guarantor of human rights, it remains indispensable for the protection of all rights.54    
 Hollenbach concludes that the importance of John’s defense of human rights was 
that it tied together the idea that human dignity is not an “abstract or ethereal reality but is 
realized in concrete conditions of personal, social, economic, and political life.”55  The 
fundamental norm of human dignity ties the tradition of Catholic social teaching together.  
Its history, culminating with the work of John XXIII, has been a process of discovering 
and identifying those conditions that promote and protect human dignity.  Hollenbach 
says the tradition has called these conditions human rights.56  These conditions require 
the proper ordering of social and political institutions to make the protection and promo-
tion of human dignity possible.  Although John did not solve all the problems about how 
different peoples should protect human worth in its social context in a highly dynamic 
world, his use of the moral criterion of human dignity shaped a view of human rights that 
was organic and personal.  As a result, John’s adoption of rights thinking achieved  
a rapprochement with modern Western political thinking and opened a path for 
Catholics to join in the emancipation of people from despotic rulers in much of 
the world, especially in Catholic regions like Latin America and the Philippines, 
as well as participation by the faithful in struggles for justice and peace world-
wide.57 
   
Later documents of the tradition would try to resolve some of the tensions raised by 
John’s thinking, but it is difficult to imagine that without his contribution to Catholic so-
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cial teaching that the church would have had the intellectual resources to defend the dig-
nity of the human person in such a highly interconnected world. 
e. Vatican II: Promoting and Defending Human Dignity and Human Rights in a 
Volatile World 
 
The rise of historical consciousness, which gives more importance to the particu-
lar, the contingent, the historical, and the changing, along with the growth of more inte-
grated political and economic structures, provided the Roman Catholic Church with the 
opportunity to grapple more earnestly with the complexities of defending a unified vision 
of human rights in a fluid and highly volatile social order.58  Church leaders recognized 
that two negative outcomes could possibly take shape in this new situation.  On the one 
hand, the focus on our historically conditioned situation could make this an absolute 
claim, which would result in idolatry and enslavement.59  On the other hand, a complete 
or premature withdrawal from historical engagement in the name of pure transcendence 
also was a temptation.60 
Hollenbach contends when commenting on Gaudium et spes that the church tried 
to meet these new historical realities by affirming that the conditions of human dignity 
are historically conditioned ones.61  The consequence of this teaching is that “it is impos-
sible to specify the conditions of human dignity a priori.”62  The recognition that the con-
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text of human rights takes shape historically allowed the church to fashion a theological 
anthropology that defended both the transcendence of the human person and the finite 
character of human existence.  The tensions that human beings experience as both tran-
scendent and finite are the context within which persons realize their dignity.  It is this 
simultaneous presence within the person of the sense of historical limitation and the drive 
toward transcendence that becomes the focus of the new ethical treatment of personal 
dignity in Gaudium et spes. 
The pastoral constitution reveals a fundamental methodological approach to the 
determination of the scope of valid human rights claims in modern societies.  The ap-
proach that it takes makes the social nature of the human person central toward under-
standing how human dignity should be respected in modern societies.  This allowed the 
church to incorporate into its teaching that the increased interdependence of cultural, 
economic, and political organization in modern societies is a natural outgrowth of our 
desire for personal fulfillment through participation in community.  Hollenbach believes 
Gaudium et spes suggests, “a fruitful way to combine the traditional view of human 
rights as rooted in human nature with modern historical consciousness.”63   
The Council reaffirmed rights that defended the transcendent worth of human per-
sons including those that protected them against coercion and bodily torture.  Signifi-
cantly, the Council added to the Catholic human rights tradition by giving as much im-
portance to social, economic, and cultural rights, defined in relation to historical condi-
tions, which acknowledged the increasing interdependence of persons.  The benefit of 
this teaching, in contrast to both liberal and Marxist versions of human rights, was that 
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the Catholic tradition saw human rights as both “negative immunities and positive enti-
tlements.”64  Hollenbach believes, 
This conciliar text laid out the most challenging vision of the church's social mis-
sion of the modern era.  It proclaimed that the Catholic community should be 
deeply engaged in promoting the dignity of every person, and this proclamation 
bore significant fruit in the church's participation in the struggle for human rights 
in Chile, Poland, El Salvador, Korea, the Philippines and elsewhere.  It challenged 
the church to help forge new bonds of global solidarity, mobilizing the church to 
lead the Jubilee 2000 campaign to alleviate the debt of the poorest countries and 
to become one of the world's strongest advocates of multilateral approaches in in-
ternational politics.  It taught that Christian faith reveals the deeper meaning of 
this-worldly activity, calling believers to transform the workplace and the civic 
forum into more authentic reflections of the communion God wants all people to 
share in the heavenly city.65 
 
f. Paul VI: Advocating Human Rights for an Integral Development 
 
The task of implementing this new vision of human rights came during the pon-
tificate of Paul VI.  Paul’s social encyclicals each are shaped “throughout by conscious-
ness of the historicity of social institutions.  They are also dominated by concern with 
transnational and international patterns of human interdependence.”66  The central con-
cern of these documents is the growing level of poverty, especially as experienced by 
those living in developing countries.  To respond to this concern, Paul called for an inte-
gral development, whereby “the development of the person is properly regarded as the 
realization of the human potential for the knowledge, responsibility, and freedom which 
are constitutive of personhood.”67  Paul believed that the actualization of this kind of per-
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sonal development required that people have the opportunity to participate in the various 
social affairs of society.   
The normative standard of integral development therefore includes all those per-
sonal and social rights which have been set forward in previous phases of the tra-
dition.  The context of these rights and their interrelationships with each other, 
however, will only be judged accurately when they are viewed in integral rela-
tionship with each other.68   
 
Economic well-being, therefore, is not simply a minimum standard that is extrinsic or 
merely instrumental in value to the development of the dignity of the human person.  Nor 
is it a means to a dignified life.  “It is, rather, integral to the standard of all moral value, 
human dignity.”69   
To respect and realize human dignity requires that human societies heed the es-
sentially moral call to mutual interdependence.70  In Populorum progressio, Paul criti-
cized calls for development that focused exclusively on one dimension of human person-
ality to the exclusion of others.71  This became even more evident in Octogesima adven-
iens 72, where the document criticized forms of “both Marxism and liberalism, which pro-
grammatically deny the fullness of integral development whether on ideological or stra-
tegic grounds.”73  Paul acknowledged that if either of these ideological systems ever be-
came a complete social system, they would deny elements integral to human develop-
ment.  Although Marxist thought helps to explain scientifically structural and economic 
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conflict, and liberal thought helps provide insights into economic and political means for 
protecting personal self-determination and initiative, independently they fail to provide 
an adequate and comprehensive vision of the human person.  Paul believed that the hu-
man person transcended any one particular ideological system.  As Hollenbach says, 
“This concrete transcendence is precisely the dignity of the human person: fully rooted in 
social and historical conditions, yet always surpassing and judging them.”74   
On the one hand, the finite character of the human person allowed Paul to assert 
that a wide range of political options could be employed to address the material depriva-
tion of millions of people around the globe.  This increased the range of possibility for 
governmental action, but the normative concept of the dignity of the human person still 
kept it (government) limited both in principle and in practice.  On the other hand, the 
transcendent character of human dignity gave Paul the ability to continue to make claims 
on society: “minimum conditions of material well-being must be met, freedom is to be 
defended, but in a way which recognizes the needs and dignity of others, and integral de-
velopment is impossible apart from human solidarity.”75  His commitment to both these 
poles of human ‘being’ allowed him to fashion principles about human dignity, which 
became mechanisms for discernment about the proper political and economic systems 
necessary to create the conditions for human flourishing.   
These principles and the human rights they entail do not constitute a social or po-
litical program.  They are, however, both minimum standards that must be met by 
all such programs, and principles which can shape the conscience of responsible 
agents.76 
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A society that respects these principles, therefore, is a society that forms its decisions and 
policies by them. 
g. 1971 Synod of Bishops and the Right to Development 
Hollenbach argues that the development of the Catholic human rights tradition did 
not stop with the significant events that transpired at the Second Vatican Council or 
throughout the papacy of Paul VI.  The Council’s creation of the international Synod of 
Bishops provided church leaders with a new forum to express the realities of cultural di-
versity within the church.  In 1971, this new forum turned its attention specifically on the 
concerns of the churches in Asia, Africa, and Latin America.  The Synod released the 
document Justitia in mundo, which incorporated both “the strength of the tradition’s the-
ory of human dignity and rights, on the one hand, and differentiated understanding of so-
cial relationships characteristic of Paul VI’s writings on the other.”77  The document 
specified that the protection of human dignity requires a host of rights that work in a dy-
namic relationship with each other.  This is most evident with the document’s call for the 
right to development.78  Hollenbach contends the right to development is  
as an overarching category that includes many of the particular human rights en-
dorsed by the Church.  Or, put differently, the right to development is shorthand 
for a group of fundamental rights that, taken together, constitute the framework 
and substance of a just social order.  Satisfaction of these basic rights can serve as 
an objective criterion for measuring development.79 
  
This right clarifies the tradition’s understanding of how the context of rights should be 
determined.  “The concrete context of the demands of dignity can only be specified 
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through an analysis of the kinds of relationships which actually govern human interac-
tion.”80  It is impossible to measure human dignity on a linear scale by analyzing the na-
ture of the individual person.  It requires a broader analysis that looks at the predominant 
economic, political, and cultural patterns of human organization and the ways these pat-
terns augment or detract from human dignity.  It is from within this context that the 
document spells out the importance of a relational definition of the demands of dignity.81  
The Synod’s reliance on a relational view of human dignity led it to criticize 
mechanisms of social organization that marginalized people from participating in shaping 
the social patterns of human life. 
Marginalization or lack of participation thus becomes a primary criterion for judg-
ing if human dignity is being violated.  Lack of adequate nourishment, housing, 
education, and political self-determination are seen as a consequence of this lack 
of participation.82 
 
Members at the Synod employed this perspective and they were especially critical of the 
growing numbers of people who were ill fed, illiterate, and deprived of political power.  
They were critical of these trends because they violated the right to development, which 
Hollenbach says they describe more aptly as the right to participation.83  The Bishops saw 
the growing numbers of people who remained outside the processes of social change and 
development as a violation of the conditions necessary for authentic human flourishing.  
The Bishops at the Synod recognized that a limited number of human potentialities would 
be realized “as long as persons remain in a condition of extreme marginalization and 
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powerlessness.”84  Thus, the right to participation “implies that all other rights are expres-
sions of the claims of the person to be a self-determining agent, that is, they are expres-
sions of claims to be a participant in the social, economic, and political process.”85  Hol-
lenbach concludes that Justitia in mundo provided the church with a way to analyze so-
cially the marginalization of millions of people by identifying the mechanisms that inhibit 
people from participating in the political, economic, and cultural development of their 
peoples. 
h. Pope John Paul II: Human Dignity, Human Rights, and the Need for Solidarity 
Hollenbach’s foundational claim that the dignity of the human person provides 
the basis for the Catholic Church’s defense of human rights is even more apparent when 
looking at the work of Pope John Paul II during his pontificate.  Even a cursory glance at 
the writings of John Paul II reveals that human dignity provided the basis for his defense 
of human rights.  From encyclicals such as Redemptor hominis to Evangelium vitae, John 
Paul II articulated a comprehensive vision of human rights that specified the political, 
economic, and cultural requirements necessary to secure human dignity in an increasingly 
complex and interdependent world.  He ardently defended a social vision of the human 
person, which led him to articulate why it was so important to give people the opportu-
nity to participate in the various political, economic, and cultural communities created by 
modern societies.  He recognized the importance of these communities because they pro-
vide the avenues for self-fulfillment and authenticity.   
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Hollenbach considers that one of John Paul’s most important contributions to the 
Catholic human rights tradition was his elevation of the virtue of solidarity to the fore-
front of Catholic social teaching.  Although prior pontiffs had identified the increased po-
litical and economic interdependence of human communities, John Paul II went further 
than did his predecessors by stressing the moral interdependence of human communities.  
As Hollenbach says, “John Paul II has distinguished the de facto interdependence that is 
inevitable in human life from a moral interdependence that respects the dignity of persons 
in a reciprocal or mutual way.”86  Hollenbach thinks it is important to see that normal 
modes of interdependence can have either negative or positive value.  Negative modes of 
interdependence arise when people are at war or when people deny others their freedom 
through subjugation or exclusion through law.  In these cases, some people exploit others 
for their own advantage by purposely designing mechanisms of social life to provide 
benefits for some and disadvantages for others.  In contrast, John Paul put forth a vision 
of solidarity that morally commits persons to producing a society that values the dignity 
of all participants to create a common good that is founded on equality and reciprocity.87  
Hollenbach believes John Paul’s affirmation of this positive mode of interdependence 
provides the minimum grounds to enhance the agency and well-being of those who take 
part in it.  “The possibility of such an achievement implies that agency and even human 
dignity, despite shorter-term conflicts and tradeoffs, are shared achievements.”88  To ex-
ercise the virtue of solidarity requires that people commit themselves to the common 
                                                 
86 Hollenbach, The Common Good and Christian Ethics, 187. 
 
87 Ibid., 188. 
 
88 Ibid. 
 
  143
good in a community of active and equal agents.  Solidarity is not primarily an individual 
virtue.  “It must also be expressed in the economic, cultural, political, and religious insti-
tutions that shape society.”89 
Hollenbach sees in John Paul II’s encyclical letter Centesimus annus a clear ex-
pression of the idea that the virtue of solidarity requires exercise within the various insti-
tutions that shape civil society.  This is particularly true for those institutions that deal 
with the economic development of modern societies.  Although John Paul lauded many 
of the benefits associated with modern economic development, including the way global 
markets have become vehicles for improving the quality of life for those who already 
have access to them, he reminded followers of the ways that modern economic institu-
tions tend to isolate and marginalize millions of poor people around the world.90  Hollen-
bach argues that the central concern of Centesimus annus is the way that modern eco-
nomic development tends to marginalize millions of people.  He thinks John Paul made it 
clear that “the market can create problems for democracy and human rights unless it is 
regulated by norms of justice that emerge from a vision of human solidarity - a vision that 
we are morally as well as factually interdependent.”91  Hollenbach questions whether the 
encyclical endorses ‘really existing capitalism’, like some theologians contend.  Thus, 
John Paul called for major domestic and international changes in the global market-
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place.92  John Paul’s long discourse on the social nature of enterprise and economic de-
velopment challenges attempts to provide a ‘rugged individualist’ narrative to support 
capitalism.  He uses the concept of solidarity to express that economic development is 
never a solitary activity.  It always takes place within a social matrix that draws on both 
the material and intellectual resources of various peoples.  The exclusion of large num-
bers of people from these activities not only detracts from the common good.  It under-
mines human dignity in ways that often causes great social ills such as wide-scale unem-
ployment, hunger, and civil conflict.   
2. Revitalizing the Tradition of the Common Good 
 
a. The Emergence of Tolerance and the Decline of the Common Good 
 
Hollenbach believes one of the principal goals of the Catholic human rights tradi-
tion today is to increase the levels of participation of millions of people around the world 
now unable to take part in contemporary economic and political systems.  Thus, a driving 
concern of Hollenbach’s recent work is the growing marginalization of millions of poor 
people around the world due to the lack of economic development.  He considers this 
widespread marginalization a threat to human dignity and a failure to promote and protect 
human rights.  Hollenbach considers the marginalization of the poor particularly disturb-
ing because its banality and fixture within today’s world is astonishing since so many na-
tions have made public commitments to human rights.  During the Cold War, scores of 
political, civic, religious, and business leaders boasted of their concern for human rights.  
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From 1948 to 1989, however, Cold War ideological strife sadly pushed human rights to 
the margins of the international agenda.  He says,  
Over the past half-century hopes that human rights could become truly effective 
standards of international behavior have risen and fallen like the tides.  When the 
United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights was proclaimed in 1948, 
many saw it as a genuine commitment to ‘never again’ tolerate genocide and to 
resist the domination of one people by another through the power of moral con-
sensus rather than armed force.93 
 
When the Cold War ended, many thought a renewed commitment to safeguarding and 
defending human rights would emerge.  Hollenbach points to the 1993 U.N. Conference 
on Human Rights, where 85% of the member states reaffirmed the binding power of the 
declaration as “beyond question” as evidence that the international community was seri-
ous about defending human rights.94  Yet, in the decades following the Cold War, and in 
spite of many public pronouncements, the international community continues to fail to 
protect a comprehensive vision of human rights.  Hollenbach believes this is particularly 
evident in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, where debates 
have arisen concerning the universality of human rights.  He says,  
Some see a rising ‘clash of civilizations’ setting Western nations with their de-
mocratic values on a collision course with the religious-moral-legal system of Is-
lamic shariah and with nations guided by Confucian traditions and ‘Asian values.’  
President George W. Bush, on the other hand, holds that the human rights associ-
ated with Western democracy and free markets are the wave of the global future.  
Meanwhile, some Western academics of a postmodernist bent reject human rights 
norms as incorrigibly Western, in the name of a respect for diverse cultures that 
itself, ironically, sounds somehow Western.95 
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Hollenbach addresses why many countries have failed to meet their high-minded 
rhetoric about human rights with tangible institutional support.  He believes one of the 
great achievements of modernity is the idea that all people share equal dignity as per-
sons.96  He points out that many Western democracies have embedded this idea in their 
foundational political documents and that many non-Western countries want to secure 
this notion in their own political charters.  This speaks loudly to the persuasiveness and 
power of this idea.  He recognizes this as an enormous achievement that must not be for-
gotten or negated.97  Hollenbach believes, however, the history of this idea has engrained 
in the modern Western imagination “not only a positive commitment to equality but also 
the suspicion that pursuing stronger notions of shared goods will lead to oppression and 
violence.”98  This presents major obstacles toward developing an ethic that makes soli-
darity with the poor and the participation of all the goal of institutions that shape society.  
Why has this happened? 
Hollenbach traces the origins of this development to the latter stages of the Ref-
ormation and the early stages of the Enlightenment.  The desire to end the wars of relig-
ion that had raged throughout the European continent made religious freedom, in the eyes 
of many, the first freedom.  The desire to end civil strife made tolerance a necessary reli-
gious attitude.  Many thought the best way to promote tolerance was to make religion a 
private matter.  Proponents of privatization believed that religion “must become a private 
                                                 
96 Although the Catholic Church was a late entrant into these discussions, the previous section showed that 
Hollenbach thinks the church today is now one of the leading advocates of this idea.  He reiterates this 
claim in an article entitled, “Human Rights in Catholic Thought: A Synthesis.”  See David Hollenbach, 
“Human Rights in Catholic Thought: A Synthesis,” America 193 (10/31/2005): 16-18. 
   
97 Hollenbach, The Common Good and Christian Ethics, 32. 
 
98 Ibid. 
 
  147
matter if social peace is to be possible.”99  Peace would be possible once religion became 
private because people would no longer have to fight about comprehensive goods or the 
meaning of the good life.  The advent of religious tolerance would bring about a peaceful 
coexistence that would allow people in civil society to cooperate with each other to se-
cure a wide variety of limited social goods.   
Hollenbach believes the person who gave the best contemporary philosophical 
expression to this position was the late John Rawls of Harvard University.  Hollenbach 
believes Rawls’s work shares several positive affinities with Catholic social teaching, in-
cluding the way his ‘difference principle’ bears a notable resemblance to the ‘preferential 
option for the poor’.100  Rawls thought that every man and woman ought to be free to 
hold his or her view about the good life and that these views must inevitably be private.  
Rawls argued that the reality of pluralism made public discussions about comprehensive 
goods impossible and that his method of avoidance was the only way to achieve any kind 
of consensus.101  The primary social benefit of his position was that by privatizing ‘thick’ 
visions of the good that this would morally constrain people from imposing their vision 
of the good life on anyone else.102  Rawls concluded this was the only way that human 
beings could relate to each other in a pluralistic society such as the United States.  Yet, 
despite this tangible social benefit, Rawls’s denial that debates about our common life in 
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the polis should wrestle with ‘comprehensive visions’ of the social good renders his work 
problematic for Hollenbach.103   
Hollenbach thinks this ideal has become so powerful in the United States that it 
has spread beyond the realm of religion.  Many Americans today consider tolerance to be 
the highest social aspiration and the range of matters to which tolerance extends has 
broadened.104  In fact, there are many indications that tolerance of “diversity occupies the 
place held by the common good in the thought of Aristotle, Thomas Aquinas, and Igna-
tius Loyola.”105  The claim that tolerance holds a preeminent position in American culture 
runs counter to those who believe that a culture war currently exists in the United States.  
Hollenbach points to the evidence provided by the social scientist Alan Wolfe, who sug-
gests that the “beliefs and values of the American middle class are still largely homoge-
nous.”106  Wolfe finds something close to consensus on what middle-class Americans 
most highly value today.107  “This consensus on the summum bonum can be summed up 
in a single word: tolerance.”108 
The assertion that tolerance currently serves as the unifying principle of American 
culture disturbs Hollenbach because he remains unconvinced that an ethos whose primary 
values are individual independence and autonomy are capable of addressing the new 
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forms of interdependence brought about by globalization.109  Although tolerance remains 
a necessary remedy to alleviate ethnic, racial, and religious tensions, tolerance alone can-
not address the widespread social ills that plague our increasingly interconnected world.  
Indeed, people need to pay more attention to the ways globalization challenges the re-
ceived tradition of public values that have prevailed in the West for the past several cen-
turies.110  What does Hollenbach propose as an alternative ethic? 
b. Reengaging the Ethic of the Common Good 
Hollenbach posits an ethic of the common good to address the widespread social 
ills that currently face American society and our world.  Essential to this ethic is the idea 
that the larger good realized in social relationships is greater than the good that can be 
achieved in the life of a single person considered apart from the community.111  Hollen-
bach argues the roots of this ethic appear in the writings of Aristotle, Thomas Aquinas, 
and Ignatius of Loyola.112  Aristotle spoke of the common good realized in community 
not only as nobler but also as ‘more divine’ than the good of persons considered one at a 
time.113  Thomas Aquinas built on Aristotle’s insights by identifying the good to be 
sought by all persons in common with the very reality of God.114  Ignatius of Loyola, the 
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founder of the Jesuits, went even further by linking the order’s principal ideal of ‘glorify-
ing God’ with the terrestrial reality of the common good.115   
Hollenbach notes that today identification with the common good is mostly asso-
ciated with concepts such as the general welfare, public interest, and public goods.  He 
says the general welfare is the most frequently used analogue to the concept of the com-
mon good.  Those who employ it use the term to address largely economic and utilitarian 
concerns.116  The danger with this notion is that politicians and policy experts can point to 
increases in the aggregative good of society while obscuring the marginalization of some 
or many of society’s members.117  The second analogical concept is the public interest, 
which is a disaggregative theory that breaks down the public good into the effects it has 
upon the well being or rights of the individuals of society.118  The principal weakness of 
this concept is that it does not consider the richer understanding of the common implicit 
in the work of past writers.119  The closest analogue to the ancient notion of the common 
good is the idea of ‘public goods’.  Public goods are those goods that are ‘non-rivalrous 
in consumption’ and ‘non-excludible’, which means that its benefits cannot be confined 
to just some people by excluding others from these benefits.  Thus, if a good is there for 
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all, it is there for everyone; if it is present for anyone, it is present for all.120  The problem 
with this analogy is that “these public goods are largely seen as extrinsic or external to 
the relationships that exist among those who form the community or society in ques-
tion.”121  In all, Hollenbach suggests that each analogy fails to address the more basic 
question raised by those in the past about the good of being a community or society at all.   
In order to revive a robust ethic of the common good, Hollenbach believes that re-
ligious communities must play a pivotal role to achieve this goal.  He recognizes the 
irony in arguing that religious traditions offer insights to revive this tradition.  The idea of 
the common good no longer holds a preeminent position in the public philosophy of the 
West because of the emergence of the serious religious disagreements about the meaning 
of the good life that arose during the Reformation.  The fact that he wants to revive this 
tradition in an age when religious pluralism is significantly greater than in the past raises 
several challenges.  The principal one comes from those who wonder whether religion 
should have any voice in shaping public affairs since religious adherents are often seen 
today as those who strain and deepen social divisions.  Hollenbach acknowledges that 
those who remain skeptical about the role religion should play in public life do so be-
cause they can point to several contemporary realities to support their fears.  One need 
only look at the divisive role played by religion in the conflicts of the Middle East, north-
ern India, the former Yugoslavia, Northern Ireland, and numerous other places.122  The 
ability of religious communities to usurp loyalty away from the state and exacerbate sub-
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divisions within the commonwealth raises the question of whether it is a good idea to 
bring back the common good as a social objective.  Opponents do not find it hard to 
imagine that this may invite new religious conflicts.  This objective may encourage be-
lievers to use the coercive power of the state to bring about their religious understandings 
of the good life.   
Hollenbach is aware of the real capacity of religion to become a divisive force 
within society, both domestically and internationally.  Those who argue for its inclusion 
in public life must be aware of its negative consequences.123  Yet, those who seek to ex-
clude religion from public life misunderstand the power of religious communities to en-
rich society because they base their observations on a selective sample of history.124  He 
says, 
There seems to be a propensity to regard all public religion with suspicion and to 
lump very different forms of religious activity together as ‘fundamentalist,’ 
‘dogmatic,’ ‘authoritarian,’ or ‘the religious right.’  When this suspicion shapes 
the discussion, somehow Mahatma Gandhi, the Revered Martin Luther King, 
Archbishop Romero of San Salvador, Archbishop Desmond Tutu of Cape Town, 
Rigoberta Menchú of Guatemala, Bishop Carlos Belo of East Timor, and the nu-
merous followers of each of these leaders get left off the list of significant reli-
gious influences in public life.125 
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This obscured view also tends to down play the positive role religious groups have had in 
the past during the abolitionist, labor, and civil rights movements.126  Today, Hollenbach 
suggests that religious communities continue to play a positive public role.  For example, 
“In numerous places from eastern Europe to Latin America to parts of east Asia, religious 
communities have helped constitute and strengthen civil society as a domain free from 
the authoritarian control of the state’s apparatus.”127  Hollenbach concludes that religious 
traditions, if interpreted properly, possess the capacity to contribute to the common good 
of public life in a way that is fully compatible with pluralism and freedom.128  They are 
most effective when they advocate the cause of the disenfranchised, the poor, and those 
marginalized because of their race, class, or gender.129  The outcome from these engage-
ments can be a more just, free, peaceful, and ultimately more united society.130 
c. Roman Catholicism and Its Resources to Revitalize the Common Good 
 
 Hollenbach suggests that Roman Catholicism in particular offers many resources 
to help reinvigorate an ethic of the common good.  The most important resources that this 
religious tradition presents to public discussions about the common good are its anthro-
pology and inclusive vision of human rights.  First, its anthropology resists the prevailing 
ethos of Western culture that human well-being is an individual task that requires isola-
tion from the community.  The Catholic human rights tradition offers the idea that human 
persons are essentially social beings whose fulfillment comes through participation in 
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community.  Active forms of participation create positive forms of human interdepend-
ence, which enhance the well-being and dignity of all persons.  From this standpoint, the 
marginalization of large numbers of people from actively contributing to the well order-
ing of society not only hurts those excluded, but it harms those who have created the 
negative conditions of exclusion.  The emphasis in Catholic social teaching about the 
common good, therefore, is both a moral and descriptive concept.  As Hollenbach says,  
When people interact in a way that expresses reciprocal respect for their dignity 
as persons their well-being becomes a shared good.  The well-being of each party 
to the relationship is linked with the well-being of the others.131 
 
As a result, the common good of both the community and individual mutually benefit one 
another.132   
A tangible benefit that could result from the employment of this kind of anthropo-
logical vision is that it will help those responsible for making decisions in the political, 
economic, and cultural institutions that shape civil society to judge whether these institu-
tions allow people to participate and interact with one another as active and equal agents.  
Hollenbach says,  
The common good, understood this way, is not extrinsic to the relationships that 
prevail among the members and sub-communities of a society.  When these rela-
tionships form reciprocal ties among equals, the solidarity achieved is itself a 
good that cannot otherwise exist.133  
  
When society’s institutions exclude large numbers of people, the resulting interdepend-
ence becomes genuinely evil.  This vision gives the ability to identify when society falls 
short of what is reasonably attainable.   
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 The second area where this tradition can bolster the common good is to help the 
international community to support a comprehensive vision of human rights.  The Catho-
lic Church today is the world’s largest non-governmental organization (NGO).  Hollen-
bach thinks its record of involvement in defending human rights, whose basis stems from 
human dignity common to all people, makes it a credible institutional ally today in the 
fight to protect society’s weakest members.  Since the most fundamental forms of injus-
tice on the global stage are those that marginalize people, countries, or cultures from at 
least minimal levels of active participation in the common good, the church’s commit-
ment to both political and economic rights serves as a counterweight to overtly individu-
alistic conceptions of the human person.  Indeed, many Western countries today recog-
nize the importance of political and civil rights by giving people the opportunity to vote, 
enjoy free speech, and benefit from a broad range of movement free from government 
control.  Although these kinds of rights positively help people to join in a nation’s politi-
cal development, they also serve to prevent political marginalization.  Yet, many nations 
fail to recognize that marginalization also takes a wide variety of economic forms.  The 
denial of basic healthcare, the inability to find employment, the lack of adequate food, 
housing, and clothing, and the incapacity to contract a living wage all prevent large num-
bers of people from minimum participation in the common good.  Hollenbach thinks the 
Catholic Church’s call to support an inclusive vision of human rights challenges nations 
around the world to establish a “floor” below which no one will fall.  Hollenbach thinks 
that nations that do this are those that truly uphold economic rights.134 
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3. Social Justice, the Role of Government, and the Principle of Subsidiarity 
a. Hollenbach’s Commitment to Safeguarding Economic Rights through So-
cial Justice 
 
Catholic social teaching defends the idea that human beings require a number of 
“economic rights” because social justice demands the institutional development of a 
framework that enables people both to participate actively in building up the common 
good and to share in the benefits of the common good.135  This is what Hollenbach means 
by the term social justice.  “The ‘subject’ of social justice … is the major institutions that 
enhance or impede people’s participation in creating and benefiting from the common 
good.”136  This approach allows government authorities and those who work in civil soci-
ety to evaluate whether the various institutions of society, including those that are eco-
nomic, prevent people from taking active part in the common good.  His commitment to 
social justice calls attention to the social structures that handicap the poor from entering 
the global market.  He advocates that civil authorities in government need to reform mar-
kets when they do not help the poor to meet their basic material needs.  Hollenbach 
shares John Paul II’s conviction in Centesimus annus 42 that the creation of a stronger 
juridical framework between markets, civil society, and political institutions needs to 
transpire in order to include more people in the processes of decision-making that affect 
the lives of millions of people.  Indeed, when the institutional arrangements prevailing in 
developing countries prevent numerous people from sharing in social goods to the level 
required by their dignity as members of the human community, this violates the require-
ments of distributive justice.  Hollenbach concludes that when important economic and 
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social institutions create barriers that disable the poor from meeting their basic material 
needs, these institutions require alteration.   
Hollenbach recognizes the role churches and other civic associations play in 
working with the poor to help them to meet their basic material needs.  Through the prin-
ciple of subsidiarity, Hollenbach stresses that people require space separate from the state 
to accomplish many basic human goods.137  He acknowledges, “Civil society, not the 
state, is the primary locus in which human solidarity is realized.”138  Churches can help 
those in poverty in a number of ways.  They can help the poor to deal with their despair 
when they cannot find work and they often provide relief for the poor through charitable 
contributions.139  When churches advocate the cause of the disenfranchised, the poor, and 
the marginalized, Hollenbach sees this as a prime example of the church working for so-
cial justice and a just, free, peaceful, and ultimately more united society.140 
b. Hollenbach’s Understanding of the Role of Government and the Principle 
of Subsidiarity 
 
Although churches and other civic organizations play an important role to bring 
about greater levels of participation among the marginalized, Hollenbach argues that 
these institutions alone cannot rectify many of the problems caused by the globalization 
of the market.  These institutions cannot solve many of the problems brought about by the 
globalization of the market because they lack the power that government has to do such 
things as enact anti-discrimination laws, enforce property laws, and establish fair tax 
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codes.  The Catholic Church does not seek to control these levers of power in society, nor 
should it, because of its commitment to the principle of subsidiarity.  The proper applica-
tion of this principle grants people within the church the capacity to remain a source of 
social vitality in civil society because the strength of the work of its followers comes 
from their involvement at the grass roots level of people’s everyday problems.141  None-
theless, Hollenbach thinks it wise to remember that John Paul II linked the principle of 
subsidiarity to the ideas of solidarity and the common good.142  Civil society alone cannot 
provide the institutional reforms necessary to alter the economic structures that oppress 
the poor.  Government institutions must also work toward these ends because they have 
the capacity and resources to structure economic systems in ways that do not place exces-
sive burdens on the poor. 
c. Does Hollenbach’s Commitment to Social Justice lead to an Improper Ex-
pansion of Government? 
 
David Hollenbach’s view of subsidiarity clearly differs from one that subscribes 
to the idea that the government that governs least is the one that governs best.  Although 
he acknowledges the important role that “faith-based” communities play throughout the 
world play toward aiding the poor and marginalized, he believes that their responses will 
be inadequate if not accompanied by changes in the larger institutional context that is the 
occasion of so much hardship in developing nations.  Thus, only large associations are 
capable of lowering the walls that serve as barriers toward the creation of an interdepend-
ent world.  Hollenbach’s understanding of subsidiarity, not surprisingly, draws criticism 
from people such as Michael Novak.  He sees Hollenbach’s view of subsidiarity as a tool 
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for making the poor dependent on the ministrations of the state for their economic well-
being.  Novak thinks that Hollenbach fails to consider whether his work, which claims to 
limit the role of government, actually expands its power radically through his commit-
ment that government has a moral function: protecting human rights and securing basic 
justice for all members of the commonwealth.143  Indeed, Novak believes Hollenbach 
fails to consider the benefits the liberal tradition offers to the Catholic social tradition.  
Novak points to the work of liberal thinkers such as John Locke to show that a liberal is 
one who pays full respect to another free person.  He is grateful that the Catholic tradition 
has kept alive the tradition of sustained reflection on the common good.  Novak suggests, 
however, that it needs to incorporate more fully what he calls the “classic liberal tradi-
tion” for the institutional experiments that have made possible both greater scope for the 
freedom of the human person, and a broader and deeper achievement of the general wel-
fare.  Thus, it is important to identify whether Hollenbach’s commitment to both social 
justice and the proviso that government should provide a “floor” below which no one 
should fall are things that will eventually lay the groundwork for the expansion of gov-
ernment.  
Hollenbach believes that social justice is more complex than simply lifting regula-
tory restrictions on the market.  Efforts to alleviate it will have to be correspondingly 
complex.144  Hollenbach believes government institutions can protect and help the poor in 
a number of ways to promote an ethic of solidarity.  State institutions can do things that 
faith based communities cannot do to provide a floor below which no one will fall such 
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as protect the poor from the nightmare of unemployment by seeking balanced growth and 
full employment.145  State institutions can also help the poor by providing unemployment 
insurance, retraining programs, and insure that workers are paid wages commensurate 
with living in dignity.146  It is vital to develop this kind of framework if a free economy is 
to serve freedom in its totality.147   
Indeed, none of Hollenbach’s suggestions about the ways government can pro-
mote solidarity and an ethic of the common good seeks to replace the power of people in 
civil society to meet their own material needs mainly through their participation in mar-
kets-based enterprises.  On the one hand, he admits that today entrepreneurial success is 
never an isolated activity.148  It requires the cooperation of many people working toward 
a common goal.  The success of people in business today requires the development of 
people with ‘know-how’ and technological skill to navigate a complex information-based 
economy.  To educate great numbers of these kinds of people requires both private and 
public educational agencies to work for the benefit of the common good.  On the other 
hand, Hollenbach believes that government plays an important role in the development of 
a free economy by giving shape to it by promoting laws and policies that aim to help 
those on the margins of society to participate in a nation’s economic development.  This 
does not mean that government has to do this by taking over the rightful autonomy that 
people have in civil society to conduct business to meet their own material needs.  These 
are some of the elements of the ‘strong juridical framework’ that Hollenbach praises John 
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Paul II for calling attention to in Centesimus annus.  Hollenbach’s commitment to social 
justice, therefore, is not a program to expand government, but a useful tool to help both 
government officials and members of civil society to identify whether current economic 
policies augment or diminish human dignity.  A commitment to social justice, in the way 
Hollenbach proposes, helps eliminate economic injustice by empowering people in both 
government and civil society to promote creative solutions to overcome the exclusion of 
large numbers of people from meeting their own material needs.  Only when this takes 
place will society no longer deny people their economic rights to allow them to partici-
pate as active and equal agents in the well-ordering of society.  In the next chapter, I want 
to explain and explore Hernando de Soto’s strategy to meet this objective.  It is to this 
issue that I now turn. 
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Chapter 5 
Hernando de Soto and Defending the Poor’s Property Rights 
 
1. Hernando de Soto’s Early Life and Background 
 
a. Early Life 
Hernando de Soto was born in Arequipa, Peru in 1941.  Almost one hundred 
twenty years before his birth, Jose de San Martin of Argentina and Simon Bolivar of 
Venezuela led Peru's movement for independence from Spain.  The achievement of full 
emancipation took place in December 1824, when General Antonio Jose de Sucre de-
feated the Spanish troops at Ayacucho, ending Spanish rule in South America.  Spain 
subsequently made futile attempts to regain its former colonies, but in 1879, it finally 
recognized Peru's independence.   
 The military became the most prominent societal institution in Peru for many 
years after its independence in 1879.  Military leaders, supported by landed interests with 
ties to the Roman Catholic Church, controlled the presidency for nearly fifty years fol-
lowing independence (1824-72).1  In the twentieth century, coups have repeatedly inter-
rupted civilian constitutional government.  The historical instability of Peru’s political 
climate often provided roadblocks to Peru’s financial stability.   
 At the age of seven, Hernando de Soto left Peru.  Hernando’s father decided to 
move his family to Europe in 1949 to manage a large engineering firm.  De Soto says po-
litical pressure kept his family out of Peru when he was a child, but his father insisted that 
he and his brothers return to their native country each summer to stay connected with 
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their homeland.  De Soto acknowledges that it was during these return visits to Peru that 
he began to think about the causes and effects of poverty.  He says, 
The way my involvement in these issues began was when I realized, after living 
in Europe for a long time yet traveling constantly back and forth to my native 
Peru in Latin America, that Latin America, and Peru of course, were very poor.  I 
hadn’t quite realized that as a child.  I thought my Peruvian friends, my cousins, 
my interlocutors when I came to Peru were just as sophisticated, as clever, as 
skilled as my European friends were when I was a child.  It only dawned on me 
about the age of 17 that I actually came from a poor country.  And then I won-
dered why, since the skills seemed to be the same, at least among elites.  So I told 
myself there must be something that isn’t obvious that accounts for the relative 
wealth of the European, the North American, the West versus the nations of the 
Third World.  Since then I’ve been interested in finding out what difference it is.  
And since I couldn’t pick it up in the books, I thought it had to do rather in obser-
vation, with getting involved in the grassroots.  That’s how I got involved in this.  
And about the age of 39 I had made enough money so as to survive, hopefully, for 
the rest of my life.  I started getting more involved in these issues.2 
 
De Soto returned home to Peru in 1980.  He came back after he successfully completed 
his post-graduate work at the Institut Universitaire de Hautes Etudes Internationales in 
Geneva, Switzerland as well as a prosperous business career in Europe as the chief ex-
ecutive of a large engineering consulting company.  It was during this time that he dealt 
regularly with overseas markets, gaining insight into the political nature of international 
aid and export credits.  He soon realized upon his return to Peru that to conduct business 
in his native country took extraordinary persistence, ingenuity, and bureaucratic shrewd-
ness when compared to Europe and the United States.   
b. Founding of the Institute for Liberty and Democracy and Writing The Other Path 
 
 In 1980, Hernando de Soto, along with several business colleagues, founded the 
Institute for Liberty and Democracy (ILD).  De Soto established this think tank to help 
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the poor of Peru to form nondiscriminatory markets where the law helps everyone to have 
an opportunity to prosper.  De Soto’s organization quickly became a major topic of na-
tional interest in 1986 when he published his first book El Otro Sendero (The Other 
Path).  The book’s title served as an intellectual challenge to The Shining Path, a self-
described Maoist movement led by Professor Abimael Guzman.  Members of The Shin-
ing Path employed Marxist ideology to rally the impoverished of Peru to try to overthrow 
the national government to establish a revolutionary socialist state.  De Soto contends 
The Shining Path’s major strength “stemmed from its intellectual appeal to those ex-
cluded by the system and its ability to generate a political cause for natural leaders, 
whether in universities or shantytowns.”3  De Soto believes if a government does not give 
to everyone the impression that it is really trying to improve things, it opens the possibil-
ity for the left to protest in the name of all the discontented people.  He therefore pub-
lished The Other Path to counter the Shining Path’s criticisms of liberal democracy and 
capitalism.  Dealing systematically with their arguments, The Other Path was de Soto’s 
defense against the idea that poor Peruvians were a social class naturally disposed against 
markets and democracy.4  
The main thesis of The Other Path is that the majority of Peruvian people in 1986, 
around 80% of the population, were poor because they worked outside the formal legal 
system.  One primary reason why so many people remained locked out of the formal le-
gal system was that in postwar Peru, the government had passed an average of 28,000 
laws and regulations each year limiting Peruvian's ability to produce and distribute 
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wealth.  For instance, permission to set up a small business and acquire the appropriate 
licenses took an average of 289 days and cost 31 times the average Peruvian's monthly 
salary.  In the face of such crushing regulatory burdens, most Peruvians operated busi-
nesses “extralegally.”  De Soto discovered that Peru, in fact, had become two nations: 
one where the legal system bestowed privileges on a select few, and another where the 
majority of the Peruvian people lived and worked outside the law, according to their own 
local arrangements.  In an effort to understand the size of this ‘extralegal’ or informal 
economy, de Soto and a group of colleagues combed the streets and shantytowns of Peru 
during late afternoons and weekends, talking to people about their work, and counting 
their businesses and enterprises.  The Other Path summarized de Soto’s findings about 
the everyday life of poor Peruvian homeowners and entrepreneurs.  It showed that many 
of these people remained mired in poverty because the legal infrastructure of the country 
denied them their property rights.  Over the past fifty years, the millions of poor people 
who migrated from rural areas to towns and cities to find work in Peru had been locked 
out of the nation’s formal economic system.  De Soto concluded that the lack of formal 
title to property inhibited poor homeowners and entrepreneurs from using their limited 
assets to secure credit, facilitate routine business transactions, or protect innovations 
through patents.  Peruvians were not resisting democracy in favor of Marxist ideology.  
On the contrary, most Peruvians, especially small business owners, wanted to live under 
the rule of law, but the cumbersome property rights system in Peru forced them to work 
in the informal sector of the economy.5  The more people the ILD researchers talked to in 
the shantytowns and rural byways of Peru, the more they realized that it was not so much 
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that the poor were breaking the law as that the law was breaking them.  Even those who 
had tried to get into the system by applying for titles to their houses and other real estate 
or licenses to legalize their businesses complained that it was impossible to succeed; 
wending their way through the bureaucratic obstacles simply took too much time and cost 
too much money.  As a result, The Other Path identified genuine problems with Peru’s 
economy to help try to transform it into a modern capitalist system that benefited the ma-
jority of the nation’s citizens. 
By 1987, The Other Path became one of the best selling books in Peruvian history 
and its popularity grew throughout Latin America.6  The book’s positive reception among 
the public spurred leaders of The Shining Path to attack de Soto and the ideas promul-
gated by the ILD in their newspaper El Diario.  They warned Peruvians that de Soto and 
the ILD sought to undermine the people’s war against the state.  Recognizing that the 
ILD was the primary intellectual influence behind the restructuring and modernization of 
the Peruvian economy, Guzman called for an all-out offensive to destroy it.  In July of 
1992, members of The Shining Path took lethal action against those who worked for the 
ILD.  They planted a car bomb outside the Institute’s office.  The explosion caused the 
death of three people and injured nineteen others.  Guzman was captured in September 
1992, and the following year the 17 terrorists who had bombed the ILD's headquarters 
were apprehended.  For de Soto and his colleagues, they saw the attack as an act of cow-
ardice.  It demonstrated to them that The Shining Path had lost the war of ideas regarding 
the causes of poverty in Peru.  De Soto believes members of The Shining Path resorted to 
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violence because their ideas to combat poverty in Peru were no longer credible with the 
public. 
In the years following the publication of The Other Path, the ILD coordinated ef-
forts with civic and government leaders in Peru to bring into law most extralegal real es-
tate and businesses.  As a result, tax income increased by $400 million a year between 
1993 and 1995 and over half a million jobs were created.  In towns where people had le-
gal assets, 20 percent more children were enrolled in school.  “By 1995, such reforms had 
brought into the legal system some 300,000 owners whose property on average at least 
doubled in value.  Twenty-five credit institutions began giving loans to these now legal 
owners.”7  By 2000, “some 1.9 million buildings of urban land had entered the legal sys-
tem, about 75 percent of the extralegal market.”8  The reforms sponsored by the ILD 
helped Peru to achieve high economic growth rates, including the highest in the world 
(12%) in 1994. 
c. Hernando de Soto and The Mystery of Capital 
In 2000, Hernando de Soto’s influence grew in the area of international economic 
development with the publication of his second book The Mystery of Capital: Why Capi-
talism Triumphs in the West and Fails Everywhere Else.  The book explicates the lessons 
learned by de Soto and his colleagues at the ILD about the causes of poverty in LDCs 
throughout the world.  He believes a major factor contributing to the rise in poverty in 
LDCs is the dramatic surge of people moving from rural to urban areas.9  Millions of 
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people around the world have migrated to cities over the past fifty years to gain better 
access to roads, communication centers, hospitals, and jobs.  In China, for example, since 
Deng Xiaoping introduced capitalist economic reforms in 1979, 100 million people have 
left their homes in rural areas to move to cities.  In Haiti, Port-au-Prince has “grown fif-
teen times larger; Guayaquail eleven times larger, and Cairo four times larger.”10  At this 
rate, 80 percent of the world's urban residents will live in developing countries by 2025.11  
The United Nations Global Report on Human Settlements confirms de Soto’s analysis.  It 
says the urban population in LDCs will “double from 2.4 billion in 1995 to 5 billion in 
2025.”12  This means the urban population in LDCs is growing 2.5 times faster than the 
rural population.13  The result of this large-scale migration is an industrial revolution that 
is in many ways similar to the one experienced by the West almost 200 years ago.  The 
main difference from the eighteenth and nineteenth century Industrial Revolution is that 
one transpiring around the world today is happening at a much larger and faster pace.  
For example, 
Britain supported just 8 million people when it began its 250 year progression 
from the farm to the laptop computer.  Indonesia is making that same journey in 
only four decades and carrying a population of more than 200 million.14 
 
The pace at which this worldwide Industrial Revolution has developed has 
brought hardship to millions of people in both economic and personal terms.  Yet, despite 
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the hardship brought about by this revolution, people living in LDCs around the world 
recognize the benefits associated with the ability to participate in the global market.  Al-
though the competition between capitalism and communism ended in the minds of many 
with the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, de Soto finds it ironic, that at the hour of capital-
ism’s greatest triumph, it is also experiencing its greatest hour of crisis.  He says, 
Capitalism stands alone as the only feasible way to organize rationally a modern 
economy.  At this moment in history, no responsible nation has a choice.  As a re-
sult, with varying degrees of enthusiasm, Third World and former communist na-
tions have balanced their budgets, cut subsidies, welcomed foreign investment, 
and dropped their tariff barriers.15 
 
For years, many developing nations have tried to enter the global capitalist system.  Yet, 
these efforts have often been met with bitter disappointment.  From Russia to Venezuela, 
the past half-decade has been a time of economic suffering, tumbling incomes, anxiety, 
and resentment.16  De Soto believes as long as local governments cannot produce a legal 
infrastructure, which can protect the property rights of the poor to enable them to use 
their assets to enter the marketplace, widespread poverty will persist in LDCs.  He says, 
The poor inhabitants of these nations – five-sixths of humanity – do have things, 
but they lack the process to represent their property and create capital.  They have 
houses but not titles; crops but not deeds; businesses but not statutes of incorpora-
tion.  It is the unavailability of these essential representations that explains why 
people who have adapted every other Western invention, from the paper clip to 
the nuclear reactor, have not been able to produce sufficient capital to make their 
domestic capitalism work.17 
 
His contention that the roots of poverty in LDCs do not reside in “cultural fac-
tors,” but in the legal obstacles created by local governments that deny people their prop-
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erty rights, is what led him to argue that the causes of poverty in many LDCs are similar 
to the foundations of poverty he found in Peru throughout the eighties and nineties.  He 
rejects the suggestion that certain cultural groups are predisposed from exploiting the 
benefits of a market economy.  He says,  
These failures have nothing to do with deficiencies in cultural or genetic heritage.  
Would anyone suggest “cultural” commonalities between Latin Americans and 
Russians?  Yet in the last decade, ever since both regions began to build capital-
ism without capital, they have shared the same political, social, and economic 
problems: glaring inequality, underground economies, pervasive mafias, political 
instability, capital flight, flagrant disregard for law.  These troubles did not origi-
nate in the monasteries of the Orthodox Church or along the pathways of the In-
cas.18 
 
In fact, de Soto believes that people across a wide spectrum of cultures in LDCs share 
common reasons for their lack of economic development. 
The cultural differences that would make for an interesting program on the Dis-
covery Channel or an article in National Geographic magazine are cute, are inter-
esting, but that’s not where the basics are.  The basics are that all of us Third 
Worlders have in common a very underdeveloped property rights system, a very 
underdeveloped legal apparatus, and that’s what keeps you ahead of us.  That’s 
the part I look at.  The fact I’m able to find it in different cultures is first of all 
important to us because it indicates that there are basic principles that account for 
development, that there are general theories that one can bring together and that, 
therefore, there are solutions that one can devise on the basis of this information.  
But it’s not the differences that make it interesting for me to go into any particular 
part of the Third World; it’s the fact that we’re so similar in spite of the fact that 
this might be manifested in different cultural forms.19 
 
Thus, through gaining first-hand experience in countries such as Egypt, the Philippines, 
Indonesia, and Mexico, de Soto explains in The Mystery of Capital that poverty persists 
at such great levels in many LDCs because these nations have not developed the neces-
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sary legal infrastructure to allow poor people to participate in a capitalist economy.  As a 
result, this new world-wide industrial revolution has caused such turmoil because the le-
gal infrastructures of LDCs have not adapted well to life organized on such a large 
scale.20  In spite of these wide-scale legal obstacles, he concludes it is possible to export 
the kind of legal reforms enacted in Peru to other LDCs.  The Mystery of Capital, there-
fore, is de Soto’s latest attempt to promote the goal of the ILD: the enfranchisement of 
property rights among the poor in the developing world. 
2. Hernando de Soto’s Major Concepts and Ideas 
a. What is Capital? 
Hernando de Soto believes the most important questions today facing those inter-
ested in economic development are the kinds that deal with the origins and creation of 
capital.  These are central questions because there remains a clear and unsettling paradox: 
“Capital, the most essential component of Western economic advance, is the one that has 
received the least attention.”21  De Soto believes the origins and means to create capital 
have received scant attention from Western nations for several reasons.  Primary among 
them is that Western nations have largely forgotten their own history about the origin of 
capital.  They have forgotten this critical piece in the puzzle toward economic develop-
ment because many Western nations have had much success toward integrating their poor 
into their economies that poverty no longer is the norm in places such as the United 
States and Western Europe.22  He says, 
                                                 
20 de Soto, The Mystery of Capital, 70. 
 
21 Ibid., 11. 
 
22 Several excellent recent works that examine the effects of poverty in the United States include David K. 
Shippler, The Working Poor: Invisible in America (New York: Knopf, 2004); Amartya Sen, Development 
as Freedom (New York: Anchor Books, 2000); Barbara Ehrenreich, Nickel and Dimed: On (Not) Getting 
  172
The problem is that most people outside the West hold their resources in defective 
forms: houses built on land whose ownership rights are not adequately recorded, 
industries located where financiers and investors cannot see them.  Because the 
rights to these possessions are not adequately documented, these assets cannot 
readily be turned into capital, cannot be traded outside of narrow local circles 
where people know and trust each other and cannot be used as collateral for a 
loan.23  
  
As a result, what many Western nations have lost is the memory of how the creation of 
capital began back in the eighteenth century.  They have forgotten why the creation of 
capital was important to their future economic success.   
De Soto turns back to the eighteenth century where Western economists such as 
Adam Smith first explained why capital is the preeminent factor towards economic de-
velopment.  In 1776, when Adam Smith wrote The Wealth of Nations, he saw the desire 
to acquire capital as an outgrowth of the human person’s natural progression from a hunt-
ing and agricultural society to a commercial one where, through mutual interdependence, 
specialization, and trade, people could increase their productive powers immensely.24  
Smith saw at the dawn of the industrial revolution in Europe that capital is the magic that 
enhances productivity and increases the surplus value of assets.  De Soto agrees with 
Smith’s assessment.  He believes capital is crucial for economic development because it 
serves as the basis for production, generates wealth, and allows for economic specializa-
tion, which allows a nation’s economy to become more diverse and efficient.  But, what 
is capital?  He sees capital as more than the simple accumulation of assets.  Capital is the 
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engine that stimulates economic growth through the stock of assets accumulated for pro-
ductive purposes.  In other words, capital is the potential that an accumulated stock of 
assets holds to deploy new production.  De Soto says today’s entrepreneurs, similar to 
their predecessors from the past, use their accumulated resources to support specialized 
enterprises and then eventually exchange their products for other things they need.  As a 
result, the more capital a person or business acquires, the more specialization becomes 
possible, which benefits society in terms of higher productivity.25  
If capital is the force that raises the productivity of labor and creates the wealth of 
nations, why do so many people in LDCs, who possess a wide variety of assets, produce 
such little capital?  One popular reason often given that de Soto seeks to overturn is peo-
ple in LDCs lack an entrepreneurial spirit.  He says, 
The cities of the Third World and the former communist countries are teeming 
with entrepreneurs.  You cannot walk through a Middle Eastern market, hike up 
to a Latin American village, or climb into a taxicab in Moscow without someone 
trying to make a deal with you.  The inhabitants of these countries possess talent, 
enthusiasm, and an astonishing ability to wring profits out of practically nothing.  
They can grasp and use modern technology.26 
 
If people in developing countries are not prisoners of dysfunctional cultures, he asks, 
“What is it that prevents capitalism from delivering them the same wealth it has delivered 
to the West?”27 
De Soto believes the reason why people who live in LDCs find it so difficult to 
produce capital is that many local governments have failed to create a legal infrastructure 
that allows home and small business owners to use their limited assets to enter legitimate 
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markets.  To rectify this problem, de Soto advocates the creation of unified property 
rights systems to help home and small business owners to gain legitimate title over their 
property.  His emphasis on protecting property rights to enhance capital growth makes 
him critical of economic stimulus programs that focus exclusively on raising per capita 
income as the primary mechanism to increase economic expansion.  He believes these 
programs often fail to see the potential of “dead” capital available to those living in the 
developing world.28  He points out that money is only a mechanism that facilitates more 
easily the exchange of goods and resources.  The value of money comes from its legiti-
mate connection to the goods that it represents.  Although he acknowledges the useful-
ness of money, he says,  
it cannot fix in any way the abstract potential of a particular asset in order to con-
vert it into capital.  Third World and communist nations are infamous for inflating 
their economies with money – while not being able to generate much capital.29 
   
As a result, it is primarily the accumulation of real wealth in terms of assets, not money, 
which allows for genuine economic growth.  
b. Property and Creating a Representational System 
 
De Soto’s interest in using the limited assets of the poor to spur economic devel-
opment makes it necessary to address his ideas on property and property rights.  He 
thinks property is a man made construct that has little to do with the physical world.  He 
says, “Property, like pure energy, is a concept; it cannot be experienced directly.  Pure 
energy has never been seen or touched.  And no one can see energy.  One can only ex-
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perience energy and property by their effects.”30  When first considering his conception 
of property, it is strikingly odd because as human beings we live in a world of physical 
objects, many of which we consider our possessions.  For example, the theologian David 
Klemm defines property as that “which is one’s own; consequently, that over which one 
has a right of disposal.”31  In other words, “property is what is proper to oneself or one’s 
community; my property is what is my own.”32 
De Soto challenges this common conception of property.  He argues that since 
property is a concept, the key toward unlocking the value of any piece of property, 
whether it is a home or a small street vending business, is the process that transposes the 
physical object into “a man-made representative universe where we can disengage the 
resource from its burdensome material constraints and concentrate on its potential.”33  De 
Soto invites people to recognize that material objects themselves are not what make them 
valuable.  What makes a material object (property) valuable is the representational sys-
tem that helps to identify the most economically and socially useful qualities about the 
asset.  He says, “The moment you focus your attention on the title of a house, for exam-
ple, and not on the house itself, you have automatically stepped from the material world 
into the conceptual universe where capital lives.”34  Indeed, “Formal property forces you 
to think about the house as an economic or social concept.  It invites you to go beyond 
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viewing the house as mere shelter – and thus a dead asset – and to see it as live capital.”35  
Consider, for example, when a house changes hands; nothing physically changes.  Merely 
looking at the house tells a person nothing about who owns it.  The house looks the same 
whether I own it, rent it, or sell it to another person.  As a result,  
Property is not the house itself but an economic concept about the house, embod-
ied in a legal representation.  This means that a formal property representation is 
something separate from the asset it represents.36 
 
How is it that a piece of paper representing ownership creates value?  De Soto 
considers that a distinguishing characteristic of a good representational system from a bad 
one is that it is ‘mind friendly’.  In other words, a good representational system, such as a 
well-constructed property rights system, is one that allows people to grasp and access 
complicated information in a coherent and simple fashion.  Throughout history, human 
beings have invented representational systems - writing, musical notation, double-entry 
bookkeeping - to grasp with the mind what human hands could never touch.  Time, for 
example, is real, but it is only possible to manage and organize it with the invention of a 
clock or calendar.  Thus, not everything that is real and useful is tangible and visible.  De 
Soto believes the revolutionary contribution of an integrated property system is that it 
solves a basic problem of cognition.  He says, 
Our five senses are not sufficient for us to process the complex reality of an ex-
panded market, much less a globalized one.  We need to have the economic facts 
about ourselves and our resources boiled down to essentials that our minds can 
easily grasp.  A good property system does that - it puts assets into a form that lets 
us distinguish their similarities, differences, and connecting points with other as-
sets.  It fixes them in representations that the system tracks as they travel through 
time and space.  In addition, it allows assets to become fungible so that we can 
easily combine, divide, and mobilize them to produce higher-valued mixtures.  
                                                 
35 Ibid. 
 
36 Ibid. 
 
  177
This capacity of property to represent aspects of assets in forms that allow us to 
recombine them so as to make them even more useful is the mainspring of eco-
nomic growth, since growth is all about obtaining high-valued outputs from low-
valued inputs.37 
 
De Soto’s conception of property as a representational concept allows people to 
see the existence of tremendous hidden value in the physical objects that surround them.  
A formal property representation such as a title, for example, is not a reproduction of the 
house, like a photograph, but a representation of our concepts about the house.”38  Formal 
representation of property, therefore, “represents the nonvisible qualities that have poten-
tial for producing value.”39  De Soto’s identification of property as a representational 
concept is important because he thinks the movement from seeing property as simply a 
physical object to seeing the potential value of the object, represented in the form of legal 
title, provided the means for Western economic development.  He says, 
Legal property thus gave the West the tools to produce surplus value over and 
above its physical assets.  Property representations enabled people to think about 
assets not only through physical acquaintance but also through the description of 
their latent economic and social qualities.  Whether anyone intended it or not, the 
legal property system became the staircase that took these nations from the uni-
verse of assets in their natural state to the conceptual universe of capital where as-
sets can be viewed in their full productive potential.40 
 
De Soto’s insight is important because in the Western world almost every piece of prop-
erty that exists belongs to someone through its representation in a legal property system.  
These systems represent property through formal titling mechanisms.  He says,  
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They represent our shared concepts of what is economically meaningful about any 
asset.  They capture and organize all the relevant information required to concep-
tualize the potential value of an asset and so allow us to control it.41 
  
As a result, property is the realm where “we identify and explore assets, combine them, 
and link them to other assets….  This is the place where capital is born.”42  When physi-
cal assets enter into this representation world through a formal property rights system, 
this serves as a “hydroelectric plant” for the creation of capital because “assets need a 
formal property system to produce significant surplus value.”43   
c. Dead Versus Live Capital 
In many LDCs today, the inability of local governments to create integrated prop-
erty rights systems, that would allow people to register ownership over their assets more 
easily, makes economic development nearly impossible.  De Soto says, 
Imagine a country where nobody can identify who owns what, people cannot be 
made to pay their debts, resources cannot conveniently be turned into money, 
ownership cannot be divided through documents, descriptions of assets are not 
standardized and can not be easily compared, and the rules that govern property 
vary from neighborhood to neighborhood or even from street to street.  You have 
just put yourself into the life of a developing country or former communist nation; 
more precisely, you have imagined life for 80 per cent of its population, which is 
marked off as sharply from its Westernized elite as black and white South Afri-
cans were once separated by apartheid.44 
 
De Soto uses this example to describe why the economic situation of the poor in the de-
veloping world remains so bleak.  He contends that only when these nations work with 
their poor inhabitants to create unified property rights systems will they begin to address 
the lack of economic development.   
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The reason why de Soto thinks it is so important to recognize a person’s right to 
own property is that the legal representation of an asset transforms it into “live” versus 
“dead” capital.  Dead capital is the material asset that a person claims as his or her own, 
but lacks formal recognition of ownership to the asset in a legitimate property rights sys-
tem.  The ability to enter assets into a formal property rights system allows people to 
transform their assets into “live” capital, which provides the first step toward increasing 
wealth and the means toward economic prosperity.  In many Western nations today, in 
contrast to the way things work in the developing world, 
every parcel of land, every building, every piece of equipment is represented in a 
property document that is the visible sign of a vast hidden process that connects 
all these assets to the rest of the economy.  Thanks to this representational proc-
ess, assets can lead an invisible, parallel life alongside their material existence.  
They can be used as collateral for credit.  The single most important source of 
funds for new businesses in the United States is a mortgage on the entrepreneur's 
house.  These assets can also provide a link to the owner's credit history, an ac-
countable address for the collection of debts and taxes, the basis for the creation 
of reliable and universal public utilities, and a foundation for the creation of secu-
rities.  By this process, the West injects life into assets and makes them generate 
capital.45 
 
An asset becomes “live” capital once it receives legal registration into a formal property 
system.  Once an asset becomes “live” capital, an entrepreneur can utilize his or her asset 
to create surplus value.  Without formal property to extract the economic potential of an 
asset and convert it into a form that can be easily transported and controlled, the assets of 
small businesses and homeowners in developing and former communist countries are like 
water in a lake in the Andes – an untapped stock of potential energy.46 
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If capital is born by the representation of an asset in the form of a title or contract, 
one of the most important benefits that come with transforming an asset into “live” capi-
tal is that it makes it more “fungible.”47  As de Soto says, “One of the most important 
things a formal property system does is transform assets from a less accessible condition 
to a more accessible condition, so that they can do additional work.”48  This is apparent 
when comparing the trading and combining of assets in the Western world from the way 
it takes place in the non-Western world.  In the West, people write standard property de-
scriptions to facilitate the combination of assets.   
Formal property rules require assets to be described and characterized in a way 
that not only outlines their singularity but also points out their similarity to other 
assets, thus making potential combinations more obvious.49 
Representations also enable the division of assets without touching them.  
Whereas an asset such as a factory may be an indivisible unit in the real world, in 
the conceptual universe of formal property representation it can be subdivided 
into any number of portions.  Citizens of advanced nations are thus able to split 
most of their assets into shares, each of which can be owned by different persons, 
with different rights, to carry out different functions.  Thanks to formal property, a 
single factory can be held by countless investors, who can divest themselves of 
their property without affecting the integrity of the physical asset.50 
 
The standardization of commodities and land holdings in the Western world today allows 
for greater rates of exchange and increases the ability of entrepreneurs to sell and trade 
their goods on the open market.  The formalization of a property rights system reduces 
transaction costs and increases a property’s exchange value.  Without this kind of stan-
dardization, trading assets requires an enormous amount of effort just to determine the 
basics of the transaction.  In the non-Western world, people often have to trade real-estate 
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faced with these questions: “Does the seller own the real estate and have the right to 
transfer it?  Can he pledge it?  Will the new owner be accepted as such by those who en-
force property rights?  What are the effective means to exclude other claimants?”51  In 
many of the world’s poorest countries, de Soto argues such questions remain difficult to 
answer. 
d. Extra-legality 
i. What is it? 
 
The inability of many home and small business owners to obtain, use, or trade 
their assets legally places an enormous burden on people living and working in LDCs.  
De Soto defines the place where people live and work outside the confines of legally es-
tablished markets as the “extralegal sector.”  He calls it extralegal instead of illegal be-
cause most people who work in this sector of the economy do not work in it out of a de-
sire to break the law.  They work in it because the system of property laws that govern 
many LDCs are so cumbersome and out of touch with the rules that govern transactions 
among the poorer classes that these laws force them to work outside of established and 
legally proscribed markets.  Thus, for homeowners, the extralegal sector is where they 
make their settlements on land or space without legal title.  In the past, people often pejo-
ratively referred to these kinds of people as “squatters.”  The United Nations High Com-
mission for the Legal Empowerment of the Poor estimates, “at least one-quarter of urban 
residents in Latin America are either squatting or living in unauthorized housing.”52  In 
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regards to where people work and operate their businesses in LDCs, while large enter-
prises typically operate in the formal economy, small and medium-sized enterprises are 
marginal in the formal economy.  Extralegal entrepreneurs lack access to bank financing 
and long-term capital.  They also cannot enforce legally binding contracts, because they 
do not have formal title to their business.  In The Other Path, de Soto shows the majority 
of home and small business owners in Peru work in this sector of the economy.  He esti-
mates today that 42.6% of all housing in Lima houses 47% of the city’s population.  
“Such housing, built by illegal settlers at a cost of years of sacrifice, is today valued at 
$8,319.8 million.”53  In addition, in the face of countless restrictions, “39,000 vendors 
have managed to build or acquire 274 informal markets valued at 40.9 million.”54  In The 
Mystery of Capital, de Soto argues that the ILD discovered that similar problems face 
home and small business owners outside of Peru in nations such as Haiti, the Philippines, 
Mexico, and Egypt.  De Soto discovered the majority of these people work in this sector 
because the process to register their title legally to a home or small business is so cum-
bersome that the choice to work in the extralegal sector is a wise prudential judgment.   
ii. Why Do People Work in the Extralegal Sector? 
 
The majority of people who work in the extralegal sector are squatters on state 
owned land and small business operators who manage vending stations, drive buses and 
taxis, and conduct trading operations.  Most of these people operate in the extralegal sec-
tor because it is nearly impossible to become legal owners of a home or small business in 
many LDCs.  In 1986, for example, de Soto and his colleagues performed an experiment 
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to ascertain how difficult the process was to gain legal title to a small sowing shop busi-
ness.  Their goal was to create a new and legal business.  He says, 
The team then began filing out the forms, standing in lines, and making the bus 
trips into central Lima to get all the certifications required to operate, according to 
the letter of the law, a small business in Peru.  They spent six hours a day at it and 
finally registered the business – 289 days later.  Although the garment workshop 
was geared to operating with only one worker, the cost of legal registration was 
$1231 – thirty-one times the monthly minimum wage.  To obtain legal authoriza-
tion to build a new house on state-owned land took six years and eleven months, 
requiring 207 administrative steps in fifty-two government offices.  To obtain a 
legal title for that piece of land took 728 steps.  We also found that a private bus, 
jitney, or taxi driver who wanted to obtain official recognition of his route faced 
twenty-six months of red tape.55 
 
De Soto claims the burdensome process to register property legally is not unique to Peru.  
For example, in the Philippines, the ILD estimates a person who wants to purchase le-
gally a settlement built on state owned land has to form an association with his neighbors 
to qualify for a state housing finance program.  “The entire process could necessitate 168 
steps, involving fifty-three public and private agencies and taking thirteen to twenty five 
years.”56  In Egypt,  
The person who wants to acquire and legally register a lot on state-owned desert 
land must wend his way through at least 77 bureaucratic procedures at thirty-one 
public and private agencies.  This can take anywhere from five to fourteen 
years.57 
   
Members of the ILD did not find it surprising that “4.7 million Egyptians … chose to 
build their dwellings illegally.”58  In other parts of Africa, “Less than 10% of the conti-
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nent’s land is formally owned, and barely one African in ten lives in a house with title 
deeds.”59   
iii. How Does Working in the Extralegal Sector Negatively Influence 
the Poor? 
 
The ILD’s findings are important because they undercover an important reason 
for the lack of economic development in LDCs.  The numerous legal obstacles it takes to 
own a home or register a small business legally limits the capacity of these people to use 
their assets for productive purposes.  As already hinted at, this problem affects two key 
areas.  The first is business.  The International Labor Organization reports that since 1990 
85% of all new jobs in Latin American and the Caribbean have been created in the extra-
legal sector.  In Zambia, only 10% of the workforce is legally employed.60  De Soto ar-
gues, “The failure of the legal order to keep pace with this astonishing economic and so-
cial upheaval has forced the new migrants to invent extralegal substitutes for established 
law.”61  This leaves migrants unable to deal with people with whom they are not familiar.  
“Whereas all manner of anonymous business transactions are widespread in advanced 
countries, the migrants in the developing world can deal only with people they know and 
trust.”62  These kind of ad-hoc business arrangements do not work well.  They make it 
difficult for people to trade large quantities of product.  It also makes it difficult to divide 
labor into smaller units to make markets more efficient.  The failure to provide a legal 
infrastructure that facilitates business “prevents enterprising people from negotiating with 
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strangers, which defeats the division of labor and fastens would-be entrepreneurs to 
smaller circles of specialization and low productivity.”63  
In the area of housing, the ILD discovered in a variety of developing nations that 
the ability to gain legal ownership over real estate is incredibly difficult.  The inability to 
gain formal ownership over one’s home is a principal reason why slums become preva-
lent in many cities throughout the developing world.  UN-Habitat defines a slum as  
a group of individuals living under the same roof that lack one or more of the fol-
lowing conditions: access to safe water; access to sanitation; secure tenure; dura-
bility of housing; and sufficient living area.64 
  
In 2003, this group estimated that 924 million people worldwide, or 31.6 per cent of the 
global urban population, lived in slums in 2001.65  In the next thirty years, they project 
this figure to double to almost 2 billion, unless the international community puts substan-
tial policy changes in place.66   
De Soto believes there is a direct link between the growth of slums and the inabil-
ity of people to acquire legal title to their homes.  This is because standardizing property 
rights leads to a formal process that allows developers to build livable and affordable 
housing.  For example, 
Bringing the extralegal sector inside the law will open up the opportunity for mas-
sive low-cost housing programs that will provide the poor with homes that are not 
only better built but much cheaper than what they themselves have been building 
in the extralegal sector.  Creating a home in the topsy-turvy world of the extrale-
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gal sector is equivalent to getting dressed by putting on your shoes first, then your 
socks.67 
  
For a new migrant moving from a rural area to a city, he must not only find a spot for his 
house, but also occupy the land personally.  Next, he must set up a tent or shelter made 
from, depending on the country, “straw matting, mud bricks, cardboard, plywood, corru-
gated iron, or tin cans – and thus stake out a physical claim.  The migrant and his family 
will then gradually bring in furniture and other household items.”68  Developing a home 
in this haphazard fashion often fails to meet basic safety standards.  From random plumb-
ing and sanitation systems, to illegal utility hook ups, the creation of these dwellings pro-
duce homes that often rapidly deteriorate.  In contrast,  
A Western developer typically holds title to the land, which gives him the security 
to develop the infrastructure (paved roads, utilities, etc.).  Then he sells the house, 
which he proceeds to build according to the buyer’s preferences.  The new own-
ers, who have probably borrowed most of the price of the house from a bank, will 
then move their furniture in and, finally the kids and the cat.69 
  
Thus, “creating a home is the equivalent of putting on your socks before your shoes and 
is thus much less hazardous, expensive, and degrading.”70  De Soto concludes the inabil-
ity to reform the validation process to buy, sell, and trade property that meet the needs of 
the poor will continue to undermine the development of safe dwellings in such diverse 
cities as Manila, Bangalore, Bali, and Mexico City.  The result of living under these con-
ditions is that it “places enormous social and psychological burdens on residents, which 
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often leads to broken homes and social exclusion.”71  As a result, slum homes will con-
tinue to stretch across large swaths of land if no one takes action to reform the property 
rights system in these urban centers.   
3. Creating a Unified Property Rights System 
 
The explosive population growth in many cities throughout the developing world 
has challenged local governments to develop strategies to deal with the consequences of 
this large-scale migration to urban centers.  The problems in business and housing created 
by this kind of movement have raised an array of legal challenges for local government 
institutions in developing countries.  De Soto believes primary among the challenges lo-
cal governments face in LDCs is the creation of legal systems that unify property rights.  
He thinks the denial of property rights to millions of people has created a legal apartheid 
among rich and poor that stifles economic growth.  The failure to document the assets of 
small business owners or give title to homeowners denies the poor from using their lim-
ited assets to transform them into “fungible” resources necessary to produce capital.   
a. Misconceptions About Why People Operate in the Extralegal Sector 
 
 De Soto believes governments in developing nations fail to open up their property 
systems to the poor because they usually operate under the following five basic miscon-
ceptions.  First, all people who take cover in the extralegal or underground sectors do so 
to avoid paying taxes.  Second, real estate assets are not held legally because they have 
not been properly surveyed, mapped, or recorded.  Third, enacting mandatory law on 
property is sufficient, and governments can ignore the costs of compliance with that law.  
Fourth, existing extralegal arrangements or “social contracts” can be ignored.  Finally, a 
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person can change something as fundamental as people’s conventions on how they can 
hold their assets, both legal and extralegal, without high-level political leadership.72  The 
main point that de Soto refutes is the claim that most of these entrepreneurs work outside 
the legal system to avoid taxes.  He says, “Most people do not resort to the extralegal sec-
tor because it is a tax haven but because existing law, however elegantly written, does not 
address their needs or aspirations.”73  In addition, they do not operate underground to 
avoid many hidden costs.  For example, 
Extralegal businesses are taxed by the lack of good property law and continually 
having to hide their operations from authorities.  Because they are not incorpo-
rated, extralegal entrepreneurs cannot lure investors by selling shares; they cannot 
secure low-interest formal credit because they do not even have legal addresses.  
They cannot reduce risks by declaring limited liability or obtaining insurance 
coverage.  The only “insurance” available to them is that provided by their 
neighbors and the protection that local bullies or mafias are willing to sell them.  
Moreover, because extralegal entrepreneurs live in constant fear of government 
detection and extortion from corrupt officials, they are forced to split and com-
partmentalize their production facilities between many locations, there rarely 
achieving important economies of scale.74 
 
De Soto’s findings make it apparent that working in the extralegal sector is eco-
nomically hurtful, devastating, and unfortunately, the norm for most small business own-
ers and homeowners in the developing world.  The question therefore remains, “How 
does a government create an integrated property rights system that helps small business 
and home owners?” 
b. Creating a Unified Property Rights System: Turning to US History 
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De Soto responds to this question by turning to the history of the United States 
and its struggle to establish an integrated property rights system in the nineteenth century.  
He believes the American experience clearly illustrates that “the history of the adoption 
of occupancy laws in the U.S. is the history of the rise of extralegals as a political 
force.”75  His work points to the fact that in America’s early years, extralegality was the 
norm in the United States, a situation which is similar to the one faced today by those in 
developing countries.  The flow of immigrants to the United States and the movement out 
West produced a situation where large numbers of “squatters” began moving onto settle-
ments of land.  The increase in the number of squatters made them a significant political 
force because of their ability to augment the value of the land on which they settled.  
Many squatters “did not have the means to cover the costs of the official legal system, so 
they established their own extralegal arrangements, thus creating new avenues for access-
ing and holding property on the American frontier.”76  In order to turn their labor into a 
profitable enterprise, squatters eventually demanded that local state governments recog-
nize their work through granting them legal title to the land on which they settled.  As a 
result, local governments throughout the United States faced the difficult choice to either 
resist squatters or try to integrate them into a formal legal system. 
De Soto recognizes that the development of a legal property system in the United 
States, which allowed for the integration of squatters, did not come without conflict.  He 
notes that some historians see the expansion out West, with the rise in claims associations 
and miners districts, as a concealment of the fact that squatters stole duly owned property 
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from rightful landowners.  Two authors, Terry L. Anderson and Peter J. Hill, in The Not 
So Wild, Wild West, generally agree with de Soto’s thesis.  They acknowledge, however, 
that it is possible to narrate the expansion of the western United States as a history of vio-
lence.  They argue,    
Violence certainly occurred, and when it did, it usually took one of two forms.  
First, violence, or more precisely coercive power, was used by private persons 
and institutions to defend property rights against intruders.  For example, cattle-
men’s associations flexed their muscle to exclude newcomers from the open 
range, and vigilante groups acted to enforce laws.  Second, violence manifested 
itself through the exercise of governmental power to take assets from others.  The 
Indian wars of the late nineteenth century were a quintessential example.77 
 
De Soto argues that this history of violence is beside the point.  He focuses on this period 
because it shows “that extralegal groups played an important role in defining property 
rights in the United States….”78  He argues that their capacity to develop property rights 
systems, through a series of extralegal arrangements, ultimately warranted a positive le-
gal response from local governments in the Untied States.  What warranted this kind of 
response was “an explicit recognition that value added to assets was something the law 
needed to encourage and protect.”79  The Supreme Court ruling of Jennison v. Kirk, 
which protected extralegally generated rights and arrangements of miners, and the fa-
mous Homestead Act of 1862, which “gave 160 free acres to any settler willing to live on 
the land five years and develop it,”80 eventually gave official sanction to extralegal ar-
rangements that had already been in place for many years.  By the end of the nineteenth 
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century, the long and sometimes bitter struggle between what de Soto calls “elitist” law 
and squatters ended with the recognition that the only way formal law could legitimate 
itself was by recognizing and embracing “many of the extralegal arrangements of the set-
tlers.”81     
De Soto notes that many benefits came with the recognition of the squatter’s 
property rights.  First, the integration of squatters into the formal property rights system 
gave them access to the legitimate business world.  This gave squatters the capacity to 
sell and trade their goods without the fear of being shutdown or evicted from their land.  
Second, their establishment in legitimate business communities gave squatters access to 
banking institutions, which gave them a source of viable credit.  In the past, like today, 
banks prefer to work with customers who possess legal title to their businesses or homes 
because they can hold borrowers accountable for paying back their debts.  Without legal 
title to their property, banks usually denied squatters this vital form of capital and this left 
them unable to sell their home or purchase new equipment, hire more workers, and grow 
their businesses.  Finally, local governments also recognized the benefits that came with 
the movement of squatters into the legal world.  The cost of a squatter acquiring a legal 
title from the government was the recognition that their business could no longer be “hid-
den” from financial oversight institutions established by the U.S. government.  This 
movement benefited local governments because they gained access to new forms of reve-
nue in the form of taxable land holdings.  The granting of property rights to squatters al-
lowed local governments to monitor the whereabouts of local businesses and this gave 
them a better sense of the potential taxable revenue flowing in and out of local markets.   
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Hernando de Soto uses the Nineteenth century history of the United States and its 
struggle to integrate squatters into a formal property rights system to show that property 
law is the key toward unlocking the mystery of capital.  Today, people in the West no 
longer view property simply as set of physical objects.  They view property in terms of an 
assets ability to create surplus value.  This is possible because a consensus has formed 
about how to represent, use, and exchange assets through the creation of a unified prop-
erty rights system.82  Legal representation of property detaches and fixes the economic 
potential of an asset as a value separate from the material object itself.  This allows peo-
ple in the West to realize the potential of an asset and control it for one’s benefit.  The 
ability to use assets in this way produces capital and generates real wealth.  The challenge 
today for most non-Western countries is to integrate the formal legal conventions of those 
who already own property with the conventions of extralegals so that the poor can capi-
talize on their assets.83 
c. Exploring the Basis of Property Law in LDCs 
 
i. Identifying the Pre-Capitalist “Social Contracts” 
 
To establish a legitimate property rights system, de Soto argues governments need 
to design laws that draw upon the already established “social contracts” between extrale-
gals.  As mentioned earlier, de Soto contends the legal systems in developing countries 
are primarily at fault for the lack of market development.  The myriad of obstacles en-
countered by small business operators and homeowners to legalize their assets is the pri-
mary reason why they choose not to enter the legitimate business world.  The ILD con-
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tends that the arduous task to register property legally for many entrepreneurs makes the 
move into the black-market almost a foregone conclusion.  Most of these people want to 
enter the legitimate business world, but the failure of local governments to create a rea-
sonable system to secure legal title to property is why millions of small business opera-
tors and homeowners have moved into the extralegal sector of the economy.   
Although many poor nations have attempted property reform in the past, de Soto 
contends they have failed to incorporate the informal property laws of extralegals.  Since 
the idea of property is primarily a social construct, property arrangements between people 
work best when they have formed a consensus “about the ownership of assets and the 
rules that govern their use and exchange.”84  The attempt to create a unified property 
rights system without taking into consideration the already existing “collective contracts 
that underpin existing property arrangements”85 will most likely fail.  In order for formal 
law to gain legitimacy among extralegals, it has “to connect with the extralegal social 
contracts that determine existing property rights.”86  He thinks this is a fundamental step 
toward the development of market economies in poor countries.   
ii. De Soto’s Solution to Codifying the Social Contracts of Extrale-
gals: Listening to the Barking Dogs 
 
 De Soto believes it is possible to connect the people’s extralegal social contracts 
with formal law through a process he calls, “listening to the barking dogs.”87  De Soto 
believes law is not simply a set of spoken, written, or formalized rules that people blindly 
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follow.  Law represents the formalization of behavioral rules about which most people 
agree.  These rules reflect behavioral propensities and they offer those who follow them 
tangible benefits.  When a particular law fails to offer any tangible benefits, it is not sur-
prising that people choose to abandon it.   
Regarding property law, de Soto asserts it is extralegal law that regulates the as-
sets of most citizens in LDCs.88  These “consensual rules” among extralegals may not be 
codified in a similar way to their Western counterparts, but that does not mean there is 
not a system of organization for these rules.  He says, 
Whenever we visited an undercapitalized area, whether in Asia, America, or the 
Middle East, we never stepped into the wilderness.  By observing carefully, we 
were always able to distinguish patterns of rules.  In the worst cases, we found a 
neglected garden – never a jungle.89 
 
In the face of great obstacles to the legal registration of their property, entrepreneurs and 
homeowners in LDCs have generated their own varieties of property rules.  To defend 
their incipient property rights from others, these people “have been forced to work out 
among themselves their own extralegal institutions.”90   
 De Soto contends the great legal challenge today facing legislators, lawyers, and 
ordinary citizens in many LDCs is the development of strategies that codifies the extrale-
gal arrangements of small business and home owners into formal law.  He says,  
The only way you can get the owners to come out and say ‘Yes, I own this’ is by 
giving them a property right that is more efficient than the existing system and 
that allows them to defend their property claims.”91 
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He notes that the formalization of these kinds of rules into an institutionalized and legiti-
mate property rights system took years to develop in many Western nations.  This pre-
sents an even greater challenge today where the massive growth of cities in developing 
nations places enormous burdens on existing legal systems to meet the needs of arriving 
migrants.  In order to tackle this great problem, local governments must find out what the 
extralegal arrangements are and then find ways to integrate them into the formal property 
system.  To accomplish this task, de Soto says, “They will have to go out into the streets 
and roads and listen to the barking dogs.”92  What does he mean by this process? 
 In a recent trip to Indonesia in 2000, government officials asked de Soto how they 
should discover the “social contracts” of extralegals to codify them into formal law.  In-
stead of using a technical explanation about how to structure a bridge between the legal 
and extralegal sectors, de Soto talked about his visit to the rice fields of Bali, where he 
estimates 90% of the people live in the extralegal sector.  De Soto says, 
 As I strolled through rice fields, I had no idea where the property boundaries 
were.  But the dogs knew.  Every time I crossed from one farm to another, a dif-
ferent dog barked.  Those Indonesian dogs may have been ignorant of formal law, 
but they were positive about which assets their masters controlled.93 
 
He suggests that government officials need to listen to their “barking dogs” to discover 
the “people’s law” by traveling their city streets and the countryside until they make con-
tact with the ruling social contract.94  This is similar to the process that de Soto and his 
colleagues at the ILD employed in Peru when they wanted to take the first step toward 
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helping the Peruvian government to build a formal property system that embraces all the 
nations’ citizens.  He says, 
After years of study in many countries, I have become convinced that most extra-
legal social contracts about property are basically similar to national social con-
tracts in Western nations.  Both tend to contain some explicit or tacit rules about 
who has rights over what and the limits to those rights and transactions; they also 
include provisions to record ownership of assets, procedures to enforce property 
rights and claims, symbols to determine where the boundaries are, norms to gov-
ern transactions, criteria for deciding what requires authorized action and what 
can be carried out without authorization, guidelines to determine which represen-
tations are valid, devices to encourage people to honor contracts and respect the 
law, and criteria to determine the degree of anonymity authorized for each trans-
action.95 
 
De Soto’s perspective helps government officials and legal experts not only to recognize 
the importance of property rights for the process of economic growth, but it should help 
these people to appreciate more fully the importance of having property rights evolve 
from the bottom up.  As Andersen and Hill suggest, 
Property rights that evolve from the bottom up – as opposed to the top down – are 
much more likely to conserve resources and promote investment.  The opposite is 
also true; when property rights are dictated from central authorities with less stake 
in the outcome, time and effort are often wasted in the process of creating the 
property rights, and productive investment suffers.96 
 
As long as government officials fail to find out how and why the local conventions work 
and how strong they actually are in practice, de Soto concludes that economic develop-
ment that benefits the majority of citizens will remain an elusive goal.97  The only way 
that government officials can discover the extralegal social contracts that exist in a given 
area is by “contacting those who live and work by it.”98  He suggests, on the one hand, 
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that if property law is similar to a tree, “the formal property system is diachronic, in the 
sense that it allows you to trace the origins of each leaf back in time from twig and 
branch to the trunk and finally to the root.”99  The discovery of extralegal property law, 
on the other hand, has to be synchronic: “The only way an outsider can determine which 
rights belong to whom is by slicing the tree at right angles to the trunk so as to define the 
status of each branch and leaf in relation to its neighbors.”100 
iii. Cooperation of the State, Legal Experts, and Extralegals 
Hernando de Soto believes most governments in the developing world now rec-
ognize that the reason “why their extralegal sectors are growing exponentially is not be-
cause people have suddenly abandoned their respect for the law but because they have no 
alternative for protecting their property and earning a living.”101  He assumes extralegals 
will only enter the legitimate business world when governments make the trip easy, safe, 
and cheap.102  Members of the ILD discovered this first hand when the Peruvian govern-
ment gave them the task to help small businesses in Lima to gain formal ownership over 
their property.  The ILD designed a program to bring small extralegal entrepreneurs into 
the legal system.  The program was so effective that some 276,000 entrepreneurs re-
corded their businesses voluntarily in new registry offices the ILD set up to accommodate 
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them – with no promise of tax reductions.103  De Soto notes about the success of this pro-
gram,  
All we had to do was make sure the costs of operating legally were below those of 
surviving in the extralegal sector, facilitate the paperwork for legalization, make a 
strong effort to communicate the advantages of the program, and then watch hun-
dreds of thousands of entrepreneurs happily quit the underground.104 
 
Therefore, government officials, legal experts, and ordinary citizens need to work to-
gether to decipher and codify the existing extralegal arrangements.  This will help the 
poor to turn their limited assets into usable forms of capital.  As long as the assets of the 
poor remain undocumented, they will remain sterile in the marketplace.105  And as long 
as they remain sterile, the development of a market economy that benefits the majority of 
people will remain a remote dream. 
iv. Obstacles To Creating a Unified Property Rights Systems in LDCs 
What are the foreseeable obstacles toward the fulfillment of this goal according to 
de Soto?  First, obtaining synchronic information from people in the extralegal sector re-
quires efforts by government officials to get in touch with extralegal authorities to dis-
cover their property arrangements.  This is a tremendous legal challenge.  De Soto notes 
this process is difficult, but not impossible.  He says,  
Although oral traditions may predominate in the rural backwoods of some coun-
tries, most people in the undercapitalized sector have found ways to represent 
their property in written form according to rules that they respect and that gov-
ernment, at some level, is forced to respect.106 
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In Haiti, for example, the ILD discovered after an intensive survey of the nation’s urban 
areas, that not one single extralegal plot of land, shack or building whose owner did not 
have at least one document to defend his or her right – even squatting rights.107  This is 
important since 55% of Haiti’s population is illiterate.108  Once government officials ob-
tain documentary evidence of representations, de Soto believes it is possible to decon-
struct them to identify the principal rules that constitute the social contract that sustains 
them.  Once these officials have all the relevant information about the ownership of as-
sets among extralegals, the next step is to codify them so that they can be examined and 
compared with existing formal law.  Thus, by gradually discarding “legal” barriers to the 
formal recognition of property, and by absorbing those laws that are recognized by all, it 
becomes possible to create a uniform property rights system that benefits the majority of 
people. 
 Second, de Soto recognizes that the establishment of legitimate property rights 
systems requires great political leadership.  De Soto is realistic about the difficulties sur-
rounding the reform of property law in LDCs because many elites greatly benefit from 
established property law.  He says, “Many of the statutes that wall off the majority of 
people from capital may also contain provisions that protect vital interests of powerful 
groups.”109  Interestingly, the ILD actually tries to spread awareness among the elites 
about their loss of control over markets and their limited access to consumers.  De Soto 
believes,  
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The most powerful group of consumers in any developing country nowadays is 
from the extralegal sector -- people who do not respect the law.  The elites have 
every interest in establishing a standard legal system because that way they will 
have the chance to defend themselves in the face of their enormous losses.110 
   
Nevertheless, many of these people likely will resist change to established property law 
unless they recognize some tangible benefits that will come from identifying and codify-
ing the assets of the poor.  In order to capitalize on the assets of the poor by integrating 
them into a formal property system,  
a president or prime minister who is more than a mere technocrat has to take 
charge and make formalization a pillar of government policy.  Only at the highest 
political level can reform command overwhelming support and wipe out the will-
ful inertia of the status quo.  Only the top level of government can prevent bu-
reaucratic infighting and political conflicts from paralyzing the progress of re-
form.111   
 
De Soto concludes it is in the interest of the “elites” of society because without property 
reform the growth of the extralegal sector will continue to overwhelm the current legal 
systems in many LDCs.  The haphazard property laws that now govern many LDCs that 
exclude many people from any chance of economic prosperity will lead to social unrest 
and civil strife.  As a result, de Soto believes to help emancipate the poor from poverty is 
one of the duties of a national leader.112 
                                                 
110 The Carnegie Council, “The Mystery of Capital: Interview with Hernando de Soto.”  Available online at 
http://www.cceia.org/viewMedia.php/prmID/100 (downloaded May 8, 2006). 
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Chapter 6 
Hernando de Soto and Catholic Social Teaching: What Have We Learned From the Dia-
logue? 
 
In chapter 1, I initiated the argument that Hernando de Soto’s commitment to se-
cure and promote the property rights of citizens throughout the developing world pro-
vides a humane framework for economic development for those who support the Catholic 
Church’s commitment to a preferential option for the poor.  In subsequent chapters, I ex-
plicated why Catholic social teaching supports an individual’s right to own property, the 
anthropological foundations of this right in Catholic social teaching as exemplified in the 
work of Michael Novak and David Hollenbach, and why Hernando de Soto champions 
the expansion of property rights among the poor in the developing world.  These chapters 
provided the background for several questions that I wish to discuss in this chapter.1  
First, “How does seeing the right to private property as a natural or secondary right influ-
ence Catholic social teaching and Hernando de Soto’s work, especially in regard to his 
commitment to expanding property rights among the poor?”  Second, “Does the Catholic 
Church’s commitment to a comprehensive vision of human rights bolster Hernando de 
Soto’s ability to advance his goal of expanding property ownership among the poor?”  
Finally, “Does Hernando de Soto’s work offer those who opt for the poor a viable solu-
tion to eradicate poverty in the developing world?”  It is to these questions that I now 
turn. 
                                                 
1 I will draw mainly from an interview I conducted with Mr. Hernando de Soto on April 15, 2006 in regards 
to the questions I would like to address in this chapter.   
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1. Private Property, Catholic Social Teaching, and Hernando de Soto: Does it Make 
a Difference if it is a Natural or Secondary Right? 
 
In chapter 2, I argued that Catholic social teaching today affirms the right of per-
sons to own property.  It affirms this right because of the tradition’s commitment to hu-
man dignity and the social nature of the human person.  The personalist communitarian 
anthropology that Catholic social teaching employs sees that persons must possess certain 
basic goods in order to participate in the well ordering of society.  Without the right to 
own property, people would not be able to contribute to their own economic well-being 
as well as the economic well-being of their families and society.  Although Catholic so-
cial teaching continues to affirm the right to private property as a natural right, the tradi-
tion gradually has returned over the past one hundred years to its Thomistic origins by 
linking its commitment to property rights to its teaching about the universal destination of 
material goods.  Today, Catholic social teaching sees the right to own property as a natu-
ral right in the sense that it is natural for people to own possessions to live and function in 
society.  Yet, since all the material goods of the earth originally come from God, the tra-
dition affirms that the use of property must also have a social function in order to benefit 
the common good.  The implication of this shift is that when the material needs of large 
numbers of people go unmet, the needs of those in poverty qualify an individual’s right to 
own property.   
In the early stages of the tradition, when Pope Leo XIII in Rerum novarum pro-
posed an almost absolute right to private property from the standpoint of natural law, he 
neglected to outline fully the social dimensions of ownership.  Although it is possible to 
argue that he neglected this dimension of ownership to combat what he perceived were 
the negative affects of socialist ideology, Leo’s failure to delineate the social duties that 
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come with individual ownership adversely affected the tradition.  By placing such a 
heavy emphasis on the right of individuals to own property, his commitment to the “natu-
ralness” of this right undermined St. Thomas’s earlier view that the use of material goods 
must benefit the common good, especially the needs of the poor.  The doctrine of private 
property presented in Rerum novarum appeared to justify that it is only necessary to at-
tend to the needs of the poor out of personal charity.  Even though Leo placed a signifi-
cant moral responsibility on those people who owned an excess of wealth to share their 
good fortune with those around them, his argument from a deductive view of natural law 
that private property is a natural right appeared to give it an absolute status that made it 
more difficult to attend to the common good and the material needs of the poor.   
Although Leo’s predecessors never abandoned the “natural” status of this right, 
they did qualify it to highlight that the ownership of property comes with certain duties 
and responsibilities in order to benefit the common good.  When Pius XI introduced the 
concept of social justice in Quadragesimo anno, his vision of a more organic view of so-
ciety and ownership led him to identify the social dimensions of the use of property more 
than Leo.2  Pius’s commitment to social justice gave him the ability to identify the ways 
social structures and institutions marginalized people from participating in the well order-
ing of society.  His social justice approach, along with the development of a more induc-
tive view of natural law, which emerged with the rise of historical consciousness in 
Catholic social teaching, led subsequent pontiffs also to stress the social dimensions of 
ownership.   
                                                 
2 See Quadragesimo Anno, no. 58 for Pius’s definition of social justice.  See Quadragesimo Anno, nos. 44-
52 for his views about the right to private property. 
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John XXIII argued in Mater et magistra that the expansion of property rights 
could greatly aid the poor by giving them the legal and institutional protections necessary 
to promote their own economic well-being.  Even though he recognized the benefits as-
sociated with expanding property rights among the poor, his optimism curtailed his abil-
ity to see the ways economic and political institutions in developing nations purposely 
exclude these people from participating in legitimate markets.   
The optimism expressed by John waned during the pontificate of Pope Paul VI.  
He stressed more than any other pontiff the shortcomings of capitalism and the ways this 
economic system marginalizes the poor by creating tremendous gaps between rich and 
poor because of its commitment to individual property rights.  His call for an integral de-
velopment led to a scathing critique against the dangers associated with the emergence of 
the global market.  As a result, Paul inverted the right to private property by placing the 
social dimensions of ownership above an individual’s right to own property.  Even 
though Paul never repudiated a person’s right to own property, his severe criticisms of 
contemporary capitalism remain the strongest in the history of Catholic social teaching.   
In the social encyclicals of Pope John Paul II, his work marks a continued return 
to the tradition’s Thomistic roots.  John Paul affirmed that it is natural for a person to 
own property, but his commitment to an organic view of ownership in conjunction with 
his constant campaign on behalf of the poor, led him to stress the duties and responsibili-
ties that come with this right.  Though he greatly added to the tradition by identifying the 
importance of human capital in the processes that lead to the creation of wealth, his 
commitment to a theological anthropology that places human dignity and human rights at 
the center of moral and ethical reflection led him to argue that those who have an excess 
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of the earth’s goods and resources have a moral obligation to share them to benefit the 
common good of society.3  Consequently, John Paul II made human need the normative 
framework to understand the right to private property in Catholic social teaching, which 
was a similar concern shared by St. Thomas Aquinas and his Scholastic contemporaries. 
The tradition’s shift in emphasis over the past one hundred years from a focus on 
the natural right to own property to one that places human need at the center of its teach-
ing about the use of property provides Catholic social teaching with the resources to ad-
dress the ways that contemporary economic structures either marginalize or include peo-
ple in the processes of economic development.  It does this in three key ways.  First, 
Catholic social teaching and its understanding of the right to private property allows the 
tradition to point out the dangers associated with making individual autonomy and the 
maximization of profit the center of society’s moral and ethical reflection concerning 
economic development.  Second, Catholic social teaching positively contributes to soci-
ety by identifying the benefits that come with the promotion of entrepreneurship, eco-
nomic initiative, and the cultivation of human capital through its teaching about private 
property.  Finally, the tradition’s call to create a strong juridical framework between gov-
ernment officials, members of civil society, and those in business to insure that the 
growth of the global market meets the basic needs of all people also stems from the tradi-
tion’s teaching about private property.   
The return Catholic social teaching has made to its Thomistic origins, by placing 
human need at the center of its teaching about private property, provides an important 
avenue for discussion between the work of Hernando de Soto and Catholic social teach-
                                                 
3 Centesimus annus, nos. 31-32. 
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ing.4  Although the tradition continues to teach that the right to private property is a natu-
ral right, especially when the naturalness of this right is understood as something that is 
integral for a person to meet their basic material needs, the tradition places more empha-
sis today on the positive effects associated with property ownership, especially for those 
mired in poverty.  The key issue for the tradition of Catholic social teaching is not 
whether people have a “natural” right to possess property.  The key issue regarding the 
right to private property in Catholic social teaching is the positive effects the promotion 
and protection of this right will have on human dignity and the common good of society.  
In particular, the tradition wants to identify whether the protection and expansion of this 
right helps poor people to meet their basic material needs.   
When looking at the issue from the standpoint of the tangible effects that promot-
ing and protecting property rights among the poor can have on personal dignity and the 
common good of society, this is where I believe collaboration between contemporary 
Catholic social teaching and the work of Hernando de Soto becomes most evident.  On 
the one hand, Catholic social teaching provides sound arguments regarding why human 
need should determine the basis for the legitimacy of this right.  Dating back to the me-
dieval period, St. Thomas held in ST II-II 66.7 that someone in extreme need who takes 
from another person what is necessary to sustain life is not guilty of robbery of theft.  In 
other words, someone in this situation is free to take from another, in the sense of enjoy-
ing immunity from guilt or punishment for the act in question.  As Jean Porter says,  
This is not equivalent to saying the poor person has a right which could be 
claimed against the rich person and defended at law, but it does imply that the rich 
individual cannot lodge a claim against the poor individual for the return of what 
the latter has taken.  Hence, the poor individual cannot defend a claim against the 
                                                 
4 See especially ST II-II 66.7. 
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rich, but neither can the rich individual defend an accusation of robbery or theft 
against the poor person in such a case.  This is at least a subjective immunity, if 
not a full-fledged subjective right.5 
  
The important issue Thomas raised is that human need determines the legitimacy of this 
right.  It is important to recognize that the tradition of Catholic social teaching since Leo 
XIII has subsequently defended this idea.  The tradition affirms that the rich have at least 
an obligation to share their goods with the poor, at least under certain circumstances.  It 
asserts that the claim in question is not a positive right, in the sense of depending on posi-
tive law for its force; rather, it is one of the benchmarks of a just society. 
 On the other hand, it is possible to argue that the tradition’s emphasis on placing 
human need at the center of its reflection about the right to private property has led 
Catholic social teaching to neglect the positive effects that the promotion and enforce-
ment of property rights among the poor in LDCs could have for these people to help them 
to meet their own material needs.  If de Soto’s analysis is correct, a drawback of the tradi-
tion’s understanding of this right is that it underestimates the fact that poor people who 
live in impoverished nations already have many of the necessary assets and resources to 
meet their basic material needs.  The protections that people in these nations lack are the 
legal and institutional rights that would enable them to use their assets more efficiently 
and productively to meet their needs.  This is where I believe de Soto’s work makes a vi-
tal contribution to the tradition of Catholic social teaching.  Thus, I asked de Soto this 
question, “What evidence do you see provides the foundation for the right to private 
property as a natural right?”  He responded, “I’m not use to thinking about private prop-
                                                 
5 Porter, Nature as Reason, 357. 
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erty as a natural right….  I think about it as something that is simply indispensable for 
economic cooperation to take place and for propensity and capital to be created.”6 
As I discussed in chapter 5, de Soto sees property principally as a human con-
struct that has little to do with the physical world of material goods and resources.  He 
believes the important step toward unlocking the hidden potential of any asset is the rep-
resentational system that helps to identify the most economically and socially useful 
qualities about it.  He believes the development of integrated property rights systems in 
LDCs will allow people to use their assets in the most productive and efficient ways pos-
sible to help them to meet their basic material needs through their own economic initia-
tive.  Not surprisingly, he thinks debates about whether the right to private property is a 
natural right are not very helpful since there is little dispute over the fact that people re-
quire possessions to help them to meet their basic material needs.  The key issue is not 
whether people have a natural right to own possessions.  De Soto thinks the key issue that 
people should discuss is the functionality of the property rights system that facilitates the 
productive and efficient use of assets.  In other words, de Soto wants people to look at the 
positive tangible effects that a well-organized property rights system will have for the 
poor living in LDCs.  That is why he believes that legalizing property is hardly charity 
for the poor.  “Creating an orderly market that makes owners accountable and gives their 
homes clear titles worthy of financing will generate an expanding market, encourage law 
and order, and put money into the pockets of the elite.”7  Thus, de Soto’s argument for 
the right to private property is one that is mainly pragmatic.  He states,           
                                                 
6 Hernando de Soto, interview by author, 15 April 2006, Pittsburgh, PA, tape recording. 
 
7 de Soto, The Mystery of Capital, 197. 
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Well, if you catch it from the point of view of the effects, and the concrete effects 
it produces (the creation of an integrated property rights system), and to this end, 
immediately get into the issues of distribution of wealth, then the argument is 
more solid.  Therefore, I am not used to looking at it as a natural right.  I am used 
to looking at it as something that actually functions.8    
 
It is clear from his statements that the important issue for de Soto is not whether people 
have a “natural” right to possess things.  The important thing for de Soto is the creation of 
a legal system for people living in LDCs that protects and promotes their property rights.  
De Soto shows in his research that the creation of integrated property rights system will 
create the conditions for long-term economic development.  The erection of these kinds 
of systems will allow people in poverty to facilitate more easily the productive and effi-
cient trading, selling, and buying of goods and resources for themselves without relying 
on foreign aid.  Long-term economic development will take place because once people 
gain legitimate ownership over their assets, the value of their assets; whether it is a home 
or small business, will immediately increase.  This, however, raises an important issue for 
de Soto.   
In the field of economic development today, opponents of his research derisively 
suggest that his strategy to reduce poverty in LDCs is some kind of “magic bullet.”9  
Therefore, I asked de Soto, “How does acquiring title to land in a region such as Sub-
Saharan Africa, for example, benefit someone in dire poverty who might be malnour-
ished, lacks health-care, or other basic goods?”10  He responded, “Well, in many ways.  
First, the moment you have established the recognition of everybody that whatever they 
                                                 
8 Hernando de Soto, interview by author, 15 April 2006, Pittsburgh, PA, tape recording. 
 
9 In The End of Poverty, Jeffrey Sachs contends that de Soto overestimates the positive value that the pro-
duction of an integrated property rights system will have for people living in LDCs.  For a full treatment of 
this issue, see Sachs, The End of Poverty, 321-322. 
 
10 Hernando de Soto, interview by author, 15 April 2006, Pittsburgh, PA, tape recording. 
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have, and they always have something, is actually protected by law, and is recognized by 
everybody else, the value of that, to start off with, starts rising.”11   
He then asked me, “Where are you sitting now?”12   
I responded, “In an office building here at Duquesne University.”13   
“In an office building?”14   
“Yes.”15   
Then de Soto asked me, “How much do you think that building is worth?”16   
I said, “I don’t know, about five million dollars.”17   
He responded,  
All right, five million dollars.  Imagine that I went over there and said, ‘I really 
like this building.  I would like to buy it.’  Then we agree on the five million dol-
lars.  And just as we were signing, I said, ‘By the way Robert, before I do sign, 
where is your title to this building?’  And then you say, ‘I don’t have it.  But all 
my neighbors know the building is mine.’  How much is that building going to be 
worth now?  Obviously, it will be worth a lot less than it was before.18 
   
After I paused to think about de Soto’s remarks, he said, 
 
Value is in perception.19  The perception is that there is a right to the building that 
everybody recognizes, which will start something off.  Indeed, that will immedi-
ately start all of the other effects that I have talked about.  I never said it was short 
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13 Ibid. 
 
14 Ibid. 
 
15 Ibid.  
 
16 Ibid. 
 
17 Ibid. 
 
18 Ibid. 
 
19 Ibid.  Emphasis mine.   
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term.  I just do not see what other resources there are.  You can get Jeffrey Sachs 
to pump some money out of the UN, and that is fine, but most of these countries 
do not have these resources because they are indebted.  The important thing is that 
you are endowing that person with a right and with everything else that goes 
along with that right.  The possibility, among other things, is if he cannot even do 
anything with that land, which is very possible; maybe one of his ten neighbors 
can do something with it.  Wherever we have gone (Institute for Liberty and De-
mocracy), and titled in the countries that we have worked, the first thing that hap-
pens is when you go to what was before a supposedly communal or collective 
administration of land and assets, and you tell them we are going to give it to you 
legally, in whatever form you decide.  And they meet.  And usually they parcel it 
out.  In other words, they take their 2000 acres or 10,000 acres; and they parcel it 
out among themselves this way.  They come back and say, ‘OK.  We’ve decided 
to divvy it up this way.’  And, once you got that in the social contract, you sign it 
up and you give away the individual titles.20 
 
De Soto argues that the next crucial step that will take place once homeowners or 
entrepreneurs gain legitimate title over their assets is the division of labor.  He says,  
The moment you got your property rights systems over land and over enterprises, 
the division of labor works, and assets start being transferred to their highest val-
ued use.  Therefore, what will happen to that farmer who is malnourished and 
lacks health care, and other basic goods, is that he may not hold onto land that he 
cannot do anything with, but somebody else will.  Or, he will see at the end of the 
day, that he can transfer it.  Or, he can go and do something about another piece 
of land elsewhere.  But, he can start moving.  You cannot do that until you have 
tradable property rights.21 
 
The legal enfranchisement of people’s property rights is an important step because when 
the division of labor takes place, a person who once was a farmer now has the ability to 
move into some other type of job.  He has the potential to become a specialized worker in 
some other area that is vital to a local community’s economic development.  As de Soto 
says,  
Nobody is talking about giving things to people that will not be ‘fungible,’ that 
cannot be moved.  Some people will use it directly, the 1/3 that have, for example, 
in Peru, and 2/3 will move along.  Nevertheless, they will have something of 
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value that they can pass to somebody else, eventually.  And if they don’t, and if 
they don’t fall into any categories, somewhere, somehow, someone will be on the 
right piece of land, and with the right quantity of property, as to be able to divide 
labor, and they will end up employing those people.  Nobody says that that piece 
of land gives everybody specifically a possession of something that will automati-
cally start to grow.  It says that society, in general, will benefit.  Indeed, some of 
them will create the jobs for other people.22 
 
Thus, de Soto acknowledges that his theory for economic development is not a “magic 
bullet” that will solve all the problems caused by poverty in the developing world.  The 
question remains, however, “Will it help most people?”  I therefore suggested to him, 
“All right, it (economic development) is something that can’t be guaranteed in an abso-
lute way.”23 
He responded, “No, but I can’t go around in advance saying, ‘I know who can use 
the assets.’  So you have to go out and give everyone the chance, and then the system will 
eventually work.”24  De Soto acknowledges that there are no shortcuts to long-term eco-
nomic development in LDCs.  Even though his proposed solution is not a magic bullet, it 
is an integral step in the process toward helping people in poverty to address their own 
economic needs.  Thus, he finished this part of our discussion with these words,  
Yes, the question is, ‘Will it help most people?’  Yes, it will help most people.  It 
will help most of them a lot.  But, when it does and gets the system working, there 
is no short-term answer for most people.  Aid just does not do it.  It just does not 
cover it.  It is a very small fragment of the resources that are necessary for real 
development….  I have never said it is a “magic bullet” in the sense that it imme-
diately produces “this.”  What we have seen where we have titled, is overall, in 
the case of Peru and El Salvador, for example, all these people are much better off 
than those who were not titled before.  28% more of their children go to school 
because now there are two more salaries per plot of land than there was before 
simply because they can now stay there and they know that their land cannot be 
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taken away from them.  Therefore, an elder brother or wife goes out to get another 
job.  Because they do that, they can afford education.  We also know now that 
they absorb the majority of Peru’s mortgages.  That the values of their homes, on 
average, have increased 40% more than those that have not been titled.  There-
fore, overall, things go better.  However, that does not mean that it is going to 
happen on that land, in that specific place, at a specific time.  The process of the 
division of labor will go, some will become entrepreneurs, some will get richer 
than others will, and then you have to put all those other things that make for eq-
uitable growth and that make for credit.  It cannot take off without that first step, 
without that cornerstone being put into place.25 
 
2. A Question of Anthropology: How can the Personalist Communitarian Theologi-
cal Anthropological Benefit the Work of Hernando de Soto 
 
In chapters 3 and 4, I discussed the work of Michael Novak and David Hollen-
bach to investigate the dominant anthropological wings in the tradition of Catholic social 
teaching.  One of my purposes in surveying their work was to identify both the benefits 
and shortcomings of each of these anthropological heritages in Catholic social teaching.  
On the one hand, the benefits of Novak’s sustained reflections on theological anthropol-
ogy provides a view of the person that is creative, resourceful, and committed to promot-
ing economic liberty in order to limit the potentially coercive power of the state.  In its 
most positive light, his more libertarian anthropology provides those mired in poverty 
with an argument for expanding private enterprise and restricting government interfer-
ence in the organization and operation of markets.  Nonetheless, I argued that his anthro-
pology does not allow him to address adequately the ways that the globalization of the 
market marginalizes those in poverty throughout the developing world.   
On the other hand, Hollenbach’s anthropology, which is personalist and commu-
nitarian, stresses the cooperative and social elements of human personhood where human 
rights become the minimum mechanisms for participation in community life.  Similar to 
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Novak, his anthropological commitments have led him to identify many of the positive 
aspects associated with the globalization of the market, especially when it promotes hu-
man dignity, social solidarity, and justice.  Even though he supports markets when they 
elevate human dignity, I contend that his anthropological leanings provide better re-
sources than Novak for identifying the ways political, legal, and economic institutions 
isolate the poor from meeting their basic material needs.  Hollenbach’s commitment to a 
comprehensive vision of human rights challenges those who give unbridled support to 
laissez-faire market systems.  In particular, his claim that economic rights must be re-
spected as much as political rights in order to give persons the necessary protections they 
need to participate in the well ordering of society challenges those who remain commit-
ted to an anthropology that sees people primarily as self-interested individuals who work 
chiefly for the maximization of profit.  Instead, Hollenbach’s work presents a strong case 
for why it is important to see persons as bound together in a web of interdependent net-
works of work and collaboration in order to identify the practical implications for the as-
sessment of the proper scope of markets.  Indeed, Hollenbach places at the forefront of 
his reflections on theological anthropology the idea that markets are to be judged ethi-
cally in light of their consequences for human dignity. 
Hollenbach’s commitment to a theological anthropology that places human dig-
nity and human rights at the center of his ethical reflection provides an interesting point 
of contact for dialogue between Catholic social teaching and the work of Hernando de 
Soto.  One of the strengths of Hollenbach’s view of human rights is the recognition that 
the context for the proper functioning of these rights will change depending on the social 
location of the people these rights mean to protect.  Hollenbach presents a normative vi-
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sion of human rights that accepts cultural, religious, and gender differences among people 
as well as their economic and political situations as relevant in the development of moral 
standards for a globalizing world.  In fact, his view of human rights accepts the common 
humanity of all people while avoiding an abstract idea of universal community that sub-
merges differences in what he calls a “stifling homogeneity.”26  Indeed, he grounds hu-
man rights in a framework that respects and celebrates differences among communities 
and peoples, but with a stipulation.  “Communal particularities and different ways of or-
ganizing public life through government are to be accepted as long as they respect basic 
human rights.”27  At a minimum, Hollenbach believes being treated justly “means being 
treated as a member of this community and in accord with the common human dignity 
shared by all people.”28  Thus, he considers that the most fundamental forms of injustice 
on the global stage are those that “marginalize people, countries, or cultures from at least 
minimal levels of active participation in the common goods that come into existence in 
the larger surrounding wholes.”29 
Hollenbach’s vision of human rights and the anthropology he uses to justify these 
rights have important implications for the work of Hernando de Soto and his attempt to 
secure property rights for home and small business owners throughout the developing 
world.  Similar to Hollenbach, de Soto’s commitment to establishing legal property rights 
rests on an assumption that people, regardless of time, place, or cultural orientation, re-
quire property rights in order to participate in the economic well-being of their commu-
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nity.  In The Mystery of Capital, de Soto calls the legal disenfranchisement of these rights 
among the poor a form of “apartheid,” which segregates the wealthy from the poor as the 
law once segregated blacks and whites in South Africa.30  Critics of de Soto’s research, 
however, challenge whether his commitment to securing legal title to assets for the poor 
in the developing world rests on a false anthropological assumption.  Opponents who ar-
gue that “culture” is the dominant factor in the process toward economic development 
chastise de Soto for trying to export “Western” ideas about individual property rights to 
peoples who do not share this same cultural heritage.  These critics suggest the world to-
day lacks a consensus about the ways to create economic growth because the proven way 
- capitalism, even modified by the welfare state - is a peculiar creation of Western cul-
ture.  In other words, the approach that de Soto espouses, if not inherently alien to other 
cultures, is at least unfamiliar and unnatural.  Opponents of de Soto’s work claim that his 
logic implicitly accepts a standard economic assumption: human nature is universal: Con-
fronted with the same incentives, people everywhere will respond similarly. 
The criticism leveled against de Soto’s work for its foundational commitment to a 
Western model of property rights echoes similar criticisms made against ethicists such as 
Hollenbach who argue for a comprehensive vision of human rights based in a founda-
tional commitment to human dignity.  Critics attack their “foundationalism” from the 
standpoint that there is no such thing as “universal” human rights.  The very notion of 
human rights is nothing more than an illusion created during the Enlightenment.  They 
challenge the idea that human rights are moral standards that stand independent of all tra-
ditions, cultures, and religions.  Indeed, the contemporary awareness of the historical em-
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beddedness of rationality raises serious doubts in the minds of many about the transcen-
dental character of human rights across history and communal traditions.31  The contem-
porary challenge raised by those who question the foundations on which universal human 
rights are made today remains important because it presents those who want to make a 
commitment to these rights account for the ways the justification of human rights norms 
and the interpretation of their concrete implications vary in notable ways from one phi-
losophical, ideological, or religious tradition to another.  Yet, as Hollenbach rightly notes, 
Such a rejection of the existence of human rights, however, would be a serious 
setback for the growing sense of solidarity across cultures in a world where viola-
tions of human dignity continue today on a massive scale.  Since the moral vo-
cabulary of human rights has become the single strongest way to address this hu-
man degradation, to declare on theoretical grounds that it is an illegitimate way of 
speaking will have serious negative consequences for the lives of many people.32 
 
I agree with Hollenbach that to abandon the language of human rights would be a 
serious mistake primarily because the interdependence of today’s world requires at least 
some kind of basic moral vocabulary to allow for dialogue among international actors to 
discuss the kind of world we all want to live in as human beings.  The key is not to aban-
don a commitment to universal human rights, but to respect the ongoing dialogue about 
how the universal standards sought by the language of human rights relate to the distinc-
tive and particular self-understanding of different ethnic, cultural, and religious commu-
nities throughout the world.   
In light of this view, there is no doubt that Hernando de Soto puts forth his pro-
gram for economic development throughout different regions of the world by adopting 
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the language of human rights.  His support for Article 17 of the United Nations Human 
Rights Charter provides clear evidence for this claim.  Even though he believes it is natu-
ral for people to possess things to meet their basic material needs, he acknowledges that 
the systems that govern these rights must respond to the local and particular needs of 
various peoples.  His desire to enfranchise people in the developing world to gain legal 
ownership over their assets therefore provides an interesting test case about the possibili-
ties of combining a foundational commitment to human rights while acknowledging that 
the implementation of these rights must respect cultural, religious, and ethnic diversity.  
Therefore, I asked de Soto, “What are the anthropological underpinnings of your under-
standing of economic development and commitment to property rights?  In other words, 
what view of the person are you employing in your view of economic justice?”33 
 To answer this question, de Soto first discussed with me his recent involvement in 
a titling program led by the ILD in Ethiopia, where he worked with that nation’s Prime 
Minister Meles Zenawi.  De Soto claims that Prime Minister Zenawi was at first skeptical 
of establishing a unified property rights system in his country primarily because of its po-
tential for concentrating wealth in the hands of a few individuals.  Eventually, Meles 
Zenawi agreed to allow de Soto to organize the property rights system in Ethiopia when 
he saw that members of the ILD had collected numerous samples of property titles that 
were being handed out by Ethiopians themselves outside of government spheres.  De 
Soto was not surprised that many Ethiopians had taken the initiative to try to document 
their assets, albeit extralegally.  He acknowledged that this was similar to developments 
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that had occurred in places as diverse from Ethiopia as Mexico and the Philippines.  He 
said,  
I have not come across, whether it has been Mexico, the Philippines, Tanzania, a 
parcel of land, in the extralegal sector, where there is no title, albeit a title that is 
issued by informal authorities outside of the law by thugs, or mullahs, or whom-
ever….  In other words, what I have seen, wherever I have gone, is that people are 
establishing papered rights to things.  Therefore, what I do is I actually bring these 
documents together.  It is based on these documents, and the forms, and the con-
tents that they have, that I begin to design standard forms that people under-
stand.34     
 
De Soto’s result led him to make an important statement about his understanding of the 
human person.  He said, “What my anthropology has brought out is that people are creat-
ing systems of documented property rights wherever you go.  I have not found a place 
where that is not established.”35  De Soto’s research in various parts of the world testifies 
to the universal desire of people to want to own and legally represent their assets.  He 
uses this important insight to dedicate his work to discovering the ways people interact 
economically in order to work with government officials throughout the developing 
world to help the poor to gain legal ownership over their assets.  He said,  
And I go to people in villages and towns throughout the developing world, and I 
say all right, here is what people with market economic systems do, they have 
property rights that are fungible, they have property rights that can be mortgaged, 
they have property rights that can be divided up, they have property rights that are 
inscribed in some primitive form of ledger, but that are brought together in some 
kind of order or standard.  Does this occur here?  That is what I do.  Then, I go to 
them, and say, now, when people got organized in this country, when they organ-
ized their enterprises, did they have limited liability, did they institute the right to 
perpetual succession?  Did they have means of taking hierarchical decisions?  Do 
you?  I find that they do in very primitive ways that are not organized according 
to written systems or adding professionals and widespread law.  They do it in un-
systematic, unprofessional, and fragmented systems.  Therefore, what I try to do 
is find any of the symptoms of a modern institutional system that are present and I 
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have found the roots everywhere I have gone.  That is what I dedicate my anthro-
pology.36 
 
Hernando de Soto’s view of the human person allows him to discover the extrale-
gal arrangements of home and small business owners in different regions throughout the 
developing world.  His insights about the human desire to own property shows that the 
commitment to establishing property rights is not adverse to people who do not share 
“Western” cultural values and orientations.  His discovery that people across different 
ethnic, religious, and cultural traditions want to gain ownership over their assets is proof 
that “culture” is not the principal obstacle toward a nation’s economic development.   
The fact that “culture” is not the primary impediment to a nation’s economic de-
velopment raises an important question for de Soto and his colleagues at the ILD.  If cul-
ture is not the principal barrier to development, why has the ILD not developed one sys-
tem of property rights that can work in every region of the world?  I asked de Soto, “You 
reject the idea that ‘culture matters’ when discussing the problem of economic develop-
ment.  However, do not some cultural orientations aid economic development more than 
others do?”37  He responded,  
My argument is not against “culture.”  Let me put it this way.  When I wrote The 
Other Path, I noted that much of Peru once was described as unemployed prole-
tariat, victims of dependency, and bad capitalism.  I indicated that, no, it is a soci-
ety that has an enormous amount of energy and entrepreneurial spirit.  Therefore, 
why, simply, did not everybody just read that and then do it in their country.  
Some people did.  But essentially the reason why I have to go country by country 
is that I have to adapt it culturally.  I have to put it in the context of the words and 
the meanings that they have.38 
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De Soto acknowledges that to organize an integrated property rights system requires an 
understanding of local customs and traditions of different peoples in order for these sys-
tems to function legally and efficiently.  He recognizes that “culture” plays an important 
role in a nation’s economic development.  Yet, he has not found one culture that is inca-
pable of constructing a modern market economic system.  He says, 
What I am saying when I say, “culture,” that I do not agree with, is those people 
who say that there are some cultures that are “fit” for economic development with 
market economies and those that are not.  I just simply have never found one that 
is not.  That is where my argument about culture comes into play.  Of course there 
are differences between cultures.  That is why I like traveling to different places 
to look at different cultures.  One of the strengths that I think we have at the ILD 
is that we can talk in different terms.  I mean The Mystery of Capital is an effort 
to talk in Western terms.  The argument it makes is very different when you have 
to sell the argument locally.  You have to talk in completely different terms.  Of 
course, culture matters, but culture does not determine that you cannot have a 
modern capitalist system.39   
 
The strength of Hernando de Soto’s anthropology is that it blends a foundational 
commitment to individual property rights while recognizing that the systems that govern 
these rights are human creations that must respond to local customs and practices of vari-
ous peoples throughout the developing world.  He refutes the idea that “culture” is the 
key factor toward a nation’s economic development, especially when people perceive 
culture as an obstacle to helping the poor to gain legal ownership over their assets.  As de 
Soto says, “… culture is not a wall that cannot be crossed.  It is a tunnel that twists and 
turns and you have to learn how to connect one end to the other.”40  By integrating the 
extralegal property arrangements of people throughout the developing world into one sys-
tem of property law, de Soto believes this will not only benefit the individual owners of 
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assets, but this will increase the economic prosperity of an entire nation.  Indeed, he 
stresses that cooperation among political leaders, members of civil society, and those who 
work in the extralegal sector of the economy is essential to the development of a society 
that respects the rule of law and promotes the common good of all citizens.  The inability 
to protect legally the property rights of those mired in poverty will continue to place un-
due burdens on this group of people.  Only when a country develops an integrated prop-
erty rights system that allows the majority of a nation’s citizens to participate in the mar-
ket will this system help those in poverty to meet their basic material needs and become 
greater participants in the well-ordering of society.  
Although de Soto’s anthropology positively merges a foundational commitment 
to property rights with a view of adapting these rights to each nation’s particular cultural, 
religious, and ethnic heritage in a unified system of property law, a weakness of his an-
thropology is that it lacks a normative center to ground these rights.  In chapter 4, I used 
the work of David Hollenbach to reveal how the dignity of the human person has become 
the normative center of Catholic social teaching.  The vision of the human person that 
Catholic social teaching employs affirms both the individual and communal aspects of 
personhood, which provides the tradition with the resources to outline the basic freedoms 
that human beings require in order to participate in society as equal and active agents.  
The granting and protection of civil and political rights, such as free speech, become inef-
fectual for human well-being if society does not join these rights with economic and so-
cial rights.  The social teaching of the church helps people to see that human well-being 
requires more than the ability to speak freely or put words on parchments of paper for 
people to become full and active citizens in society.  To affirm human dignity in its most 
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comprehensive sense requires giving people access to work, to basic healthcare, to educa-
tion, and to housing.  Hernando de Soto’s work contributes greatly to affirming human 
dignity today through its ability to unlock the mysteries pertaining to the creation of 
wealth.  Its ability to identify and eliminate the legal obstacles that deny those in poverty 
access to the right to own and use their property to meet their basic material needs and 
the needs of their families provides groundbreaking intellectual and practical resources to 
help people living in LDCs to escape the cycle of poverty.  Despite the many tangible 
benefits of de Soto’s research, however, his primarily pragmatic anthropology does not 
adequately provide a rationale about why it is necessary to help those living in LDCs to 
gain ownership over their assets.  Thus, a dialogue with a tradition that places human 
dignity and the needs of the poor at the center of its ethical reflections could provide de 
Soto with a better foundation on which to advocate the protection and promotion of prop-
erty rights among the poor in the developing world.  It is to these issues that I now turn. 
3. Hernando de Soto and The Enfranchisement of Property Rights: An Option for 
the Poor? 
 
In chapter 1, I discussed that one of the most important developments within 
Catholic social teaching over the past forty years has been the commitment of the Catho-
lic Church to the principle of the preferential option for the poor.  Today, Catholic social 
teaching proclaims that a basic moral test of society is how its most vulnerable members 
are faring.  In a society marred by deepening divisions between rich and poor, the Catho-
lic tradition recalls the story of the Last Judgment (MT 25) and instructs the faithful to 
put the needs of the poor and vulnerable first.  Indeed, justice at its foundation demands 
the establishment of minimum levels of participation in the life of the human community 
for all persons.  The option for the poor challenges the Catholic faithful and all people of 
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good will to work with the marginalized to help them to become full and active partici-
pants in society.   
The strengths of Catholic social teaching to meet this goal are many, but three in 
particular stand out.  First, its humanistic attitude allows members within the church to 
reach out to others not only to teach them, but also to learn from them.  The humanistic 
framework that Catholic social teaching offers provides ample room for dialogue among 
diverse religious and secular groups.  Second, its attention to the values of participation 
and solidarity give meaning to this option.  The concept of participation helps to identify 
how to share power among divergent groups.  The concept of solidarity allows people to 
recognize why it is vitally necessary for people to work together to improve the aggregate 
well-being of society as a whole.  Finally, its prophetic challenge to respect the dignity of 
all members of society calls both followers and non-believers to work for a more just and 
equitable division of resources in order to allow all people to meet their basic material 
needs.   
The foundation upon which the church makes this option for the poor is human 
dignity.  The exclusion of large numbers of people from participation in the global mar-
ketplace today constitutes a grave threat to it.  In order to meet the challenge of making 
those now excluded by the globalization of the market full participants in society, the 
church must do more than simply use its social teaching to identify the causes of margin-
alization.  It must seek ways to integrate those now mired in poverty into local and inter-
national markets.  The desire of those who work within the Catholic social tradition to 
meet the objective of producing a human society that respects the dignity of all persons 
requires both teaching and learning from other groups who share this objective.  As I 
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have argued throughout this dissertation, I believe the work of Hernando de Soto pro-
vides tangible means and resources for those who work within the Catholic social tradi-
tion to move toward the goal of fulfilling this option.  If the option for the poor does not 
mean pitting one group against another, but rather, it calls followers to strengthen the 
whole community by assisting those who are most vulnerable, members within the 
church must turn to its social teaching in addition to sources outside of the tradition to 
meet this objective.  I believe Hernando de Soto’s strategy to help the poor constitutes 
one such source.  Therefore, I asked him, “How can your views on solidifying property 
rights among the poor relate to the Catholic Church’s commitment to a preferential op-
tion for the poor?”41  He responded, “There is no problem about a preferential option for 
the poor.  I think I have always had a preferential option for the poor because these are 
the people I am targeting.”42 
Although de Soto supports the concept of a preferential option for the poor, he 
also noted its shortcomings, especially in regards to the way this concept developed in 
Latin and South America in the work of liberation theologians such as his professor and 
friend, Gustavo Guitiérrez.  De Soto said,  
The only part, which I have told this to Gustavo, who is a friend of mine, was in 
his book (A Theology of Liberation) he refers to Marxism.  The only part I do not 
like about that is that he does not refer to the other side.  Both Marxism and liber-
tarianism both have things to offer.  However, if you look only in terms of one, of 
course you are excluding the other.  Of course, I can understand why he did that 
because in Latin America the kind of people that would come up with a Von 
Hayek argument or a Milton Friedman argument are really people who use the ar-
guments of libertarians to further their own private interests.  In the same way that 
Left wing dictators use Marxism to justify their dictatorships.  Therefore, I have 
absolutely no problem about a preferential option for the poor.  I think it is not 
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only the human thing to do.  I think it is not only the decent thing to do, it just as-
pires to all the better sides in me, I also think it is the only practical thing to do 
because without a majority constituency on the side of development, even for the 
most cynical reasons that you can think of, it is going to collapse.43 
 
It is interesting that de Soto acknowledges the early links that existed between liberation 
theology and Marxist thought while still giving a positive assessment to the concept of 
the preferential option for the poor.  This is important since those who originally favored 
this principle advocated theories of economic development that were decisively at odds 
with the market-based ideas presented by the ILD.  It is also significant that de Soto en-
dorses this concept because his group has no direct connection with the Catholic Church.  
This lends credence to the idea that key principles of Catholic social teaching, such as the 
preferential option for the poor, are not only reasonable, but worthy of support among 
those who do not share the Catholic faith.  
Regarding his criticism of the early link that existed between liberation theology 
and Marxist thought, Hernando de Soto thinks this resulted from the fact that those who 
typically support market reforms to further the goal of economic development do not un-
derstand, or worse, do not care about those in poverty.  Scholars beyond de Soto point out 
that several early proponents of liberation theology originally turned to economic pro-
grams favored by socialists to seek solutions to the problem of poverty in Latin America.  
Many of them did this because they practically equated capitalism with injustice.  Since 
liberation theology marked a break from a traditional Catholic approach to social prob-
lems due in part to the grossly inhuman plight of people ravaged by poverty throughout 
Latin and South America, those working with the poor sought answers about why these 
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people remained mired in poverty to help them to overcome their situation of economic 
injustice.  As Peter Burns, S.J. says,  
Hunger, slums, high infant mortality, illiteracy, high unemployment, and low 
wages were typical throughout the continent when liberation theology was born.  
There was a strong sense that these problems were not simply due to misfortune 
or mere circumstance, but were the result of structural forms of exploitation and 
oppression.  It was deeply felt that it was the system, in some sense, that was to 
blame.44 
 
Indeed, “the very word capitalism tended to have negative connotations – suggesting for-
eign domination, exploitation, and concentration of wealth – not just for liberation theo-
logians, but for many Latin Americans generally.”45  In the original publication of A The-
ology of Liberation, for example, Guitiérrez called for a radical transformation of the so-
cioeconomic structure, not simply for reforms that would leave capitalism in place.46  
Later, in The Power of the Poor in History, he reiterated his opposition to the capitalist 
order.47  When prominent theologians such as Guitiérrez and José Míguez Bonino dispar-
aged the negative effects of capitalism, it was not surprising that practioners of liberation 
theology embraced a broadly Left-wing agenda.48  Burns suggests this happened for three 
main reasons.     
First, there was a strongly felt need to concretize the faith-inspired quest for social 
justice in specific political options….  Second, confronted with the facts of sys-
temic injustice, an almost unanimous identification was made that characterized 
the system in question as capitalist, and so justified a desire not merely to see 
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changes within capitalism, but to replace it with a different kind of socioeconomic 
system altogether.  Third, since traditional Third Way approaches were judged to 
be accommodating of the capitalist system, and therefore incapable of the radical 
transformation that was thought to be necessary, the only real alternative appeared 
to be an unabashed option for socialism.49 
 
Hernando de Soto’s positive assessment of the preferential option for the poor led 
me to discuss with him why people who were at least sympathetic to this principle origi-
nally turned to Marxian analysis and socialist concepts to address the problems of the 
poor in Latin and South America.  He said,   
Let me tell you what the advantage that Gustavo and my other friends have on the 
Left.  Most of my friends in Peru are on the Left.  The reason for that is that we 
are concerned with the same things.  The problem with everybody who actually 
believes in the more liberal options, or more libertarian options, in the European 
sense of the word, are people who are, in the best of cases, fascinated with the so-
phistication of a market system, and a capitalist system, but who really do not care 
about the poor.  The problem with those who really do care about the poor is that 
they really do not understand the market system.50 
 
De Soto then discussed with me why he believed this to be the case.  He said,  
Or, worse, it is they do not want to understand markets because the people who 
advocate markets are those that have used them for their single benefit and have 
not cared that the market system has not carried to the rest of the country.  There-
fore, it is really a Third World dilemma that, in terms of those that are honest and 
truthful, that are on the Right, and who have understood that markets are best, 
they just do not care about getting them to the poor and they do believe that “cul-
ture matters.”  On the other side of that coin are those who do care about the poor, 
but do not care about markets.  Therefore, I can understand why at the end one 
would tend to sympathize with the Marxists because these people do care about 
the poor.  I come from a class of people, I mean, my family has no fortune, I have 
not inherited a cent….  Everything I did I did by myself.  Nevertheless, I belong 
to that stock of “Whitish” people with whom I find absolutely no identification 
and no values to share.  They just happen to be my cousins, they were the kids I 
was presented to when I was a child, and, therefore, my tendency is with the Left 
side.  Again, I have problems with the Left side because they do not agree with 
my reasoning.  Therefore, I can also understand that one of the reasons that any-
body, who would tend to be with the Left, when they had an option for the poor, 
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is because these are your natural neighbors, they are the only people who really 
care.  Therefore, it is a problem of company.  Yes, keeping the right company.51 
 
De Soto’s argument that those who identify with the poor mostly favor economic 
development programs that borrow heavily from socialist strategies challenges him to 
demonstrate that securing the legal protection of property rights among the poor provides 
greater prosperity for this group of people than Marxist alternatives.52  Even though de 
Soto generally is unsympathetic to socialist strategies for economic development, it is 
important to recognize that he uses the concept of “class” to identify that fundamental 
differences do exist between people regarding access to economic opportunities and basic 
goods that people possess in society.53  Yet, he does not subscribe to the idea that the so-
lution to this problem is to dissolve private property or deny entrepreneurial activity 
among those now living at the margins of society.  De Soto believes there is no better 
means to meet the basic material needs of the poor than to allow them to enter the market 
legally.  He says,   
We (ILD) do believe that there is no way that you can accumulate the strength to 
change things unless you have capital.  We also agree that it is a very difficult 
journey between a market economy and monopolies and excessive things.  You 
have to do what the West has done, which is to steer a course between both 
things.  The problem in Latin America is that it is very hard to do that because the 
only people who really care about the poor are the people on the Left.  After a 
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while, you believe that solving the problem of poverty is tied to the Leftist ideol-
ogy.  It is not.  It is unfortunate.  It is a tragedy.  It is a drama.54          
 
De Soto’s contention that it is a “tragedy” that many who want to help the poor 
have chosen socialist ideology over market reforms is a criticism sometimes leveled 
against those in the Catholic Church who have worked on behalf of “social justice” in 
many places throughout the developing world.  Michael Novak, for example, believes 
liberation theologians made a great mistake by borrowing socialist ideas from Latin 
America’s social scientists.55  As discussed earlier, Novak believes socialism is not a cure 
for excessive state control; it only intensifies it.56  Novak believes that some who support 
Catholic social teaching and its commitment to social justice misunderstand this concept 
because they fail to see the way it can provide a potential inroad for the dangerous expan-
sion of government power.  He thinks the extensive effort under way to commit the 
Church to ‘economic rights’ as the means to secure social justice has the potential to be-
come an error of classic magnitude.  He says, “It might well position the Catholic Church 
in a ‘preferential option for the state’ that will more than rival that of the Constantinian 
period.”57  Novak believes the tradition’s commitment to economic rights will lead to the 
expansion of government power because if every human being has the right to be given 
income, and to be fed, sheltered, and cared for by the state, every person who without ne-
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cessity exercises that right sells himself into dependency.  In that way, human dignity, far 
from being gained, is lost.58   
Although Novak provides an insightful warning regarding the potential dangers 
associated with expanding the role of government in the operations of a nation’s econ-
omy because of the church’s commitment to a wide-range of economic rights, its call for 
social justice is not an attempt to undermine the rightful autonomy of individuals to en-
gage in private economic initiative.  Therefore, I asked de Soto, “Do you believe the 
Catholic Church’s commitment to “social justice” has hindered or helped the advance-
ment of economic development in Latin and South America?”59  He responded, “No, I do 
not think it has hindered it at all.  I think that it is the right thing to do.  The only thing 
that has hindered it is that they also do not understand markets.”60  De Soto argued that 
throughout the 80’s and 90’s officials and those in leadership positions within the church 
tended to be against the “system,” which meant they remained skeptical of the benefits 
promised by those who wanted to introduce market reforms within Latin and South 
America.61  As his work shows, the expansion of property rights does not require the 
creation of wide-scale government programs to redistribute wealth through such things as 
tax programs.  Instead, his work shows that government must play an integral role in the 
promotion of this kind of right by eliminating the legal and political barriers that cur-
rently deny millions of people in the developing world from gaining access over their as-
sets.  In developing nations, only the state can command the attention and garner the 
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overwhelming political support required to wipe out the willful inertia of the status quo, 
since bureaucracies are initially inclined to resist even small changes.  Any decision as 
far-reaching as creating a legal property system, which will include and emancipate the 
poor, is essentially political and should be developed by creating partnerships between 
government officials, legal experts, and members of civil society.  If governments create 
the legal property tools that people in poverty require for their enterprises to prosper, they 
will become part of the legal expanded market.  As de Soto says, “If governments do not 
take them seriously as economic agents, if governments see them only as a nuisance or 
passive recipients of charity, the resentment among the poor against the status quo will 
only increase.”62  The failure of government to meet this challenge will lead to a contin-
ued disrespect for the rule of law.  It will also encourage the poor to focus on their exclu-
sion from society, which will spread in the form of civil violence, rather than on their as-
pirations for the future. 
Hernando de Soto’s comments illustrate that he is in agreement with Catholic so-
cial teaching about the need for government to participate in the proper legal functioning 
of the market to help individuals to meet their basic material needs.  The tradition’s 
commitment to the right to private property and encouragement of the principle of sub-
sidiarity provides the intellectual framework to think about the institutional role that gov-
ernment should play in the structuring and development of integrated property rights sys-
tems in LDCs.  Indeed, I think the principle of subsidiarity is particularly relevant to link-
ing de Soto’s work about property rights to Catholic social teaching and its commitment 
to a preferential option for the poor.  This principle states that, in order to protect basic 
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justice, government should undertake only those initiatives that exceed the capacities of 
individuals or private groups acting independently.  Government should not replace or 
destroy smaller communities and individual initiative.  Rather it should help them con-
tribute more effectively to social well-being and supplement their activity when the de-
mands of justice exceed their capacities.   
As mentioned earlier, this does not mean that the government that governs least 
governs best.  Rather it defines good government intervention as that which truly “helps” 
other social groups contribute to the common good by directing, urging, restraining, and 
regulating economic activity, as the occasion requires and necessity demands.  Therefore, 
I asked de Soto, “Do you think it (the principle of subsidiarity) has any benefit in rela-
tionship to your ideas about solidifying property rights among extralegals in LDCs?”63  
De Soto responded positively to this question.64  He said that the primary goal of the ILD 
is not to substitute what people in developing nations have already done as far as estab-
lishing property rights over assets.  As discussed in chapter 5, de Soto believes people 
throughout developing nations are already doing this kind of work.  He thinks what they 
are missing are standard terms.  When people in developing nations do not have standard 
terms or uniform titling systems, everybody starts in a different way, which makes the 
development of a capitalist system that benefits the majority of people difficult.  The In-
stitute for Liberty and Democracy, therefore, works with government officials and mem-
bers of civil society to standardize titles and registries of assets to integrate them into 
presently fragmented market economies.  The role of the state in this process is to be-
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come the primary social institution that prescribes the boundaries of property rights.  In-
deed, legislatures and legal institutions must work together with small home and business 
owners who operate in the extralegal sector to develop the technical and social infrastruc-
ture without which property rights are meaningless. 
The important role governments can play in the process to develop unified prop-
erty rights systems in LDCs will only be effective if they do not attempt to usurp the 
rightful autonomy of persons who work within civil society to meet their basic material 
needs.  De Soto’s research clearly shows that people who live and work in LDCs do not 
lack entrepreneurial skill or talent, nor do they lack a capacity to understand the benefits 
of a market-based system of political economy.  The growth of wide-scale extralegal 
markets that operate outside the prescribed boundaries of government law in these na-
tions testifies to the desire of these people to use their reason, ingenuity, and labor to 
meet their own material needs.  The attempt on the part of government to either stop this 
kind of activity or totally control it will continue to augment the growth of the extralegal 
sector.  Only by connecting the social contracts of those who work in the extralegal sector 
to established law will governments in LDCs provide the legal infrastructure to increase 
the level of participation of the poor in the economic development of these kinds of na-
tions.   
The integral role that government plays in this process is important.  Government, 
however, cannot accomplish this objective alone.  It requires that non-governmental or-
ganizations, such as the Catholic Church, work with organizations such as the ILD to 
help people in government to identify the extralegal social contracts that now regulate 
business operations in developing nations.  As previously mentioned, the Catholic 
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Church today remains a principal actor within civil society in a number of LDCs since it 
is the world’s largest NGO.  Many who live and worship in this community of faith seek 
opportunities to stand in solidarity with the poor.  Participants within the church want to 
do more than simply proclaim an option for the poor.  Members within the church want 
to stand in solidarity with the poor through participating in programs that partner with 
both government and civil authorities to help those in poverty to overcome a situation of 
economic oppression that continues to threaten their dignity as persons.  As mentioned 
earlier, much of the work the ILD currently performs relies on the cooperation of home 
and small business owners to identify their assets.  As de Soto says,  
In fact, in all of our titling programs, the majority of people that are on the ground 
actually helping put these things together are the original squatting chiefs and the 
heads of the communities.  We very much believe in that.  We build on them be-
cause they know their people best.  It is much easier to take them, to bureaucratize 
them, and to allow them to work with government officers because they know 
their people.65 
   
The ILD takes these extralegal property titles so that they can eventually integrate them 
into one system of unified property law.  One of the greatest challenges the ILD faces to 
achieve this objective is the difficult time its members have of connecting with these 
home and small business owners throughout these nations.  Government officials who 
cooperate with the ILD often face a situation of distrust from those who work and operate 
in the extralegal sector because they typically blame the government as the institution 
responsible for their situation.  Moreover, these people sometimes perceive agents who 
work for the ILD as a threat because they lack any direct connection to them.  Looking at 
this situation from the perspective of the poor who live and operate outside of established 
markets, it is not too difficult to understand their level of distrust of foreign workers, al-
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beit non-governmental ones.  Therefore, one way that the church’s leadership can use its 
connections among the poor is to lend support to the ILD’s program, which promotes 
strategies for economic growth by working toward the legal enfranchisement of people’s 
assets in developing nations.  As a result, the church, as a principal institutional actor 
within many of these nations, can use its connections with the poor to help members of 
the ILD to discover and document the assets of those now working in the extralegal sec-
tor.  Many within these nations already see the church as a firm advocate for the poor and 
marginalized.  The church can use its credibility among the poor to serve them by helping 
to build partnerships between members of the ILD and those working in extralegal mar-
kets.  This kind of partnership between the church and de Soto’s organization could allow 
ILD workers to collect and organize the social contracts of extralegals more readily since 
people most likely would be more willing to trust those they live and pray with than a 
foreign worker with whom they have no direct connection.      
As I have argued throughout this dissertation, I believe that the work of Hernando 
de Soto and his colleagues at the ILD share many of the same goals as proclaimed by 
Catholic social teaching.  Both share a commitment to property rights because the protec-
tion and promotion of these rights are essential for persons because they give them the 
capacity to use their assets to meet their own as well as their families basic material 
needs.  Both de Soto and members within the church also share a commitment to doing 
more than simply proclaiming a preferential option for the poor.  Both want to work with 
those in poverty to give them the necessary resources to allow these people to become 
active participants in the well ordering of society.  Those within the church, who want to 
make this option, should carefully consider adopting de Soto’s strategies for capital 
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growth to further this goal.  Indeed, I believe there is no major ideological obstacle for 
members within the church not to cooperate with the ILD to work toward the legal en-
franchisement of people’s assets in currently fragmented market systems.  The careful 
assessment of Catholic social teaching and de Soto’s research explicated within this dis-
sertation shows a need to develop avenues of cooperation between those who participate 
in the Catholic Church and those who work for the ILD.  A partnership of this kind is 
needed in order to address the problems of those now mired in poverty throughout LDCs 
around the world.  The church’s personalist communitarian anthropology, joined with de 
Soto’s insights to augment capital growth through protecting people’s property rights, can 
lead to a collaboration that will help to further the principal goals of Catholic social 
teaching, which are to affirm human dignity, defend human rights, and augment the 
common good by increasing the levels of economic participation of all people. 
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Appendix 
 
An Interview with Hernando de Soto (April 15, 2006) 
 
1. What evidence do you see provides the foundation for the right to private property 
as a natural right? 
 
Van der Waag: One of the things I’m interested in this dissertation is that in Catholic 
social teaching there has been a long legacy of seeing the right to private property as ei-
ther a secondary right, as part of human positive law, or as a natural right.  I am interested 
in your thoughts regarding the foundations to the right to private property.   
De Soto: Let me tell you how I am used to thinking about it.  I am not use to thinking 
about private property as a natural right.  I think about it as something that is simply in-
dispensable for economic cooperation to take place and for prosperity and capital to be 
created.   
Van der Waag: OK. 
De Soto: That does not mean that I do not recognize that it has a series of other values 
and that it can make for independence.  All sorts of those things.  I am in a very specific 
world, which is the one of developing and former Soviet nations.  We are about 5/6 of the 
world’s population.   
Van der Waag: Right. 
De Soto: Where that kind of reasoning has only led to 1 billion people having any respect 
for that kind of institution.  Therefore, I do not emphasize that because it does not travel 
well. 
De Soto:  Have you read The Mystery of Capital? 
Van der Waag: Yes, of course. 
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De Soto: I say that private property does concrete, very specific things.  For example, 
Prime Minster Meles Zenawi of Ethiopia called me in.   
Van der Waag: Interesting. 
De Soto: And he had asked to see me to set up a four-hour appointment.  I knew for a 
long time that the American government and the international community wanted to es-
tablish a system of property rights in Ethiopia.  They did not see any way out of Ethio-
pia’s famines without agricultural production taking place or any kind of economic de-
velopment without a property rights system.  Originally, he had rejected this.  When I sat 
down with him, I discussed with Prime Minister Meles Zenawi the intellectual depth of 
what it would take to create an integrated property rights system in Ethiopia.  Once it was 
finished, we agreed to do a project together. 
- Conversation interrupted -  
De Soto:  You are aware that what we do in developing countries is start up the political 
and legal basis for creating a property rights system.  Indeed, so I asked Meles Zenawi 
one question, “Why have you bought this now in Ethiopia?  Why haven’t you tried to es-
tablish this earlier for the reasons that our American and Western friends gave you?”  He 
said, “Because what you propose it is not theological.  In other words, you don’t ask me 
to believe in a right.”  In other words, Meles Zenawi, coming from a Marxist, macro 
background, what he meant is there are people who have faith in the system and see it as 
a way of affirming individuality.  I, on the contrary, being a Marxist, he didn’t say this, 
all right, but this is what I’m thinking he could say.  He could say, “I’m a Marxist, and I 
see that property is an argument for establishing individuality.”  I do not doubt that, but it 
is also an instrument for concentrating wealth.  Because those people who promote the 
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system also tend to be some of the biggest landowners in the world and they live in coun-
tries where they concentrate most of the land and most of the assets in their hands.  Take 
the case of the UK, where 6000 aristocratic families own most of the land, literally, most 
of it.  Or, in the case of Spain, where 0.2% of the population owns 70% of the place.  I 
mean, that also gives cause for civil wars and is the basis of injustice.  Therefore, if you 
go to it that way, you can talk about both sides of it. 
Van der Waag: Sure.   
De Soto: Well, if you catch it from the point of view of the affects, and the concrete af-
fects it produces, and to this end, immediately get into the issues of distribution of wealth, 
while you are at it, then, at that moment, the argument is more solid.  So, I’m not used to 
looking at it as a natural right.  I am used to looking at it as something that actually func-
tions.  I have not thought very much about the natural right and I have never actually 
been too convinced about it.    
Van der Waag: OK.  That is interesting.  It is really like a practical insight.  This is how 
it (private property) functions in society and these are the benefits.  Whether or not it is a 
natural right, per se, is not the issue. 
De Soto: No.  I see no reason.  Re-reading Locke, and re-reading Jeremy Bentham, and 
all those people, I can understand that the incentives there, you know, the world works a 
lot better for it.  However, then, use those arguments.  I go about it that way because it 
produces all sorts of results.  It cannot just be the natural right for property.  It has to be 
the natural right for everybody to have property for the whole system to work.  That is 
much stronger. 
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Van der Waag: That is an interesting framework to think about it.  I know for myself, 
and this is an aside, I recently returned from a trip to Guatemala.  I was in a small town 
called Sayaxche, and I was working with my wife delivering eye-care.  You see how 
people in Sayaxche really do have assets.  They have many things to work with, but you 
can definitely tell that they are disenfranchised from those assets in a way that denies 
them the possibility for capital development.  When you see it in action, especially for 
someone who has lived in the United States his whole life, you really do see the differ-
ences about what it means to have that enfranchisement in a system that facilitates prop-
erty ownership versus one that does not facilitate ownership.  Indeed, that is an interest-
ing point. 
De Soto:  I would add a second reflection based on what you just said.  I remember 
sometime ago talking with Milton Friedman when he came to visit us in Peru.  He said, 
“Look, what you have demonstrated is that these people actually own their assets, but 
what you have demonstrated is that they do so outside of the law.” 
Van der Waag: Right.  
De Soto:  They can enforce their possession probably even more efficiently outside of the 
law than inside of it simply through the massive presence of their popular organizations.  
Now why bring in the state with all its crumby property systems?  Let us just let them 
have it that way.   
Van der Waag: Right.  
De Soto: That is when I started thinking about…  Wait a second now.  What is the differ-
ence if it is legal or it is not legal?  Therefore, I started calling property right, the fact that 
it works within a system, which is why I started saying it has to have at least six things 
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working for it, and law can only do these things.  So, the reply to it is, is a property rights 
system natural?  No, it is a very artificial human creation.  It is natural for people to pos-
sess things.  Then, probably they have been fighting about their possessions, you know, 
our ancestors, and us for a few million years so far.  Therefore, I do not see the natural 
thing.  What I see is that through law you can create a system whereby all of this is tre-
mendously more productive and leveraged than the other way around.  And you can ar-
gue it reasonably, in such a way, that it seeps through ideological cracks.  And it just gets 
to a point that everybody gets to a positive position to comply with both the desires of 
those who believe it is a natural right and all of us who really don’t care as long as it gets 
put into place.   
Van der Waag: OK (Laughter).  It’s interesting because the roots of your argument have 
a basis in the work of St. Thomas Aquinas, and his work on property, which dates all the 
way back to the Medieval period.  Aquinas saw it (private property) primarily as a secon-
dary right in the way it facilitates things in a very positive way, and that is really the 
benefit, and that is what the good of it is.  And that’s really interesting. 
2. How do you respond to critics, such as Jeffrey Sachs in The End of Poverty, who 
see your ideas on economic development as a kind of ‘magic bullet’ theory? 
 
De Soto:  I do not think that Jeffrey Sachs has read The Mystery of Capital.  I have had 
the opportunity to debate him at the United Nations when we were the only two invited 
guests of Kofi Annan and his management committee.  He has not read it and he has not 
understood it.  I think he has had an American liberal knee-jerk reaction to my work be-
cause that is the side he has decided to group his proposals around.  Therefore, he actu-
ally believes the natural right sort of stuff.  During that debate, for example, he said, 
“Here is what the world is actually composed of.  You need agricultural development, 
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you need infrastructure, you need medical care, and you need education.”  He went down 
a whole list like if it was a dictionary.  Then he said, “Property rights are a part of it, 
which is fine, but it is no magic bullet.”  I said, “That isn’t the issue.  The issue is that 
you’ve been doing all the other things in the Untied Nations, and the only one thing you 
haven’t done is Article 17 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which is to cre-
ate a property rights system.”  Therefore, my emphasis is not that it is a magic bullet; you 
need all the other things.  It’s just the only piece that’s missing that will make all the 
other one’s work.   
Van der Waag: OK. 
De Soto:  When I came across that argument, I understood that he had not understood.  
He even talked at length about the fight against malaria.  And I pointed out that… 
Van der Waag: Yes, he makes such a big point of getting malaria nets to all these peo-
ple. 
De Soto:  I said it is absolutely right to do that.  His whole point was all very interesting.  
At the time of the conference, I said this is all very interesting, but you know, just less 
than 130 years ago in Washington, DC, Congressman would leave just before the start of 
summer because of the malaria.  When you set up a system of property rights, all of sud-
den it became interesting to drain the land, and there is no malaria there anymore.  So, 
I’m not saying that property rights are the key to everything.  I am saying that of all the 
reforms that you have put on the board which are part of the UN agenda, the World Bank 
agenda, or the development strategy of any other country, the only thing that has not been 
given importance is that one.  Moreover, I am saying, is that if you do not get that one 
into place, all the other one’s will either won’t work, or they’ll work very, very, badly.  
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The reply to his “magic bullet” is that he just has not read it.  He just has not read it.  Be-
cause the nature of the debates…  His replies, and everything, indicate that he is into 
something else.  And that he does not have time to read other people’s books.  Like, 
probably, I do not even have time to read his stuff.  Therefore, that is where we are. 
Van der Waag: That is interesting.  When I read The End of Poverty and some of his 
other comments about your work, I did find that it was short-shrift.  Obviously, his use of 
the term “magic bullet” implies something condescending.  I was interested in what you 
had to say about it since Professor Sachs has made quite a stir here in the United States 
since he gets into many of these economic development questions.   
De Soto:  It is also probably part of a political strategy, which consists in you trying to 
pick a fight.  You try to establish yourself.  You know, there are probably not very many 
of us who have actually not only brought thinking to the development table, but pro-
grams.  We (ILD) are now moving into 33 different countries.  We have a high-level 
commission at the United Nations, which I co-chair with Madeline Albright.  The World 
Bank has taken up our policies through and through.  So has the Inter-development Bank.  
So, there are probably only two economists who have gotten their ideas moving along.  
And probably at that time he thought it was a good idea to polarize.  By the way, I agree 
with him.  I mean, it is obvious that one day we will find the moment to thrash it out.  
Therefore, it makes a lot of sense.  Because that is the way the world moves.  Wherever 
you go, the vote ends up always 52/48.  The important thing is to end up on the right side 
of that fraction.   
Van der Waag: (Laughter) 
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De Soto: He is like many other economists, who are good friends of mine, who have got 
ideas, and who advice, and give their opinion, but do not actually move programs.   
Van der Waag: The institutional structures that actually do something about it. 
De Soto: That is right.  What we have similar, Sachs and ourselves, though we work from 
the Third World, and we’ll probably get more time to be seen, I have absolutely no doubt 
that the relative importance about what we’re saying, in every sense of the word, will 
simply overwhelm whatever Sachs is talking about because there is not much substance 
to what he is saying.  It is still some of the traditional do-good stuff, which I repeat, it is 
hard to attack progress, because who can be against good charity.  If you can save a life, 
for God’s sake, do it.  If there are people willing to contribute, I think it is fantastic.  
However, in terms of the emphasis that this should be given, since we have both managed 
to put the projects we have, we have caught the attention of governments.  OK.  We both 
are talking to dozens of heads of state.  We are probably the only people doing so, in 
terms of getting concrete projects off the ground.  It probably makes a lot of sense that we 
fight it out.  That is simply the way the democratic and free world lives.  So, probably, 
when it comes to the “magic bullet,” it’s the kind of thing, even if he hasn’t read it, or 
even hasn’t thought it out, it doesn’t really matter.  Because, what it will permit him to 
do, eventually, like it will permit me, is to make our ideas clearer in the context of a con-
trast.  And you can’t contrast unless you are fighting someone.   
Van der Waag:  That’s true.  Interesting.   
De Soto:  I read Jeff that way.  From an intellectual point of view, I really think his con-
tribution is zilch.  I mean it is not interesting to say that we have to do all these things.  I 
mean, you go to any country, and they are fighting malaria, and they are just not doing it 
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that well.  He says toss more aid at it.  I really do not think that is intellectually interest-
ing.  However, aside from that, I do not think that much of his accusation is anything than 
creating a position for a future battle, which is fine with me.   
Van der Waag: What support do you think foreign aid will actually get? 
De Soto:  It will not fly.  It will not fly.  However, the other institutional thing will.  To-
day, the budgets for property rights in the World Bank, in the Inter-American Develop-
ment Fund, in the funding agencies, are all increasing.  Moreover, our projects are a sub-
ject of heated debate on the ground wherever we go.  Therefore, we will just keep on fol-
lowing up and it makes a lot of sense for both of us to fight really. 
3. How does acquiring title to land in a region such as Sub-Saharan Africa, for ex-
ample, benefit someone in dire poverty who might be malnourished, lacks health-
care, or other basic goods? 
 
De Soto:  Well, in many ways.  First, the moment you have established the recognition of 
everybody that whatever they have, and they always have something, is actually pro-
tected by law, and is recognized by everybody else, the value of that, to start off with 
starts rising.  For example, “Where are you sitting now?” 
Van der Waag:  In an office building here at Duquesne University. 
De Soto: In an office building? 
Van der Waag: Yes. 
De Soto: How much do you think that building is worth? 
Van der Waag: I do not know, about 5 million dollars. 
De Soto:  All right, five million dollars.  Imagine that I went over there and said, “I really 
like this building.  I would like to buy it.”  Then we agree on the five million dollars.  
And just as we were signing, I said, “By the way Robert, before I do sign, where is your 
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title to this building?”  Then you say, “I don’t have it.  But all my neighbors know its 
mine.”  How much is that building going to be worth now?  It will be worth a lot less 
than it was before.   
Van der Waag: (Laughter) 
De Soto: Value is in perception.1  That the perception is that there is a right to it that is 
recognized by everybody, which will start something off.  And, that will immediately 
start all of the other affects that I have talked about.  I never said it was short term.  I just 
do not see what other resources there are.  You can get Jeffrey Sachs to pump some 
money out of the UN, and that is fine, but most of these countries do not have these re-
sources because they are indebted.  The important thing is that you are endowing that 
person with a right and with everything else that goes along with that right.  The possibil-
ity, among other things, is if he cannot even do anything with that land, which is very 
possible; there might be one of his ten neighbors that can.  Wherever we have gone 
(ILD), for example, and titled in the countries that we have worked, the first thing that 
happens is when you go to what was before a supposedly communal or collective admini-
stration of land and assets, and you tell them, well, you know, we are going to give it to 
you legally, in whatever form you decide.  And they meet.  And usually they parcel it out.  
In other words, they take their, whatever it is, their 2000 acres or 10,000 acres, they par-
cel it out among themselves this way.  They come back and say, “OK.  We’ve decided to 
divvy it up this way.”  And once you got that in the social contract you sign it up and you 
give away the individual titles.  What happens after a while is that about 2/3 of them 
starts moving out.  2/3 start moving out because only 1/3 has the green thumb.   
                                                 
1 Emphasis mine. 
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Van der Waag:  Yes.  OK. 
De Soto: And, one of the people, the other 2/3 will, who he was reeling in, was how to 
make liquor out of the oranges.  The other one was on how to repair tractors.  The other 
one was caring for the animals that pulled the plow.  The division of labor starts to take 
place.  The moment you got your property rights systems over land and over enterprises, 
the division of labor works, and assets start to be transferred to their highest valued use.  
And, so, what will happen to that farmer who is malnourished and lacks health care, and 
other basic goods, is that he may not hold onto land that he can’t do anything with, but 
somebody else will.  Or, he will see at the end, that he can transfer it.  Or, he can go and 
do something about another piece of land elsewhere.  Nevertheless, he can start moving.  
You cannot do that until you have tradable property rights.  
Van der Waag: That is a very interesting idea.  Once you get the division of labor that 
person who once was a farmer, can now move into something else, and become a special-
ized worker in health care, for example. 
De Soto: That’s exactly it.  When you go back to Adam Smith and Karl Marx, they both 
agreed on the division of labor.  Even though they lived 70 years apart, they agreed upon 
the division of labor.  They said, “Something is happening in our time.  What accounts 
for it?”  Their reply was the division of labor.  The specialization of the “pin factory” 
kind of argument.  The first thing that obviously underlies the pin factory is that you ac-
tually need fungible property rights.  Nobody is talking about giving things to people that 
will not be ‘fungible,’ that cannot be moved.  Some people will use it directly, the 1/3 
that have, for example, in Peru, and 2/3 will move along.  Nevertheless, they will have 
something of value that they can pass to somebody else, eventually.  And if they don’t, 
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and if they don’t fall into any categories, somewhere, somehow, someone will be on the 
right piece of land, and with the right quantity of property, as to be able to divide labor, 
and they will end up employing those people.  Nobody says that that piece of land gives 
everybody specifically a possession of something that will automatically start to grow.  It 
says that society, in general, will benefit.  Indeed, some of them will create the jobs for 
other people. 
Van der Waag: OK, it is not something that is possible to guarantee in an absolute way.  
De Soto: No, I cannot go in advance saying, “I know who can use the assets.”  Therefore, 
you have to go out and give everyone the chance, and then the system will eventually 
work.   
Van der Waag: That is an interesting argument.  When I thought about that question, I 
thought about the person at the point of fact, meaning, if you have a person who lacks 
assets.  However, if you are thinking about the long-term institutional development about 
what needs to go on, that is obviously a valid response to it. 
De Soto: Yes, the question is, ‘Will it help most people?’  Yes, it will help most people.  
It will help most of them a lot.  But, when it does and gets the system working, there is no 
short-term answer for most people.  Aid just does not do it.  It just does not cover it.  It is 
a very small fragment of the resources that are necessary for real development. 
Van der Waag: No, it’s (foreign aid) like putting a band-aid on a dam. 
De Soto: That’s right.  This is a little bit more than that.  And it starts working.  I have 
never said it is a “magic bullet” in the sense that it immediately produces “this.”  What 
we have seen where we have titled, is overall, in the case of Peru and El Salvador, for 
example, all these people are much better off than those who were not titled before.  28% 
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more of their children go to school because now there are two more salaries per plot of 
land than there was before simply because they can now stay there and they know that 
their land cannot be taken away from them.  Therefore, an elder brother or wife goes out 
to get another job.  Because they do that, they can afford education.  We also know now 
that they absorb the majority of Peru’s mortgages.  That the values of their homes, on av-
erage, have increased 40% more than those that have not been titled.  Therefore, overall, 
things go better.  However, that does not mean that it is going to happen on that land, in 
that specific place, at the time.  The process of the division of labor will go, some will 
become entrepreneurs, some will get richer than others will, and then you have to put all 
those other things that make for equitable growth and that make for credit.  It cannot take 
off without that first step, without that cornerstone being put into place. 
4. What are the anthropological underpinnings of your understanding of economic 
development and commitment to property rights?  In other words, what view of 
the person are you employing in your view of economic justice. 
 
Van der Waag: What I am asking is, “What is your view of the person that you are em-
ploying?”  In Catholic social teaching, in particular, there has been an emphasis on the 
dignity of the human person, which frames the tradition’s understanding of economic jus-
tice and establishing rights and duties.  Therefore, I was interested in your anthropology.  
De Soto: Let me go back to Meles Zenawi.  I sent my people into Ethiopia for 12 days 
before my meeting with the Prime Minister.  So when I went to talk with him, I brought 
to him property titles that were being handed out by Ethiopians themselves outside of 
government spheres.  I have not come across, whether it has been Mexico, the Philip-
pines, Tanzania, a parcel of land, in the extralegal sector, where there is no title, albeit a 
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title that is issued by informal authorities outside of the law by thugs, or mullahs, or 
whomever.   
Van der Waag: OK.   
De Soto: In other words, what I have seen, wherever I have gone, is that people are estab-
lishing papered rights to things.  So, what I do, is that I actually bring these documents 
together.  And it is based on these documents, and the forms, and the contents that they 
have, that I begin to design standard forms that people understand.   
Van der Waag: OK. 
De Soto: Therefore, my anthropology goes in this sense.  I go, and I tell them, I have 
walked this communal land that you have talked about, and you may remember in one of 
my books I said every time that I advance 100 meters there is a different dog barking.   
Van der Waag: The barking dogs, scenario. 
De Soto: Correct.  I have found, and I point this out in the book, not one place where a 
dog barks that actually does not have a piece of paper.  Therefore, what my anthropology 
has brought out, if you want to, is that people are creating systems of documented prop-
erty rights everywhere.  I have not found a place where that is not established.   
De Soto:  Now, here would be the interesting question.  When people like Karl Polanyi 
started attacking capitalism, head on, about 70 years ago, where he was saying that mar-
kets do not work, and all that, were these things going on there, I have no idea.  I have no 
idea when these things started.  I am not too sure that people can actually say when….   
- conversation interrupted -  
De Soto:  I do not know that anybody has because most anthropologists are not actually 
very interested in these kinds of institutions.   
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Van der Waag: Sure. 
De Soto:  Or, they are actually very much against them for ideological reasons.  All I do 
is study the present.  I have not found from Ethiopia, to Tanzania, to the Philippines, one 
place where people do not document their property rights.  Therefore, my anthropology 
attempts to find out how people interact.  And I go to people in villages and towns 
throughout the developing world, and I say all right, here is what people with market 
economic systems do, they have property rights that are fungible, they have property 
rights that can be mortgaged, they have property rights that can be divided up, they have 
property rights that are inscribed in some primitive form of ledger, but that are brought 
together in some kind of order or standard.  Does this occur here?  And that is what I do, 
and then I go to them, and say, now, when people got organized in this country, when 
they organized their enterprises, did they have limited liability, did they institute the right 
to perpetual succession?  Did they have means of taking hierarchical decisions?  Do you?  
And I find that they do in very primitive ways that are not organized according to written 
systems or adding professionals and widespread law.  They do it in unsystematic, unpro-
fessional, and fragmented systems.  Therefore, what I try to do is find any of the symp-
toms of a modern institutional system that are present and I have found the roots every-
where I have gone.  That is what my anthropology is dedicated to. 
Van der Waag: Right. 
De Soto:  Do they have forms of taking hierarchical decisions?  Do you?  And I find that 
they do in very primitive ways that are not organized according to written systems or 
adding professionals and widespread law.  They do it in unsystematic, unprofessional, 
and fragmented systems.  Therefore, what I try to do is find any of the symptoms of a 
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modern institutional system that are present and I have found the roots everywhere I have 
gone.  That is what my anthropology is dedicated to.  Now, the difference of course, 
probably with people who are more academic than I am is that I am the only one in my 
organization who once in awhile writes a book and then documents it. 
Van der Waag: (Laughter) 
De Soto: But, at the same time, when I have thought of our mission, we (ILD) are not so 
much a “think” tank, than a “do” tank. 
Van der Waag: Yes, just thinking about that point, it is very true.  One of the things that 
attracted me to your work was its practically.   
De Soto: Right. 
Van der Waag: I believe that many academics that get into economic development is-
sues never have walked the same streets that you have walked and been with the people 
with whom you work.  And, you know, when you get a bunch of academics in a room, 
they’ll fight tooth and nail, about this point versus that point, but actually doing some-
thing is a different story. 
De Soto: Right.  In our recent Executive Summary of our Tanzania Study, which we fin-
ished about 4 months ago, it shows in the last pages is that my team for Tanzania to pick 
up all the documented evidence that you will see there, or that is summarized there, was 
about 970 people.  What I have found is the following thing.  Every time I decide to lead 
a life of reflection and seclusion in some beautiful American campus is that anthropolo-
gists are people who are dedicated to this kind of thing cannot mobilize the resources that 
I can when I get a government contract.  When I get a government contract, I get millions 
of dollars to carry it out.  It is non-profit, of course.  But, I still get millions of dollars and 
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I can put together huge teams.  Therefore, I put together questionnaires and polling, and 
we are very good at doing that.  Moreover, we go out there and we get all that evidence, 
which I could not do if I did it in the solitude, plus two or three good assistants that you 
would get in academia.  Therefore, like everything, there are two sides of this coin.  And 
the part that falls short is that if I only had more time to write, I would be writing all the 
time, I could get more of this out.  On the other hand, what I am able to do is get an awful 
lot of evidence.   
Van der Waag: Yeah, the hard, concrete, data bears the results. 
De Soto:  That is right.  That is the kind of anthropological underpinnings.  It is really a 
question of systems and of volume.   
Van der Waag: Interesting. 
5. You reject the idea that “culture matters” when discussing the problem of eco-
nomic development.  However, do not some cultural orientations aid economic 
development more than others?  If not, why? 
 
De Soto: Yes.  Absolutely.  My argument is not against “culture.”  Let me put it this way.  
When I wrote The Other Path, I noted that much of Peru once was described as unem-
ployed proletariat, victims of dependency, and bad capitalism.  And I indicated that, “No, 
it is a society that has an enormous amount of energy and entrepreneurial spirit.”  Why, 
simply, didn’t everybody just sort of read that and then do it in their country.  Some peo-
ple did.  Nevertheless, essentially the reason why I have to go country by country is that I 
have to adapt it culturally.  I have to put it in the context of the words and the meanings 
that they have.  There was once when I was talking to President Fox, when I talked to 
him, I said to him, “What happens if you just say look what we found in Peru and Mexico 
can’t be that different.”  He said have you ever seen a political argument work that way.  
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He said, “Hey guys, we found out that in Russia everyone likes Goat Cheese, we should 
like Goat Cheese as well.”  He said, “No, you’ve got to Mexicanize it.”  So, it’s not that I 
don’t recognize that culture exists.  Moreover, in every country, the first two years when 
we put these huge teams into place, and what they do is, is adapt things from what we 
already know to the existing culture.  What I am saying when I say, “culture,” that I do 
not agree with, is those people who say that there are some cultures that are “fit” for eco-
nomic development with market economies and those that are not.  I just simply have 
never found one that is not.  That is where my argument about culture comes into play.  
Of course there are differences between cultures.  That is why I like traveling to different 
places to look at different cultures.  One of the strengths that I think we also have at the 
ILD is that we can talk in different terms.  I mean The Mystery of Capital is an effort to 
talk in Western terms.  The argument it makes is very different when you have to sell the 
argument locally.  You have to talk in completely different terms.  Of course, culture 
matters, but culture does not determine that you cannot have a modern capitalist system.  
In the same way you would have to say, you know, that Muslims do not like automobiles, 
they do not like penicillin….  
Van der Waag: Oh sure, that has been an argument that has gone on against poor people 
for sometime.   
De Soto:  I do not believe that any culture gets in the way of progress.  For example, one 
of the first places I started getting my funding in the United States, when I had to give a 
speech at the State Department, and the question was, it was during Reagan’s time, and I 
had to give a speech, and the question to them was, “The private sector, development, 
and the poor: Have you been talking to the right people?”  That was the question.  The 
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question was all those guys that Huntington says, you know, who don’t look like you, 
that are not your culture, those guys who don’t speak English, the guys who got few 
teeth, even though some of them might be gold, etc.  And do everything backwards, but 
are entrepreneurs.  They are really much closer to you than some of the elites that you 
actually support every time you invade another country.   
Van der Waag: (Laughter) 
De Soto: But it means…  Culture, you have to understand culture.  You probably have to 
understand that it was wrong to bet on Iraqi elites.  You should have found a way of bet-
ting directly with the poor people to do the kinds of things you did in Japan, which was 
rapidly give them property rights.  And those were the people that had not traveled, who 
did not understand you.  Automatically, Huntington would have said, “Boy, they lack the 
Anglo-Saxon attitude and the work ethic….”  But they are the one’s closer to you.  So 
culture, of course, does matter.  What I am saying, and it varies in a variety of ways, is 
that culture is not an argument for saying that the system does not work.  In other words, 
culture is not a wall that cannot be crossed.  It is a tunnel that twists and turns and you 
have to learn how to connect one end to the other.    
Van der Waag: OK, that’s what I assumed you would say.  It is an argument that traces 
its roots back to Weber.  For example, you look at Ireland today, and it is one of the most 
prosperous nations in all of Europe. 
De Soto:  That’s right, somebody found the connection.  You know, somebody found it 
in Japan, and they are still just as different from their American counterparts as they were 
before.   
6. A major emphasis in modern Catholic social teaching is the idea of the preferen-
tial option for the poor, which challenges followers to create conditions for mar-
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ginalized voices to be heard, to defend the defenseless, and to assess lifestyles, 
policies, and social institutions in terms of their impact on the poor.  The option 
for the poor does not mean pitting one group against another, but rather, it calls us 
to strengthen the whole community by assisting those who are most vulnerable.  
In light of this teaching, how can your views on solidifying property rights among 
the poor relate to the Catholic Church’s commitment to a preferential option for 
the poor?   
 
De Soto: There is no problem about a preferential option for the poor.  I think I have al-
ways had a preferential option for the poor because these are the people I am targeting.  
Remember, I told you about when George Schultz invited me to talk in front of the Secre-
tary’s open forum in Reagan’s time, it was about, you know, you have been talking to the 
wrong people, your real constituents are the Boston Tea Party, are the more bourgeois 
plus poor people of our continents.  So, I do target that class.  In addition, I do believe in 
classes.  Classes are a useful way to label certain segments of society.  I think Marx had 
this over libertarians.  He knew the importance of pinpointing.  He knew the importance 
of tailoring arguments to specific groups and their objective and subjective economic 
conditions.  Therefore, I am all for that.  
Van der Waag: Interesting. 
De Soto: Moreover, I am a disciple of Gustavo Guitiérrez.  He was my professor.  You 
know, liberation theology.   
Van der Waag: Oh sure.  That was going to be my next question.   
De Soto: Now, in that sense, I have always subscribed to that.  The only part, which I 
have told this to Gustavo, who is a friend of mine, was in his book (A Theology of Libera-
tion) he refers to Marxism.  The only part I do not like about that is that he does not refer 
to the other side.  Both Marxism and libertarianism both have things to offer.  But, if you 
look only in terms of one, of course, you are excluding the other.  And, of course, I can 
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understand why he did that because in Latin America the kind of people that would come 
up with a Von Hayek argument or a Milton Friedman argument are really people who use 
the arguments of libertarians to further their own private interests.  In the same way that 
left wing dictators use Marxism to justify their dictatorships.   
Van der Waag: Sure. 
De Soto: So, I have absolutely no problem about a preferential option for the poor.  It is 
not only the human thing to do.  It is not only the decent thing to do, it just aspires to all 
the better sides in me.  It is the only practical thing to do because without a majority con-
stituency on the side of development, even for the most cynical reasons that you can think 
of, it is going to collapse.   
Van der Waag: Oh, sure.  As far as violence, revolution, and all the instability, it creates.   
De Soto: The idea of the dual economy was something, that when I was a younger per-
son, people believed was just going to continue forever and ever, and also on the basis of 
cultural analysis, you know, most of the Indians in the hinterland doing there old primi-
tive things, and the modern people, like in China today, on the coast being up-to-date, 
and in the twenty-first century, was practical only inasmuch as the other 80% didn’t 
really know what the other 20% were doing.  But, now they do.  Communications have 
changed.  There are roads and there are newspapers.  More than 90% of this country 
(Peru) read, and those that do not read watch television, and those that do not have a rich 
uncle in the United States or in Lima, they are not taking it anymore.  Even for the most 
cynical reasons it is not going to last.  Apart from that, the option for the poor is some-
thing that I always had very much in mind.  I started as being a Socialist.  Therefore, that 
is where my preferences were.  I did not see how you could look at yourself in the morn-
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ing if you did not do something for the rest.  Therefore, I absolutely go with that.  The 
only thing I resist, but I would think that Gustavo would never rewrite that Marxism 
piece the way he did before, is the idea that the Left was the only one who presented the 
option.  Now I can understand that.      
Van der Waag: Well, that’s why I really asked the question because one of the reasons 
why I got into your work that way was because of the fact that, looking at market based 
reforms for understanding the preferential option for the poor as a platform, was what 
really interested me in your work because liberation theology had gone in a leftist frame-
work to do it in, and when you look at the actual results, it doesn’t really help the people 
it is intended to help.  That is why I got interested in your work because primarily you 
were working with the poor, but providing an alternative strategy to help them.  
De Soto: Let me tell you what the advantage that Gustavo and my other friends have on 
the Left.  Most of my friends in Peru are on the Left.  And the reason for that is that we 
are concerned with the same things.  The problem with everybody who actually believes 
in the more liberal options, or more libertarian options, in the European sense of the 
word, are people who are, in the best of cases, fascinated with the sophistication of a 
market system, and a capitalist system, but who really don’t give a “hoot” about the poor.  
And the problem with those who really do give a “hoot” about the poor is that they really 
do not understand the market system.   
Van der Waag: (Laughter) 
De Soto: Or, worse, they do not want to understand markets because the people who ad-
vocate markets are those that have used that for their single benefit and have not cared 
that the market system has not carried to the rest of the country.  So, it’s really a Third 
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World dilemma that, in terms of those that are honest and truthful, that are on the Right, 
and who have understood that markets are best, they just don’t care about getting them to 
the poor and they do believe that “culture matters.”  On the other side of that coin are 
those who do care about the poor, but do not care about markets.  Therefore, I can under-
stand why one would tend to sympathize with the Marxists because they care about the 
poor.  I come from a class of people, I mean, my family has no fortune, I have not inher-
ited a cent.   
Van der Waag: OK 
De Soto: Everything I did I did by myself.  I belong to that stock of “Whitish” people 
with whom I find absolutely no identification and no values to share.  They just happen to 
be my cousins, they were the kids I was presented to when I was a child, and, therefore, 
my tendency is with the Left side.  Again, I have problems with the Left side because 
they do not agree with my reasoning.  Therefore, I can also understand that one of the 
reasons that anybody, who would tend to be with the Left, when they had an option for 
the poor, is because these are your natural neighbors, they are the only people who really 
care.  So, it’s a problem of company.  Yes, it is a matter of keeping the right company. 
Van der Waag: This is an aside question, but do you get upset when people try to “posi-
tion” you? 
De Soto:  Yes.  Yes.  It is very upsetting.  Sometimes, if I think about it, well before an 
unlucky moment, I am able to say why that is not important and it does not look like I’m 
ducking the shot.  I do say it all the time, you know, that it is very difficult to position me.  
As you know, today some of our biggest supporters are President Clinton and Madeline 
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Albright.  They were not before.  And that has gotten some of my conservative friends 
frustrated.   
Van der Waag:  Well, it is interesting that you mention former president Clinton because 
that is how I actually first learned about your work.  I’m a graduate of Georgetown Uni-
versity.  He was giving an alumni interview to President DeGioa (President of George-
town University) at Gaston Hall in 2003.  When the conversation turned to the issue of 
economic development, President Clinton immediately brought up your name and your 
work sounded interesting.   
De Soto: President Clinton is a great friend and promoter.  We have become good 
friends.  However, what happens then, is….  The traditional people who really supported 
us were the Republicans or the Conservatives.  The reason that happened is President 
Reagan mentioned the work of the ILD at his first appearance at a General Assembly 
meeting, at a time when the Untied States was being very aggressive with the United Na-
tions.  The American delegate said something like, “I wish you would all get on a steam-
boat and I’ll get on a New York warf and wave to you as you disappear into the sunset.”  
It was this aggressive attitude between the U.S. and the U.N. 
Van der Waag: (Laughter) 
De Soto: And then all of sudden Reagan goes to the UN and says, “I have a Third World 
hero.”  His statements immediately put us in the black books of every Social Democrat in 
the world and every Socialist.  That is where we have been, just painted on the Right, un-
til President Clinton came along and saw through it.  Now, we are somewhere in the mid-
dle, which is where we should really be.  What we really do believe in, however, is we do 
believe that there is no such thing like the market economy system.  We do believe that 
  262
there is no way that you can accumulate the strength to change things unless you have 
capital.  We also agree that it is a very difficult journey between a market economy and 
monopolies and excessive things.  You have to do what the West has done, which is to 
steer a course between both things.  The problem in Latin America is that it is very hard 
to do that because the only people who really care about the poor are the people on the 
Left side.  After a while, you believe, somehow or other, that solving the problem of pov-
erty is tied to the Leftist ideology.  It is not.  It is not.  It is unfortunate.  It is a tragedy.  It 
is a drama.   
7. Do you believe the Catholic Church’s commitment to “social justice” has hin-
dered or helped the advancement of economic development in Latin and South 
America? 
 
De Soto:  No, I do not think it has hindered it at all.  I think that it is the right thing to do.  
The only thing that has hindered it is that they also do not understand markets.   
Van der Waag: OK 
De Soto: And, are generally, in Latin America, I do not know how they are in other 
places, but in Latin America, they tend to be very “anti-system.”  They do not like it, they 
do not believe in it.  That is what has actually hindered, not much, a little bit, because 
when we had to do the reforms during the 1990’s, which have really improved Latin 
America, whether socially we have been able to keep up, you know, Latin Americans 
have been able to keep pace with the velocity of changes that are required.  Nevertheless, 
we have had in Peru since 1993 economic growth of about 5% or 6 % a year after not 
having grown in the 70’s and 80’s.  Thus, things are much better than they were before. 
Van der Waag: Are you surprised by the recent elections in nations throughout Latin and 
South America and what is going on? 
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De Soto: No, not at all.  No, as matter of fact, if you look at the last chapter in The Mys-
tery of Capital, it has a subchapter called, “The Ghost of Marx.”  In it, I say they are go-
ing to come back because we are not doing economic reforms fast enough.  So, you 
know, I’m saying that’s going to happen.  But, remember, I just say, if we don’t get there 
fast enough, if you don’t give them two tools that are required, I mean, if you look at the 
Washington Consensus, the Washington Consensus is the way it was summed up by a 
man named John Williamson.   
Van der Waag: Sure.  Yes. 
De Soto: He says there are ten points.  For example, fiscal stability, open trade, etc.  His 
last two points, nine and ten, are enterprise and property rights.  What I am saying is that 
everybody agreed that you should do those things but that nobody did anything about 
them.  What I am also saying, if you do not get those two things, the rest are not going to 
work.  The trickle-down is not fast enough.  In other words, people on the Right are those 
who have Right-type arguments and they have had their heyday for the past twelve to fif-
teen years.     
Van der Waag:  Now the shift is coming because the trickle has not happened fast 
enough. 
De Soto: This is the way it has always been for the last one-hundred fifty years.  There is 
nothing new.  The thing is that the Left can become more Marxist.  They can become 
more pro-American, there is Arab-nationalism, and there is Al-Qaeda, so it takes differ-
ent forms, but Peru has always sorted between the both.  There is no reason why, in fact, 
that when the Left comes in that they cannot pick up the market type argument and do it 
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right.  Just like, probably, Clinton is closer to a market economy than Bush is in terms of 
real action taken.   
De Soto: So as far as I am concerned, I am not at all surprised.  In fact, I think that if Fu-
jimori had not planned sloppily and gotten caught in Chile.  You know that he is arrested 
right now. 
Van der Waag: Yes, I know. 
De Soto: If he had not done that, he would be running way ahead of everyone else.  He 
probably would have won the first round.  What he would have done is that he would 
have captured the same amount of people, much more, twice the amount of people that 
Hamala has, and he would have said, “You have been excluded.  You have been dis-
carded.  You have not been paid attention to.  I’m going to pay attention to you.”  He 
would have come in with a right wing message and picked them us just as quickly.    
Van der Waag: Interesting. 
De Soto: The reason that Ollanta Humala, Evo Morales, and Hugo Chavez have picked 
them up has very little to do with their Leftist stance.2  It has to do, rather, with their anti-
elite stance.  In other words, they said, there are only a few people who have done it, and 
we are going to correct it.  That’s what has polarized it.  It is not the fact that they were 
Leftists.  I do not think people even think in those terms.  I don’t really.  
Van der Waag:  I don’t think most people are ideologues that way at all.  They see what 
their actual situation is and say, “Who is actually speaking to me about it.”   
De Soto: Who is speaking to me about it?  You just said it.  That is it exactly.  Who is 
speaking to me about it in a way that I understand.  Therefore, somebody comes across, 
                                                 
2 Ollanta Humala leads the Union for Peru party, Evo Morales is the President of Bolivia and heads the 
Movement Toward Socialism (MAS) party, and Hugo Chavez is currently the President of Venezuela and 
heads the Movement for the Fifth Republic party. 
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like our friend Clinton, and says to the people of Latin America, “I feel your pain because 
I know you get up in the morning and you don’t see the future.” 
Van der Waag: (Laughter) 
De Soto: “I know in the afternoon that I have given you a democracy.  And I have found 
out that you were going to shout to the heavens and that you were not able to shout to the 
heavens because you had no voice.  And the democratic institutions really allow you to 
elect, but not to participate.  You do not have common notice periods, you do not have an 
Office of Management and Budget, you do not have the institutions actually to have your 
voices heard, but I am here, and I listen to you.  I know you hurt here, that you are not 
well fed, and I know, that on top of that, you are better fed than you were before, that you 
are still angry, and to you just surviving is not good enough.  You want your kids to go to 
school.”  The politicians on the Left in Latin and South America said it, and they spoke to 
them, and they picked it up.  If they had had a more rightist, populist attitude, such as Al-
berto Fujimori would have had, the Right would have picked them up.  It just so happens 
that the only people who have that lingo, today, are Leftists.   
Van der Waag: Yes, it rather has that populist notion.  It’s true.   
8. What role do you think “faith-based” communities can play toward helping home 
and small business owners gain legal title to their assets in developing nations? 
 
De Soto: I do not know much about “faith based” communities.  Sorry, you want to talk 
to me about that. 
Van der Waag: One of the things I was thinking about is that you put a lot of weight into 
developing institutional structures that facilitate market economies, and that is an impor-
tant component.  I was looking at it in terms of Latin and South America where the 
church still plays a large role in shaping civil society, maybe not in the same way it once 
  266
did, but it is still an important social force in civil society.  Have you ever worked col-
laboratively with those types of groups to do the things that you do at the ILD?  
De Soto: No.  Because the things we do have to do with working with government.  In 
other words, even though we work at the grass-roots level to get our information from 
there, and to design legislation that is conformity with their anthropological manifesta-
tions, in fact, we do not do community work.  I mean, we take all of that, and we go to 
government and say, “OK, you’ve got to change your property laws this way, you’ve got 
to change your corporations this way, you got to change your constitution because you 
are not getting to them.  You got 29 organizations that are directing the records of prop-
erty.  You need one.”  We change all that.  In fact, we do not work with the people one by 
one.  No, we work with the people one by one to get an idea of what is stopping them, 
from their point of view, of getting the tools they need actually to develop economically.  
Then our client is always the head of state and government.  Therefore, I have never met 
members of faith-based communities.  What I do know, interestingly enough, the people 
who most call us in terms of wanting to know what we do, and trying to tune into what 
we do, and actually mention us in their political speeches, when they get involved in poli-
tics, are evangelists. 
Van der Waag: That is interesting. 
De Soto: So, all the time they are coming to us.  For example, there is an evangelist can-
didate now in Peru, who has surprised everybody, I think he has gotten close to 4% of the 
vote.  His name is Alberto Lay, an evangelist pastor.  Many of these kinds of candidates, 
actually, take photographs in front of a picture of me.   
Van der Waag: Oh, really. 
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De Soto: Yes, one of the reasons that Alberto Fujimori called us to start implementing, 
and we did most of his initial reforms in his first 2 to 3 years. 
Van der Waag: Right.  Yes. 
De Soto: The reforms were made.  They were all designed by us.  We were brought in 
there by the evangelists.  Now, the fact is, I am not an evangelist, I do not go to the ser-
vices.  I do not get involved in the church.  However, for some odd reason, either their 
sponsors in the United States or the pastors who come from the United States, are obvi-
ously much more market orientated.  Therefore, they have a tendency to sympathize with 
us.  I repeat, “None of us are evangelicals.”  However, when these groups have their na-
tional meetings, they have these huge meetings and they bring people from all over Peru 
and other Latin American countries to talk about our reforms, which is the only thing I 
have seen about “faith-based.”  I have not seen it in terms of the Catholic Church, inter-
estingly enough.   
Van der Waag: The only Catholic theologian that I have seen that has referenced your 
work is Michael Novak of the American Enterprise Institute in Washington, DC.   
De Soto: That’s right.  I do not see it anywhere else.  Now, were not involved.  It has not 
hit us one-way or the other.  I am not into the “faith-based” thing.  I think it is fine.  I am 
glad that they are doing it.  I think that there is a lot of very good work taking place.  
However, since you asked me, what I know about them, this is the only thing I know 
about them.  I do not follow them.  I do not follow that.  Our paths do not cross. 
Van der Waag: It is interesting why I got into in your work and its possible relationship 
to Catholic social teaching.  I got interested in it primarily because the church has had 
such a long history, especially in its official teaching, of upholding and defending a per-
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son’s right to own property.  Since there is a natural connection between your work, es-
pecially in the way you give an institutional face to a person’s right to own and use prop-
erty, and Catholic social teaching, I thought you were natural allies.   
De Soto: Well, it’s interesting.  Somebody mentioned to us, but it was many, many, years 
ago.  It was an account of some Columbian Cardinal who wanted to talk to us.  I had un-
derstood that generally speaking, the Catholic Church in Peru was not against it.  We 
never had a criticism, whether it is Gustavo Guitiérrez, or the Cardinal of Lima, we get 
along very well.  In the case of Gustavo, of course, with a lot of affection.  Some people 
have told me you would have a logical ally in the church.   
Van der Waag: Yes. 
De Soto: However, I have never received any sign of attention.  Well, I have received it 
from just about everyone else.  I have received it even from Muslim organizations.  How-
ever, I have never received it from the Catholic Church.  As a matter of fact, when you 
tell me that the church is very supportive of the property based thing, well, you know, 
when you read a lot of the encyclicals, or the few that I have seen, there is always a refer-
ence to the right to private property, but there is a reference to so many things it looks 
like a UN message.  I’m not sure which one they want to emphasize.      
Van der Waag: Yes, you are right.  One thing Catholic social teaching lacks in its broad 
outline is specificity about the right to private property.  Where does the rubber hit the 
road?  That is why I got interested in your work.  Your work provided an answer to those 
questions.  How could it actually work in a real, practical, and institutional sense?  That is 
why I thought there was a natural connection between your work and Catholic social 
teaching.  However, you’re right, when you read the documents in their whole, and you 
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look at the corpus of the body of work over the past one hundred years, there is a back 
and forth in the tradition between a person’s right to own property and its teaching about 
the universal destination of material goods.  I could see how reading these documents, as 
an outsider, would be very difficult.   
De Soto: Well, let me put it this way.  It is very interesting what you are saying.  Now, I 
remember, we have collaborated with the Catholic Church, for example, we did manage 
to empty out many of Peru’s jails when we found that 70% of Peruvian’s were in jail 
without being tried.  They were in jail for more time than if they had been found guilty.  
That was part of our property rights program.   
Van der Waag:  Interesting. 
De Soto: The property rights program was basically, you could not go out and have a real 
state point of view, you have to get all the connecting points.  One of the connecting 
points, of course, is that everybody knows somebody, a cousin, a friend, or a friend of a 
friend, who is in jail, and unjustly so.  Therefore, you have to create the kind of confi-
dence that indicates that, in terms of violating other people’s properties, you are willing 
to look at this again.  We get into marriage laws, for example, because we started finding 
out that the majority of Peruvian women that lived with their husbands were not legally 
married because there was no way of formalizing property because you did not formalize 
marriages.  To institute our property rights reforms, we restructured 187 laws outside of 
formal property law so that the property laws could actually work.  Another one was jail 
reforms.  In this case, we collaborated very narrowly with a French priest named Roberto 
Lancier.  Now, that I think of it, there are many things we have done in collaboration with 
priests and members of the church, but we have never heard from the hierarchy.  In other 
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words, we have never had a reason to knock on their door not because they were hostile 
to us and not because they were not friendly, there were just no signs.  There were just no 
signs.   
Van der Waag: Well, maybe my work could serve as bridge. 
De Soto: Of course, that is why all of sudden what you are saying has become very at-
tractive to me. 
9. One of the most important ideas in Catholic social teaching is the principle of 
subsidiarity.  This principle states that, in order to protect basic justice, govern-
ment should undertake only those initiatives that exceed the capacities of indi-
viduals or private groups acting independently.  Government should not replace or 
destroy smaller communities and individual initiative.  Rather it should help them 
contribute more effectively to social well-being and supplement their activity 
when the demands of justice exceed their capacities.  This does not mean, how-
ever, that the government that governs least governs best.  Rather it defines good 
government intervention as that which truly "helps" other social groups contribute 
to the common good by directing, urging, restraining, and regulating economic 
activity, as the occasion requires and necessity demands.  Thus, in light of this 
principle, two questions come to mind.  First, have you ever heard of this princi-
ple of Catholic Social Teaching?  Second, do you think it has any benefit in rela-
tionship to your ideas about solidifying property rights among extralegals in 
LDCs? 
 
De Soto: Of course, I have heard about subsidiarity.  I have even read about it.  Of 
course, it makes sense because wherever we go, remember I told you that we were find-
ing that there were property titles and acts of incorporation in the informal sector that 
were organized by local authorities or informal governments, in other words, informal 
governments are issuing paper, in all developing countries… 
Van der Waag:  Right.  Yes.  They are doing it locally.   
De Soto: They are doing it locally.  What we do is plug into them.  In other words, we do 
not substitute what they do.  We say they are already doing it.  What they are missing are 
standard terms.  If you do not have standard terms, if everybody has a different type of 
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property title and starts in a different way, then it is not going to work.  Therefore, we 
actually go and standardize what is a fragmented market economy in every developing 
country.  Absolutely.  All those pieces of paper, all that anthropological side that you 
talked about, is working because they have institutions that work.  The problem is, re-
member when Jesus Christ threw the merchants out of the Temple, he threw them out be-
cause they converted to a market, right? 
Van der Waag:  (Laughter) 
De Soto: Christ pretty much knew what a market economy was all about.  However, it 
was a very small, little, market.  Markets only work when they have depth to them.  Mar-
kets only work when they have scale to them.  Markets only work where the division of 
labor is possible to a degree that is significant.  Therefore, what we have to take are all 
these fragmented little markets in developing countries and we try to weave them into 
one system such as you have in the United States.  That is the history of the European 
Union as well.  Absolutely, that is what we do.  Therefore, we base our institutions, we 
base whatever we create, on what works.  Moreover, we empower them.  Therefore, 
when people say to us, “But wait a second, the people that you are talking to are the peo-
ple that did these invasions of land and the squatting,” then we go back to US history.  
We start saying to them, “You know, the guy who kept the peace, they pinned a silver 
star on him.”  The person who started the squatting invasion, you are not going to get him 
out of the way because he has authority.  He actually gave these people their first squat-
ting rights over things.  Therefore, what you have to do is make him a real-estate dealer.  
In fact, in all of our titling programs, the majority of people that are on the ground actu-
ally helping put these things together are the original squatting chiefs and the heads of the 
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communities.  We very much believe in that.  We build on them because they know their 
people best.  It is much easier to take them, to bureaucratize them, and to allow them to 
work with government officers because they know their people.  Or, give them a space in 
the private sector as real-estate dealers or as facilitators, and we build on them.  Abso-
lutely, I completely agree with that.  It is the only way it is going to work.   
Van der Waag:  Here is another instance where I think there is real connection between 
your work and an embedded principle in Catholic social teaching.  Your work gives intel-
lectual coherency to a principle like subsidiarity.  Here is a real practical orientation of 
what it looks like in practice.  Because, again, when you read the official teaching, it’s 
there, it’s talked about, but it’s never really given any flesh.  I think a program like yours 
really embodies that principle.   
De Soto: Very much so.  I would be very interested if you were able to create that bridge. 
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